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                                          Pojetí YHVH v Myšlení Martina Bubera 
SUMMARY: This thesis concerns Buber´s concept of YHVH. According to Buber, immediate, 
dialogical relation with YHVH is best exemplified by the prophets in contrast to the offical cult. Buber 
is an original and text-orientated Biblical interpreter. The author of this thesis is of the impression that 
Buber is perhaps too selective in his use of source material in his argumentation. This selectivity can 
lead to the formation of a somewhat subjective picture of historic Judaism, Christianity and Hasidism. 
Buber’s I-Thou and dialogical philosophy can be seen as a reaction to the scientific world-view at the 
beginning of the 20th century. Connected with this is his intended anti-systematic approach, echoed in 
the anti-institutionalism and anti-legalism of his Biblical theology. Buber also applied it to fields such 
as education and psychotherapy. Nevertheless, although Buber presents himself as an anti-systematic 
thinker, the author finds that knowledge of Buber’s major works and intellectual problems current in 
Buber’s time reveal broad concepts that repeat themselves in various lines of his thought. These form 
an implicit system of thought no less demanding than those of his intellectual peers. 
Key words: YHVH, Prophetic Faith, Anti-Institutional, Anti-Legalism, Judaism, Christianity, 
Theodicy, I-Thou / I-It Primaries, Existentialism, Dialogue, Immediate Relation, Education, 
Psychotherapy 
 
ANOTACE: Tato práce pojednává o Buberově pojetí YHVH. Podle Bubera je bezprostřední 
dialogický vztah s YHVHem nejlépe ilustrován proroky v protikladu s oficiálním kultem a knězi, kteří 
by dali přednost pohodlnému a neměnnému Bohu. Buber je originální a na text zaměřený biblický 
vykladač. Autor se domnívá, že Buber je někdy příliš selektivní ve způsobu, jak používá prameny v 
dokládání svých názorů, což může vést k utvoření poněkud subjektiního obrazu dějinného judaismu, 
křesťanství a chasidismu. Buberovo Já-Ty a dialogická filozofie mohou být chápány jako reakce vůči 
vědeckému světonázoru na začátku 20tého stol. S tím je spojen jeho záměrný proti-systematický 
postup, který se ozývá v proti-institučním, proti-legalististickém postupu v jeho biblické teologii, a 
posléze je aplikován v oborech jako je vzdělávání a psychoterapie. Nicméně ačkoli Buber se 
prezentuje jako anti-systematický, autor má názor, že znalost hlavních spisů Bubera a intelektuálních 
problémů Buberova období umožňují identifikovat obecné pojmy, které se opakují v různých 
podobách Buberova myšlení. Ty vytvářejí implicitní systém myšlení neméně náročný než je tomu u 
Buberových současníků. 
Klíčová slova: YHVH, Prorocká Víra, Proti-instituční, Proti-Legalistický, Judaismus, Křesťanství, 
Teodicea, Já-Ty / Já-Ono Základní Slovo, Existencialismus, Dialog, Bezprostřední Vztah, Vzdělávání, 
Psychoterapie    
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Introduction: 
The Czech public is familiar with the work of Martin Buber primarily through his small but 
significant book I and Thou, a deservedly esteemed and important work which presents what 
can be described as the core of Buber’s I-Thou and dialogical philosophy. Notwithstanding 
that book’s weighty contribution to Western thought it has largely overshadowed Buber’s 
other major works which contain elaborations on the main themes of that book as well as 
cover themes and topics which I and Thou does not cover. This applies not only to his 
philosophical and anthropological works mostly in the form of essays and lectures collected 
in thematic units titled according to their subject matter but also to his works on Biblical 
theology and exegesis which are highly esteemed by numerous Christian and Jewish Biblical 
scholars. Also of note are Buber’s works on Hasidism which occupy a major part of his 
written opus. In writing this thesis the author has chosen to limit himself primarily to Buber’s 
major theological and philosophical writings and has referred to his works on Hasidism only 
in a very limited context within the framework of a critical assessment of his Biblical 
theology and exegesis. A work of any depth addressing Buber’s interpretation of Hasidism 
would occupy a thesis at least the size of the one presented here as well as address problems 
not directly related to those adressed here. 
The scope of this thesis is an elaboration on Buber’s parallel concepts of YHVH in his 
Biblical theology; following this we elaborate on his I-Thou, dialogical and relational 
philosophy. The author of this thesis has attempted to show the implicit dialogue and polemic 
between Greek and Hebrew thought that is a major feature of Buber’s writing. We hope to 
show in what ways Buber has retained Hebrew thought and where this has been coloured by 
Greek philosophy. The author feels, based on his reading of several of Buber’s major works 
as well as some of those less known to the general reader, that the Greek mode of thinking 
predominates his writings and that his thought bears less resemblance to historical Hebrew 
thought than is obvious at first glance. In this context, among the questions the author has 
addressed in the first part of this thesis are those that might attract the attention of the 
theologian and critical reader: The tenability of Buber’s concepts of direct relation and the 
dialogue with YHVH or Thou without the (as Buber sees it) impediments and dilutions of 
institutional religion within the framework of historical Judaism. Another important question 
is the hermeneutic and philological sustainability of Buber’s exegesis and translation of the 
Hebrew Bible as well as to what extent his concepts of Judaism, prophecy and Biblical 
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hermeneutics are dependent on his philosophical thought. Closely connected to such issues 
are Buber’s critical statements about Christianity: Buber uses a similar exegetic method to 
support his arguments against Christianity to the one used to interpret Hebrew Scripture in his 
works on the Hebrew Bible. The author has attempted to show that despite of the profundity 
and originality of Buber’s Biblical thought, the same weaknesses that are present in his works 
on the Hebrew Bible (and the source of criticism by both Christian and Jewish thinkers) 
pervade his polemics with Christianity, resulting ultimately in the untenability of his 
criticisms against Christianity – that it is a pessimistic religion more rooted in Greek than 
Hebrew thought.   
In the second part of this thesis, the author examines the implicit notion of YHVH, as He is 
understood by Buber in his philosophical works. Here we examine the evolution of Buber’s 
thought and its place within 20th century Western thought. In this context it seems that Buber 
tries to level the criticisms of the Hebrew mind against Greek thought: He postulates a 
personal Absolute in Thou with whom one can only have a personal, direct and unmediated 
relation. This is echoed in Buber’s apparent lack of system. The author hopes to show that 
Buber holds a firm place within the context of the polemics between anti-rationalist 
phenomenology and existentialism on the one side, and logical positivism and analytical 
philosophy on the other. Buber’s I-Thou, dialogical and relational philosophies are elaborated 
on in some depth and an attempt has been made to show what sets Buber apart from his 
contemporaries. Within this context of what can be seen as a profound protest against the 
scientific world-view, Buber’s contribution to the fields of psychotherapy and education 
(which Buber believes can only be truly successful when permeated by the presence of Thou) 
have also been given space as apt illustrations of the practical dimensions of Buber’s concept 
of YHVH. Ultimately, the author hopes to show that Buber’s main contribution is as a thinker 
for the intellectual public, but that his writings on spirituality, education and psychotherapy 
seem somewhat detached from historical and empiric reality. They are deeply rooted in 
Buber’s individualism and in themselves make thought-provoking, profound, and complex 
statements about the subjects they address by an undoubtably great thinker. This fact 
notwithstanding, they need to be read carefully and their arguments addressed critically.                     
The method we have chosen proceeds from a descriptive-analytical to critical examination of 
Buber’s thought. In proceeding in this manner the author hopes to produce a balanced and fair 
view of the topics chosen within the space constraints of this thesis. The main source of 
10 
 
information are Buber’s major works on the Bible and his major philosophical works, 
especially those dealing with topics broached in I and Thou. The second major source of 
information for this thesis has been provided by critical and descriptive essays by the 
scholarly public of Buber’s time, as well as the voices of certain major contemporary Judaic 
scholars. We hope to substantiate the argument that Buber’s dialogical hermeneutics are too 
deeply rooted in philosophical thought to be practicable in the areas he addresses – religion, 
psychotherapy and education – and are therefore of most value to Biblical scholars and 
professional philosophers who are able to truly and edequately appreciate the depth of his 
thought and profit from it. 
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Part I: The Concept of YHVH in Martin Buber’s Biblical Theology 
1.1.YHVH’s Relation to Man in the Bible 
1.1.1. YHVH’s Nature – His Dialogic and Personal Immediacy: Similarly to Buber’s 
philosophical works, the concept presented in Buber’s Biblical theology of YHVH is 
that of a deity who has a dialogical and immediate relation with man, while remaining 
invisible and independent. In this sense, YHVH calls man to worship Him and this call 
requires the faithful devotion of the complete man. No other deity besides Him can nor 
will be tolerated. The attempt to have a god who is at one’s disposal leads to 
estrangement and sin. 
Buber deals with the Hebrew Bible as a single book which contains, as James Muilenberg 
puts it, the account of Israel’s dialogue with YHVH, concentrating his analysis on the three 
main themes controlling this dialogue: those of creation, revelation and redemption.1 Buber’s 
careful exegesis of key passages shows how YHVH identifies Himself to Israel not only as 
the God who leads them, but also as the God who leads the course of the stars; thus those who 
love Him are led by his might, and those who hate Him are destroyed.2 YHVH wants the 
complete man; and because He is God nothing man-made can be served nor worshipped as 
His manifestation or representation. Buber translates YHVH as I shall be there as I shall be 
there or He Who will be present,3 implying, as Buber sees it, constant presence: YHVH shows 
Israel the desire to lead them from the beginnings in the genealogical narratives, where He 
makes the call upon His chosen, addressing them. According to Maurice Friedman, Buber’s 
interpretation of the name reveals YHVH as Thou to the receiver of the revelation, in Moses’ 
                                                
1 MUILENBURG, James, Buber as Interpreter of the Bible in SCHILPP, P. A. and FRIEDMAN, Maurice, eds. 
The Philosophy of Martin Buber, La Salle. Open Court. 1967 (Hereafter to be referred to as “Schilpp and 
Friedman” and “Muilenburg” respectively) pp. 381–83. Muilenburg draws attention to Buber’s existential and 
sociological concerns in his (Buber’s) Biblical theological works, which he believes are partly influenced by 
Max Weber. Muilenberg quite accurately shows that such issues are of greater importance in Buber’s Biblical 
interpretation than historical issues and that Buber stresses the call on the faithful to live in dialogical relation as 
the example of Israel clearly illustrates, “The Word of God is never, therefore, a generalisation or abstraction, 
but always a living, concrete, historical here and now in which Yahweh and His people engage. The Word of 
God is the symbol kat‘ exochen for the dialogical encounter.” (p. 381) 
 
2 BUBER, Martin. The Prophetic Faith. New York. The Macmillan Company. 1949. Transl. by WITTON-
DAVIES, Carlyle (Hereafter to be referred to as “Prophetic Faith”), pp. 11–25. YHVH identifies Himself as the 
God who leads the people of Israel and wants to be loved by them.  At various pivotal points of Israel’s history, 
the people are called on to eradicate other gods (statues, idols they have collected in their wanderings) from their 
midst because these have had the effect in diluting and weakening immediate relation with the only God.  
3 Ibid., p. 28. 
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case the same God as the One whom the forefathers worshipped. The revelation is more of a 
personal nature, revealing the personality of God to a human being rather than merely 
disclosing information about His essence. Thus the revelation is of a dialogical nature.4 
The decision to follow the call is a leap of faith, so to speak, in which the chosen gives up the 
security of home and settlement.5 The chosen nation becomes somewhat like the heralds 
going out before their king who leads them with his authority. Buber contrasts this immediate 
relation to the Eternal One with the pantheons of religions such as those of the Babylonians 
and the Egyptians, in which the other gods are mere manifestations of the supreme god.6  
Buber’s philosophy of dialogue plays an important role in his Biblical theology, although it is 
not merely read into it forcefully.7 Genuine relation with God is immediate and undiluted: 
YHVH is God who is allied to the world and the people He created. Although He remains 
invisible, He is continuously within His creation though He sometimes appears in divine 
manifestations such as the messenger who, despite his bodily appearance, has neither a name 
nor an individual personality that would enable him to be worshipped as a pantheon demigod. 
Buber goes to considerable lengths to stress the independent nature of God. Although He 
permits Himself to be seen in fire, smoke, He never assumes a definite form; He always 
remains essentially invisible; and despite His revelation in the afore-mentioned 
manifestations, He will not allow man to create an image that could be considered as 
representative of YHVH’s presence. Never taking on a definite form, YHVH always retains 
His distance and independence. Buber has a unique and original way of emphasizing the 
                                                
4 FRIEDMAN, Maurice. Martin Buber – A Life of Dialogue. 1955. Chicago. University of Chicago Press 
(Hereafter to be referred to as “Friedman, Martin Buber”), pp. 246–47.  
 
5 Prophetic Faith, p. 35–37. The calling as well as leading belong to the nature of this God, who calls an 
individual who is the start of a small tribe which then develops into a community and then a great people. In 
doing so, the God of man becomes the deity of history.  
 
6 Ibid., p. 40. 
7 Cf. Friedman, Martin Buber, pp. 239–46. According to Friedman, God, in Buber’s theology, creates every man 
as a unique personality carrying a very specific function within God’s creation. In man’s relation as I to the 
human Thou there is already potential for relation to the Eternal Thou. Man completes God’s creation and God 
wants to be present in creation through man whom God also created as a free being and given responsibilities as 
the creation’s steward. Friedman writes that the centre of the Israelite faith is the freedom to enter into dialogue 
with God in a partnership which can only be entered with the whole being, the realization of faith being only 
with the whole self. 
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singular quality of YHVH: This God is different from all other gods in that He lets Himself be 
seen only when He wills and manifests Himself in the leading of His tribes and people.8 
 The Eternal One retains contact with a people estranged in the land of slavery, where 
religious laxity has resulted, according to Buber, in a forgetting of the meaning of the Name. 
It is as if the Israelites have forgotten their being in the land of Egypt, having forgotten the 
qualities of their God. They have also perhaps, from Buber’s point of view, confused His 
name with that of the Egyptian deities controllable by the correct use of their names in magic 
rituals.9 The situation changes once God reveals Himself to his people, which Buber views as 
God entering history, as does Israel to whom He has chosen to reveal Himself. Israel is a 
partner in this dialogue, listening to the command of the zealous God who chooses to remain 
invisible and brooks no rival. In this sense Israel has become I, responding in faith to Thou. 
The immediacy of this relationship can be summed up by what Buber, in his book The Two 
Types of Faith, frequently refers to as emunah – trusting faith in that which remains unseen. 
Such faith involves allowing God to care for His people by leading them; and an “invisible 
deity becomes perceptible as the One who comes and goes”.10 The turning towards God is 
accomplished by prayer – something that Jesus also taught his disciples. In what is essentially 
                                                
8  BUBER, Martin. Moses. Oxford. East and West Library. 1946. Transl. by LASK, I. M. (Hereafter to be 
referred to as “Moses”), pp. 39–49. Buber, perhaps curiously, draws attention to such facts as the fire that burns 
but consumes neither the bush nor itself, which he considers proof that the text does not have a mythological 
character. Buber, however, also makes us aware of such details as YHVH addressing Moses by his name and 
telling him who He is. YHVH is thus a personal God. Buber takes pains to emphasise this personal element in 
God’s relation with man, and the uniqueness of His revelation to him within the realm of Near-east religions. 
This God, moreover does not merely rest content to call these men from their world, but desires to lead them, 
invisibly; yet He is also understanding of human weakness such as fear and resistance to calling. These are 
countered by the assurance that as the Almighty He will lead His people. See also Moses, pp. 126–30, Moses is 
depicted as a fighter against the natural tendency to trivialize the relation to God by creating a visible image and 
here institutional ritualism is contrasted with direct relation. For a more detailed elaboration on Buber’s polemics 
with institutional legalism and ritualism see below, section 1. 2. 
 
9
 Ibid., pp. 51–53. The true name carries great importance in the Orient, where it was believed that it could be 
used as a medium of controlling the other. According to Buber, YHVH’s name implies constant presence and is 
not to be understood as abstract, but rather as personal being. The very nature of YHVH’s name retains a 
distance even though this distance is paradoxically dispelled by the ‘I will be present’ aspect of the Name. This 
signifies the unchangeable character of His nature as well as an unwillingness to be restricted to one place or 
manifestation. Buber also believes that one can lose the right to address God by His name, as the Israelites in the 
time of Hosea did. But see also Muilenburg, p. 393 for an opposing view: Muilenburg writes that Buber’s 
explication of the name is unpersuasive, drawing attention to the improbability of Israel failing to remember the 
name. According to Muilenburg, “to be present” is not the usual interpretation of the verb hyh, but according to 
modern lexicons, “is to come to pass”, “to happen”, giving a translation of the Name as “I cause to come to pass 
what I cause to come to pass”. Thus YHVH is a God of event or promise, assuring His people that He will bring 
about that which He has promised. 
 
10 Prophetic Faith, p. 49.  
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an imageless religion, prayer is a movement of the soul towards the invisible God and is thus 
a movement of the entire being. Buber points out the similarities of the Lord’s Prayer to the 
Jewish prayer of Eighteen Petitions. Immediacy is, moreover, strengthened by the personal 
petitions of the Lord’s Prayer in which the Lord is addressed as Our Father. It cannot take 
place in a space-time world but only in immediacy.11 Careful reading of Buber’s writings 
gives an impression of a deeply personal God who speaks to man in an idiom comprehensible 
to him through mediators in the shape of the prophets, whose words carry deep meanings and 
make an impact in the inner man or the heart. Another example of the care for man and 
creation is to be seen in the institution of the Sabbath, when the community takes part in a 
single ritual as though they were one man. On that day, the community can experience 
essential being by experiencing community with its Creator and God. Humanity is essentially 
alive on the Sabbath.12 
Sin results in estrangement from YHVH, and in Buber’s book The Prophetic Faith, one 
senses the growing estrangement of Israel from their God: We see a metamorphosis in the 
community from being a small nomadic people who were led by their God based on their 
following His call. They went from a relationship that was very close, if not quite immediate, 
to a increasingly pragmatic and distant relationship to YHVH.13  
Buber’s concept of the dialogic relation YHVH has with man is evidently rooted in his book I 
and Thou. The world of objects is described as a clear and predictable world of clear-cut 
boundaries which is the exact contrary of the realm of I-Thou which Buber describes as a 
relation spoken with the whole being. Such relation is one that has no definite boundaries; and 
as the primary word of the primary relation is spoken with the whole being, the being 
                                                
11 BUBER, Martin. The Two Types of Faith. London. Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1951. Transl. by SMITH, 
Ronald Gregor (Hereafter to be referred to as “Two Types of Faith”),  pp. 157–59. 
 
12  Moses, pp. 81–87. 
 
13 Prophetic Faith, pp. 13–43, 63–70. Buber analyzes the institution of the royal office, describing it as the result 
of a historical situation where the people react to the failure of the sanctuary and the ruach to provide them with 
stability and protection, as well as the unstable interim periods following the deaths of the judges; and they call 
for a king with charismatic gifts to lead them. Samuel and his retinue view this as an attempt to dethrone God, 
who has led Israel until then. Buber says it is not YHVH’s failure in government but the people’s failure to be 
His and live up to His standards. The prophetic phenomenon is shown to be the result of the theo-political reality 
rather than historical necessity. Although the period of conquest ends with David being allowed victory over his 
enemies (1 Sam 5–6) there is, according to Buber (p. 69), no justice in his kingdom; the degeneration deepens 
during Solomon’s reign with his arrogant self-assurance of the Lord’s presence nearby in the temple he has 
erected as an “everlasting abode” for YHVH (1 Ki 8.12 ff). He is far from the kind of faith epitomized by Moses 
and Samuel. 
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becomes part of the reality of the word that is spoken.14 One could say that this kind of 
relation is more demanding on the faithful because one must have faith in what can neither be 
seen nor kept a hold of or defined.  
This is difficult for the person who desires to have control of what can be defined and 
counted; and a reachable God who can be domesticated in a temple can be controlled. Buber 
extends this to such phenomena as the Israelites asking for a king who would rule over them 
like the the kings of the other nations, interpreting that as evidence of the growing distance 
between YHVH and His people.15  
In his Biblical theological writings Buber frequently contrasts the man who silently follows 
God with his heart with the self-satisfied confessor who presumptuously assumes that he has 
God nearby as though He were a human neighbour. It even seems as though this abstractly 
contrasts the ancient sage who is willing to accept and follow God in sheer faith without proof 
as opposed to the modern man of wisdom who is more reluctant to do so given the modern 
attacks on faith. At the heart of Christian and Jewish faith is the standpoint of its belief that 
God revealed Himself to man and entered into relation with him, remaining near and present 
even in times of darkness and pain where God is enigmatically hidden, or, as Buber puts it in 
numerous places of his book Eclipse of God, when God remains eclipsed.16  
In modern times the claim of faith has come under increasing attack from the side of scientific 
and historical thinking which are presented as the only reliable standpoints. We can agree 
with Emil Fackenheim that one of the most pressing issues for the believer is to counter-
attack the modern assault on faith by making its relevance contemporary without 
compromising it or emptying it of content. In an important essay, Buber’s Concept of 
Revelation the religious existentialism of Buber is presented as among the most profound 
currents of thought in defending revelation.17  
                                                
14  BUBER, Martin I and Thou.  Edinburgh. T and T Clark. Reprint 1944. Transl. By SMITH, Ronald Gregor 
(Hereafter to be referred to as “I and Thou“), pp. 3–5. For a more detailed analysis of the twofold relation, the 
life of dialogue and direct relation, see below, Part II. 
 
15 Prophetic Faith, p. 66. 
16 For a more detailed elaboration on the question of theodicy in Buber’s Biblical theology, see below 1.6. 
 
17 FACKENHEIM, Emil L., Buber’s Concept of Revelation in Schilpp and Friedman (Hereafter to be referred to 
as Fackenheim, Buber’s Concept), pp. 272–77. Fackenheim discusses the emergence of modern sceptical 
thought and the various attempts to defend revelation against rationalism. Buber’s religious existentialism is 
16 
 
Buber finds the soul of the Decalogue in the word Thou, in which orders are given or 
addressed to the listener as a single, unique individual. Only the listener who hears them as an 
address to himself will be able to fully grasp their meaning; and it is evident that Buber means 
that only the person who enters into the I-Thou relation with the entirety of his being can be 
said to have entered into a genuine relation with YHVH. The Decalogue is also addressed to 
the people as a community, and constitutes it by means of common regulation. By this we can 
see that the believing community as a whole obeying their God also forms I as a body, 
responding in faith and dialogue as much through its ethical conduct as through ritualised 
forms of worship.18 
1.1.2. The Dialogue through the Prophets: YHVH calls men from among those whom He 
has chosen to be the bearers of His word and decree. He speaks to these individuals 
closely, but His closest communication is with Moses, to whom he speaks directly. 
Although YHVH’s relationship with man is immediate, He often communicates His will 
through the mouths of the prophets whom He has elected from among the people to be the 
bearers of His word. Buber is under no illusion about man’s weakness of heart and 
unwillingness to be the bearers of such difficult tasks, illustrating how YHVH takes full 
possession of those He elects.19 The essential intimacy of this relation is accurately captured 
in Buber’s exegesis by the Hebrew verb “to know”, where one comes into contact with an 
                                                                                                                                                      
shown to be rooted in the thought of Schelling and Kierkegaard, who argued that reality ceases to be an object 
when we cease to view it with detachment. According to Fackenheim, it was Kant who discovered that reality 
viewed increasingly as a series of laws of cause and effect could only disclose a phenomenal world, but his 
discovery was first made full use of in the defence of revelation by Kierkegaard and Schelling,  who believed 
that full personal engagement in reality (as opposed to the attempt to possess it by knowing it fully),  gives “a 
knowing access to the transphenomenal, an access which consists not in the discovery of laws and causes but in 
a direct encounter. And the most important fact that can be encountered is divine revelation.” (p. 277)  
Fackenheim argues that Buber’s understanding of the Hebrew Bible is that it is the account of the dialogue 
between God and man, and is thus a Biblical rather than modern understanding of it (the Hebrew Bible). 
Fackenheim later (pp. 279–81) goes on to show how Buber’s doctrine of the I-Thou relation can be a basis for a 
modern doctrine of revelation, that all genuine religion is I-Thou relation with God against the modern theories 
of religion as a mere subjective feeling.   
18 Ibid., p. 131. 
 
19 Moses, pp. 57–59. YHVH is depicted as the One who stands behind His chosen, even though Moses describes 
himself as being of uncircumcised lips. He is sent as the intermediary between heaven and earth to a people who 
do not accept him. His task is one which despite the nobility of the station as “…leader of his tribe, teacher, 
prophet, lawgiver; yet in the sphere of the word he remains insurmountably lonely; alone in the last resort with 
the word of heaven which forces itself through inflexible soul into inflexible throat“. God uses the fragile vessel 
of Moses’ “stammering mouth” and “inflexible throat” to speak His word, choosing to limit Himself thus to an 
imperfect medium to be the mediator of His voice and realm on earth. 
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object by knowing it, expressed most appropriately by the image of God lifting out men to 
bear His message by knowing them, and preparing the ways for their lives as it is known to 
God.20 Muilenburg draws attention to the central focus of Buber’s elaboration of the prophets 
of Israel, particularly his interpretation of the activity of Elijah, Amos, Hosea, and Isaiah: 
Once again, historical and political issues that were current in ancient Palestine occupy 
Buber’s exegesis far less than the fateful issues around the prophets’ ministries and the 
momentousness of the struggle between YHVH and the Baals.21  
The nabi, or prophetic bearer in word and deed of God’s unfolding will is a crucial theme in 
the Hebrew Bible and a central area of interest in Buber’s Biblical theology. In the chapter 
The Great Tensions in the book The Prophetic Faith, Buber carefully maps the emergence of 
the prophet’s vocation from its beginnings as a group of orthodox men of faith that began to 
develop alongside the sanctuary priesthood, particularly after the capture of the Ark at 
Ebenezer, the event which made the failure of the sanctuary priests plainly visible (1 Sam 
4ff.).22 The nebiim, according to Buber, in the truest sense of the word have their powers 
based on direct dialogue with Divinity.23 Buber’s depiction of the nabi, shown as the one who 
                                                
20 BUBER, Martin, Right and Wrong, An Interpretation on Some Psalms. London SCM Press Ltd. 1952. Transl. 
by SMITH, Ronald Gregor (Hereafter to referred to as “Right and Wrong”), pp. 58–60. Buber’s exegesis of this 
verb is unusually profound here. The righteous, who delight in the way of the Torah, have every stage of their 
lives in constant direct contact with God who is with them and near them even in the face of failures and 
disappointments. It enables them to overcome poor affects and withstand the erosion by time and change. 
  
21 Muilenburg, p. 391. Muilenburg aptly observes that the depth and profundity of Buber’s interpretational 
account of the “inner mysteries of nature worship and of the sexual drives associated with them” is particularly 
useful in understanding the urgency of the struggle for Israel’s faithfulness to YHVH. The root of Buber’s depth 
of expression in this regard lies in his complex existentialism, especially his concept of the primary twofold 
relation I-Thou and I-It. 
  
22 Prophetic Faith, pp. 60–63. Buber believes that this and other incidents close to it signal a turning point in 
Israel’s faith, but that these tumultuous events were perhaps as a positive development nonetheless, given the 
mechanical sterility of the oracle. Buber believes that it was YHVH’s intention of allowing the Ark to be 
captured to overcome that sterility, even going so far as to announce beforehand that the Ark would be captured 
and desecrated. The independence of YHVH is doubly emphasized in His not only allowing this to come to pass, 
but also by His refusal to be forced into granting a victory over the Philistines. (Author’s Note: Scriptural 
references in this thesis are from the Revised Standard Version of the Holy Bible). 
 
23 Moses, pp. 165–69. Moses is described as being the nabi based on his close relationship with divinity; the 
elders who receive some of his spirit (Exo 24.1, 9) are nebiim in the derived sense, based on the decision of the 
Spirit to rest upon them, in somewhat similar fashion to the judges. Moses has, according to Buber, a mission, as 
opposed to being inducted into office, making his liaison with YHVH of a far more personal and immediate 
nature. Moses’ vocation is a personal strain, primarily because of the responsibility involved, and he wishes that 
everyone could be a nabi. His gift is unattainable and unique. Paradoxically, as Buber shows, Moses remains 
human, but receives God’s word face-to-face, as opposed to other prophets who receive their message in visions 
and dreams. 
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stands in God’s name against rulers – frequently issuing words of rebuke – remains true to the 
text. Admonishment and warning are directed at wayward rulers and the mighty that oppress 
the weak.24 The prophet is thus esteemed in Buber’s works as the one who is the true priest as 
opposed to the “official” priests who are increasingly susceptible to corruption, having grown 
comfortable with the material benefits of that station. Samuel the nabi replaces the soulless 
sanctuary priests. Because the priests failed in their mission, they are utterly rejected by 
YHVH (1 Sam 2.13–36).25 The true priest is in stark contrast with the sorcerer or sanctuary 
(or later temple) priests who receive their supposed powers from themselves, thus from 
below. Samuel is thus the lone prophet with his retinue of fellow-prophets, who attempt to 
replace the corrupted priesthood with the station of the nabi and redeem the ever-increasing 
distance between YHVH and His people but fail to do so given that the people’s desire for a 
king – or earthly needs – is stronger than the interest in religious reforms. Samuel and his men 
grudgingly have to accommodate the wishes of the people.26   
Frequently, the prophets are mediators as they speak the divine word from their mortal lips, 
interpreting it comprehensively. The nabi’s powers are not transferable, taken away when the 
men die to rest after that on those whom YHVH chooses. Out of all the types of leaders in the 
Old Testament Buber singles out the prophet as the most significant who, as Nahum Glatzer 
points out, far surpasses the apocalyptic writers in Buber’s esteem. The prophet’s word gives 
the listener the choice to turn and cease the estrangement between himself and God caused by 
sin. The apocalypticist, on the other hand, seems to have neither hope nor faith in the 
possibility of God’s merciful intervention.27 
YHVH also speaks to the nations through the prophets. Buber analyzes the way YHVH 
admonishes the people in their contemporary situation. YHVH leads His dialogue with the 
                                                
24 Ibid., pp. 63–68. Buber’s rationale of their warnings is sober: The disasters the prophets warn of are not 
necessarily supernatural in character but can be often seen as the logical consequences of social injustice. Thus 
neither Moses nor any other prophet is a magician or soothsayer. But interestingly, Buber attributes Moses’ 
success with the Pharaoh to be given by the fact that Moses is even more than a prophet. Events such as the 
plagues are looked upon as natural disasters of unusually intense proportions; and Buber draws attention to the 
fact that Moses, although raised in the midst of the Egyptians and their magic, merely foretells of disasters which 
come to pass rather than putting them into effect. 
  
25 Prophetic Faith, pp. 62–63. “The true nabi – this is the intention of the early narrator – is the true priest”. 
26 Ibid., p. 64. 
27 GLATZER, Nahum N., Buber as Interpreter of the Bible, in Schilpp and Friedman, pp. 371–73 (Hereafter to 
be referred to as “Glatzer”). 
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nations, sometimes – as in the case of Amos – addressing them as though they were 
individual people. Although critical of the nations, Israel is subjected to the most severe 
criticism from the prophets’ lips because she was the subject of YHVH’s special care: 
Because YHVH had made His will known to Israel, her falling short of His expectations is 
even more of a tragedy, shown in the most personal way in the poem of the adulterous wife in 
Hosea (Hos 2.2–23).28 Buber goes to considerable lengths to show the poignancy of the 
prophet’s plight: The burden of trusting the divine decree and entreatying the people to turn 
despite their stubbornness lies on the prophet, who also has the knowledge that God that may 
turn away from the punishment He had planned and repent (Jon 3.9). Buber uses Amos as an 
example of the Deuteronomistic accent of much pre-apocalyptic prophecy where the people 
of Israel are given the paths of good and evil to choose from, and are exhorted repeatedly to 
repent and turn from sin.29 And yet the fate of the nabi, as is well known from the Biblical 
accounts, is one of ridicule and scorn at the hands of peers. Buber views the personal 
suffering of the nabi at the hands of the multitude as metaphorically representative of 
YHVH’s own suffering in His disturbed relations with His Chosen. The prophet embodies 
this secret in the forms of the signs and parables he enacts with his body as in the cases of 
Jeremiah and Ezechiel. 
In The God of the Sufferers, a chapter of unusual depth and complexity in The Prophetic 
Faith, Buber draws the reader into the increasing urgency and subsequent radicalism of the 
prophets’ message as the crisis of estrangement grew deeper. Their protest contains three 
main elements. First, there is criticism of the social order which starts simply but grows 
increasingly severe. Then there is a crystallization of the divine demand with its underlying 
issue of religious ethos – what is demanded is a walking in God’s way in addition to kindness. 
Finally, a warning of punishment is given should the addressees fail to heed the prophets’ 
message.30 The prophet as a mediator between heaven and earth is bound to both by the 
                                                
28
 Ibid., pp. 96–104. Although God has raised the prophets from among the people, making their language 
intelligible to their contemporaries, the people refuse to listen, deepening the estrangement between them and 
God, turning their failure into their judgement. 
 
29 Prophetic Faith, pp. 107–10. True prophecy is rooted in a divine revelation; and insofar as it is not a human 
calling, its demands on the man are absolute in nature. Failure to heed their words brings divine punishment. 
Buber defines such punishment in realistic terms of wars, bloodshed and catastrophe – a direct result of the broad 
destabilisation caused by social injustice and upheaval. The problem of the innocent caught in bloodshed and 
upheaval, however, remains unsolved here. The author is of the impression that Buber’s most interesting work 
addressing theodicy is Right and Wrong.   
30
 Prophetic Faith, pp. 156. 
20 
 
prophetic word, not the cult. In Buber’s view, the priests administer the word, but the 
unofficial prophet is the bearer of the true Word of God in his mouth and utterance. This is 
YHVH’s intervention breaking into the world through the tangled web of human sin. The 
prophet, standing apart from the temple priests, becomes a metaphor illustrative of the 
relationship with YHVH who will have neither Himself nor His Word at anyone’s disposal.31 
A parallel is also drawn between the struggle of the prophet and the wandering in the desert, 
bringing to mind another vivid metaphor of the true Israel.32 
There is an interesting modern parallel to these ancient men of faith in Buber’s book The 
Tales of Rabbi Nachman, one of his early works on Hasidism, where the Hasidim are placed 
at odds with the masters of the Talmud, whose authority was formerly accepted without 
question. These react to the Hasidim by intimidation and disciplinary measures. Yet the later 
Hasidim are not spared criticism by Buber, who sees the institution of “mediators” called the 
Zaddikim as the real cause of the decline of Hasidism: The spiritual demands of purity made 
on the men of faith being too high, few could meet the required standards of self-searching 
and sacrifice. Thus, paradoxically, the new institution of mediators hailed as the new spiritual 
elite gave rise to a group who overran the original teaching of the Hasidim, their spiritual 
power trusted at the expense of the self-sacrifice and purity that lay, according to Buber, at the 
heart of the teaching. The fact that these men were supported financially and materially also 
attracted all sorts – even from among the rabble – to the calling of the Zaddik.33 Buber 
discusses briefly, but eloquently, the fate of a handful of individuals such as Rabbi Nachman 
of Bretzlaw, who wished to retain the purity of the teaching of Baal Shem Tov which they felt 
was becoming corrupted by the new opportunists. In the description of their tragic fates in the 
opening section of The Tales of Rabbi Nachman, Buber alludes to the prophets of Israel, 
                                                
31 Ibid., pp. 164–65. 
32 Ibid., pp. 76–77. Of special interest in this instance is Buber’s exegesis of Elijah’s flight from Ahab and his 
wanderings through the desert (1 Ki 19.1–18). Here Buber draws parallels between Elijah’s life and the choosing 
and leading of Israel; and – perhaps more so – to Moses and his struggle with the lack of faith of the Israelites: 
Elijah is also elected by God and led by Him on a path that can be endured only by faith. Buber draws on 
similarities to Moses and the wanderings through the desert in a similar fashion to the rabbinic sages by placing 
different verses alongside one another which together create a single abstract statement. Interestingly, Buber says 
that these narratives have a historical nucleus as, in his opinion, do numerous others with a legendaristic 
colouring, Buber, however, does not further elaborate on what this historical nucleus could be, choosing instead 
to respectfully accept the text in faith. 
 
33 BUBER, Martin. The Tales of Rabbi Nachman. Reprint. Bloomington. Indiana University Press. 1962.  Transl. 
by FRIEDMAN, Maurice (Hereafter to be referred to as “Rabbi Nachman”), pp. 14–19. 
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where these particularly faithful individuals seek others like themselves who are men of 
devotion rather than wonder-workers. These men are, like the prophets, confronted by the 
barrier of “the smallness of men”.34 Thus the true Hasidim become a modern equivalent of the 
ancient prophets.  
The mysticism of these special individuals, or perhaps more specifically, their immediate 
contact with YHVH is implied, as this author understands it, in Buber’s stressing the 
importance of communication for Rabbi Nachman, who not only had little patience for 
superficial talk but also “spoke no word of instruction that has not passed through much 
suffering; each is “washed in tears”. The word forms itself late in him; the teaching is with 
him at first a feeling even and only then becomes a thought, that is, a word”.35 The unusual 
empathy combined with the depths from which the subsequent words become a balsam for the 
listener’s soul. Often not understood at first, their impact is comprehended when they are 
repeated to someone else later. The effect of the words is primarily in the dialogue between 
the listener (who then becomes a speaker) and a new hearer of his words.36   
1.1.3. The Ethical Dimension: If man follows YHVH, he must heed what He has revealed as 
His will through the prophets and in the teachings of the Torah. That fact 
notwithstanding, the Torah is to be followed as a guide to the manner in which one is 
to lead his life and not as a secular Law imposing restrictions and potential 
punishment. 
Buber sees the Berith as the “expansion of leadership” to meet and cover every aspect of the 
people’s lives; the mutual character of the relationship between God and His people is 
revealed in their willingness to surrender to the divine power and grace as presented in its 
decrees. According to Buber apodictic laws are intended to emphasise YHVH’s rulership over 
all realms of human life, The Eternal I addressing the community as Thou. If the people of 
Israel take His authority as the melekh seriously, they are to abide by the statutes of the Torah 
which recognise the social element and the danger of social injustice that living as a 
community will bring. Buber views social differences as a source of increase in the distance 
                                                
34 Ibid., p. 19. 
35 Ibid., p. 29. 
36 Ibid., p. 30–31. 
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between people and thereafter, between God and themselves.37 Buber’s mysticism is to be 
found primarily in his intensification of reality and one could say, with Hugo Bergman, that 
Buber, especially in the years following the First World War, finds the relationship with God 
in the imposition of responsibilities upon the human.38 Genuine religion, and with it, true 
relationship with God involves an ethical standard that goes beyond mere subjective feeling, 
and is only possible in genuine dialogue if it is not to be a flight from reality. Relation must be 
rooted in reality and cannot merely be defined as a set of laws or dogma.39 Hezekiah’s reform 
(2 Ki 18) is sharply criticized by Buber because of its inability to eradicate social injustice, 
concentrating primarily on cultic reforms. But, as Buber points out, social reform is what 
would make the cult reforms credible in YHVH’s eyes. In doing so, Buber implies that this 
was the reason why the reforms ultimately failed to halt the destruction of Jerusalem.40 
The socio-ethical aspect of the relationship is a central concern of Buber’s. In an exegesis on 
Psalm 82, the nations are compared to gods. The gods referred to are, however, judged for 
their allowing the weak and afflicted to suffer at the hands of the strong. They are 
idiomatically compared to divine beings who had their power lent to them (Ps 82.1-6), but 
whom have now come under judgement, showing their self-supposed divinity to be but a 
mask, a caricature.41 In Moses, the people elect Moses, who is to become the first among 
equals on Jethro’s suggestion; Moses is to make the crucial decisions. The step is taken, as 
Buber sees it, in order to avoid the anarchy that seems to threaten. Buber sees a historical core 
                                                
37 Prophetic Faith, p. 52–55. 
38 BERGMAN, Hugo, Martin Buber and Mysticism in Schilpp and Friedman, p. 304 (Hereafter to be referred to 
as “Bergman”). 
39 FACKENHEIM, Emil L., Buber’s Concept of Revelation in Schilpp and Friedman, pp. 284–85 (Hereafter to 
be referred to as “Fackenheim”). 
40 Prophetic Faith, pp. 157-65. Buber clearly analyses this problem parallel to the problem of the I-Thou relation. 
The cultic reforms were inadequate because of their cosmetic nature. God’s will is that the people are to be a 
unity, an I relating to Thou. This seems to be a Talmudic way of thinking: holiness that penetrates every fibre of 
the being and enters into every aspect of life: Even everyday activities such as eating and storing food become 
sacred rituals, forming a nation of priests. But the most important aspect of the dialogic relationship with YHVH 
is love. YHVH has chosen his people out of love, and out of love they must serve Him.      
41 Right and Wrong, pp. 23–30. The “gods” referred to in Ps 82.6–8 are interpreted as the nations who have had 
their power alloted to them but who have failed in their mission. The representation of God on earth places the 
weighty responsibility of serving His ends as far as justice and righteousness are concerned. Failure to do so 
leads to rejection and destruction. Buber also points out that an outwardly just policy is not sufficient as “...a 
human community can only truly exist in so far as it becomes a community of true human beings” (p. 30). The 
gods (nations) as YHVH’s intermediaries were meant to follow His justice, hence the accusations against their 
failure to curtail evil.  
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in the institution of elders by Moses (Exo 18.13–27) in the logical outcome of utilitarian 
necessity: Because of the problematic nature and the arduousness of the task, Moses borrows 
from the Midianite gift for system and organisation, allowing the nation to be a group that is 
easier to manage, more mechanised, less organic in structure.42 The Decalogue also acts as a 
unifying force for a nation that has now evolved from a relatively disorganised group into a 
Body Politic in which I is expressed essentially by its interhuman relations. On the other 
hand, envy is a special type of social disease decomposing the very tissue of society;43 and the 
statutes of the Pentateuch itself have a dynamism enabling it to fit into a historical situation. 
The key issue in the passage cited here is the establishment of a Berith by YHVH between 
Him and the community made holy through Him by obeying his commands. In doing so, 
Israel confirms Him to be their melekh and become His mamlakah, His special property.  
The commandments of the Decalogue are to be adhered to unconditionally by those who love 
YHVH the zealous God. Buber defines the nature of guilt in Moses as the upsetting of the 
equilibrium between heaven and earth that can only be rectified by punishment, the 
consequences of evil conduct being visited on subsequent generations. Whatever one’s 
confessional standpoint, it is evident that Buber is very perceptive in this observation that also 
emphasises the singularity of the Pentateuch’s apodictic warning against transgressors. 
Oppressors of orphans and widows will be visited by war.44 
  
                                                
42 Moses, pp. 99, 103, 114–15. God rules over His people, and now they must constitute themselves as a unity 
ruled by Him. The contract at Sinai is more than a mere fixed agreement and “YHVH unites himself with Israel 
as a theopolitical unity”. 
43 Ibid., pp. 133–38. Buber attempts to unearth the historical kernel that probably underlaid the Biblical account. 
He believes that the tribes must have known or had prohibitions on their consciences, prohibitions of certain 
relations now becoming a matter of neccessity. There was also a neccessity of the community becoming 
homogeneous, no tribe lording it over the other. 
 
44 Ibid., pp. 141–45. Buber analyzes the problem anthropologically, saying that YHVH is not only zealous in His 
war against those who hate Him, but also against those who decay the very fabric of society through their 
corruption. The religious element has a direct effect on the realm of social justice: Without the one, the other the 
other dissappears. Buber theorizes that there must already have been widespread social abuses or at the very least 
injustices which led to the formation of single laws formulated to combat evil, the great laws being the summa 
thereof (pg. 144, but see also Moses, pp. 130–31). As the author understands it, it seems as though Buber implies 
that an unstable or unjust community upsets the inner-I. I thus has a disturbed relation with itself, and with the 
Thou who is God. Israelite law is revolutionary in its willingness to let people decide, giving even the slave the 
choice of whether he wants to be freed. The slave is treated as a human being, nature is allowed to rest from use 
by man; Buber (p. 145) attributes this to an ethical principle or concern unique in the ancient Orient applicable 
even today.  
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1.2. Buber’s Polemic with Institutional Religion. 
1.2.1. The Encroachment of Religious Legalism and Ritualism on the Dialogic and 
Immediate Relation: Because YHVH is invisible, and the meaning of His name 
carries the meaning of constant presence, Buber views attempts to build temples and 
similar permanent anchors of God’s presence as various aspects of the I-It relation to 
the world and therefore represent man’s encroachment on the I-Thou primary by 
giving preference to a predictable, controllable relation. 
In a certain sense, Buber can be spoken of as a religious anarchist. Throughout his major 
works on the Bible one can clearly see a position taken giving the reader strong reason to 
believe that Buber also takes an existentialist stance in his polemics with institutional religion.  
Similarly to the continental existentialists such as Sartre who were ostensibly against 
academic philosophy, seeking to free it from that institution, Buber tries to do the same with 
man’s relation with YHVH by taking a strongly anti-ritualistic and anti-legalistic stance in 
what can be said to be a prophetic protest against such practice. In this sense also, Buber’s 
philosophy of dialogue emerges as a crucial factor of his Biblical theology. Because every 
individual is created by God as a unique and non-repeatable I, who must relate to the Thou of 
God (who covers every aspect of daily life) in that same unique importance (in which I 
completes God’s creation), he/she cannot confine God to the boundaries of an image.45 
Buber’s criticism of institutional religion based on empty legalism is influenced by 
Kierkegaard’s aversion to empty religiosity. Profession of faith becomes a self-satisfied lie 
where one does so not having been affected to the core of one’s soul - something Kierkegaard 
rails against in his polemic with the self-satisfied bourgeois institutionalised but 
inconsequential and empty confessional Christianity of his day. The crucial issue becomes 
whether the substance of man’s faith transforms his life as a whole.46  
                                                
45 Cf. also Friedman, Martin Buber, pp. 240–42. According to Friedman, every person has a specific importance 
in the eyes of God in Buber’s philosophy and every individual has undeniable residues and vestiges of the 
Creator. Individuals are created as free, and because of this, every person sins as Adam sinned, but also have 
every opportunity of turning and proving true before God. It is this freedom and human responsibility towards 
God in immediate relation that forms the essence of the dialogical relationship of Israel to God, based on Israel’s 
belief that such dialogue is possible. It implies partnership and nearness; it permeates every aspect of daily 
existence.  Thus there can be no confining of God to a single image and limiting His freedom in such a manner. 
 
46 BUBER, Martin, What is Man in Between Man and Man. Reprint. Boston. Beacon Press. 1959. Transl. by 
SMITH, Ronald Gregor (Hereafter to be referred to as “What is Man?”) pp. 161–62. 
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The primary relation I-It, unlike that of I-Thou, is not spoken with the whole being. It is an 
encroachment on God’s independence as it seeks clear-cut boundaries, desiring to possess 
what it attempts to define and confine within the criteria and framework of its own    
choosing. 47 Understanding Buber’s attitude to the I-It mode of being enables us to understand 
Buber aversion towards institutional religion. An early example of the strong anti-institutional 
stance Buber takes can even be found in his early book The Tales of Rabbi Nachman, perhaps 
most markedly in the tale The Rabbi and His Son, where the path of orthodox Talmudic 
Judaism compares negatively to the mysticism of the Hasidim. In the tale, apparently minor 
details create a subtle combination of psychological hints leading to a critical image of 
religious dogmatism.48 It is, however, useful to note that Buber pieced his Hasidic tales from 
notes left by the pupils of the Hasidic masters and Buber retold these stories in such a way as 
to preserve what convinced him as belonging to the originals.49 His licence in editing these 
tales is particularly significant because Buber supports his anti-dogmatic and legalistic views 
with his editing of these tales but also lays him open to criticism by other authors on scientific 
grounds.50 
One of the most illuminating texts on this issue is Buber’s exposition on the Egyptian state 
system and religion in his book Moses, with its description of the awe-inspiring systematic 
hierarchic infrastructure of the society and its love of control and predictable results. On the 
                                                
47
 I and Thou, pp. 3–5. See below, Part II: The Implicit Notion of YHVH in Buber’s Philosophical Thought. 
48 Rabbi Nachman, pp. 49–58. Although the story The Rabbi and His Son is a retelling of a tale by Rabbi 
Nachman, it appears particularly suited as an illustration of Buber’s views on religion. The Rabbi is described as 
a particularly devout man who tries to teach his son to be as orthodox as himself, and warns him to avoid any 
kind of contact with the Hasidim, whom he describes as having rambling dreams which they dare to join to the 
Torah. Interestingly, even the letters of the books of the Scriptures are described as having rigid letters despite 
their mystery which the boy needs all his strength to absorb himself in (p. 50). This is compared, perhaps even 
ironically, to the mystic “rambling” of the Hasidim (p. 49). His very room is described as a narrow prison, and 
the boy’s soul wanders away from the room like a bird every time he sits deep in thought over the Scriptures. 
Even his soul is described as imprisoned. Ultimately, the Rabbi’s dogmatism results in the boy’s death.  The 
Rabbi then learns that the Messiah was prevented from coming because the boy had the Rung of the Lesser Light 
which was supposed to join with the Rung of the Greater Light which a Zaddik in a nearby town had in order for 
the eschatological event to occur. Thus dogmatism and legalistic institutionalism succeeds in thwarting, albeit 
unintentionally, the arrival of the Messiah. In Buber’s retelling of this tale, he unwittingly comes close to 
Gnostic mythology, which held similar views of the Hebrew Scriptures and had a similar eschatology to the one 
described in this tale. There is also a Platonic element present in Buber’s low esteem of the written reminiscent 
of the Seventh Epistle (which describes a fire that cannot be effectively captured in the phenomenon of writing).   
 
49 Ibid., Foreword. 
 
50 See below, section 1.3.0. A critical assessment of Buber’s Biblical Hermeneutics for a further elaboration on 
this point.  
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surface, one might be of the impression that Buber is expressing wonder at the meticulously 
organised work - from the harnessing of the Nile’s natural power to the hierarchy of labour 
involved in the architecture divided into groups, each with task master, leading all the way to 
the Pharaoh.51 For all this grandeur, in these passages Buber makes us well aware of the 
demonic element of such structures, especially by elaborating on the attempt by the Egyptians 
to extend the sphere of their control past the boundaries of the technical and the living to the  
realm of the dead and conquer it. The deceased ruler must be preserved from the indignity of 
death at all costs and is appropriately equipped by his magicians to endure in the world of the 
spirits so he may be able to continue his rule after his demise. In doing so, he becomes 
immortal. According to the Egyptian belief, the ruler is king even of the realms of life and 
death.52 
Buber then introduces the Habiru (the Hebrews?), the people without an anchor who worship 
a God who remains unseen and who adapt easily to the conditions they come across in any 
land giving them hospitality. This indomitable kind of nomadic people is a thorn in the side of 
the Egyptian state that hates what cannot be possessed or controlled. Although Joseph’s 
family are tolerated and make a considerable contribution to Egyptian society, they remain 
outsiders as they maintain a nucleus of inner life that cannot be systematised. By the very 
essence of His name, YHVH will not be restricted to being a deity at the believer’s disposal. 
The very prohibition of images ensures that He will retain that status over the clay temple 
dwellers. Moses, writes Buber, was not a hater of art but stood against the tradition frequently 
found in many religions to create a sensible image of the deity. Moses wanted to establish an 
imageless cult for the invisible absolute God YHVH. But as early as the days of the 
wanderings numerous rebellions and murmurings of the people disturbed the relations 
between YHVH and His people. Such murmurings have their root in the people desiring a 
visible deity they could “have” at their convenient disposal through a sacral system, a security 
which Buber emphasises that Moses cannot and must not give them.53 Moses brought them 
assurance from YHVH that He would lead them out of Egypt and not desert them. But 
YHVH, who wanted to be their God, would also remain invisible to them. And the people – 
conditioned to the Egyptian deities who could not only be seen, but whose strength lay 
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precisely in their image – are suspicious of Moses, who cannot simply produce this God. This 
is what led the people to create the image of the bull.54 
 In another passage of Moses,55 Buber is as sceptical of any kind of stone or graven setting of 
God’s Word as he is of palaces and temples that might attempt to limit God to one place or 
dwelling and assure of His presence. Buber implies that the lack of human faith in God and 
His presence makes it necessary for these people to have a testament in hard stone that could 
be called upon to testify against them. That should outlast the flimsy medium of human word 
of mouth. The stone monument shrouded in mystery gives off an atmosphere of mysterium 
tremendum et fascinans, but which is nonetheless supposed to be evidence of revelation. 
Although the stone tablets ostensibly serve as a permanent witness to be referred to in future 
times, Buber compares them to other monuments of stone such as Solomon’s temple which 
attempted to fix YHVH’s presence – or a piece of it in the case of the tablets – to one place. 
Because His Word alone endures, however, it cannot be held in a material that is subject to 
erosion by the forces of time and change. Any attempt to hold that Word without end meets 
with failure or destruction. The stone tablets were lost but the Word has remained. 
In another important chapter of a book concerning this problem – The Great Tensions in his 
book The Prophetic Faith – YHVH is described as God who wants to be worshipped and not 
used, even allowing the ark to be captured at the hands of the Philistines (1 Sam 4 –5). Buber 
attributes this to the failure on the part of the priests and people, who believed too strongly in 
the guarantee of the Lord’s presence among them thanks to the presence of the Ark, and came 
to think of YHVH as a deity at their disposal and try to control Him.56 The Israelites are 
devoted to YHVH and know him as the liberator and leader of their journey, seeing the hand 
of God in everything that came into their paths, extending to the realms of sickness and 
health, as well as that of nature, where sudden adverse conditions are interpreted as the work 
of YHVH. Buber mentions the numerous amulets and fetishes that were taken out and used 
only when the owner remembered them, reminding the reader that these were forgotten after a 
time. Thus a deity which can be controlled and called at the owner’s bidding will ultimately 
                                                
54 Moses, p. 151. 
 
55 Ibid., pp. 138–40. 
 
56 See also above, 22n. 
 
28 
 
be forgotten, so that continuity must be primary basis of faith and worship. And yet “after 
surmounting, time and time again, many stumbling blocks do these men, who recognise every 
unusual event with violent feeling, learn to recognise their God and His activity in the spheres 
which seemed necessarily foreign to Him”.57 
1.2.2. The Building of Temples and Idolatry: Idolatry, institutional legalism and ritualism 
are estranging factors in the I-Thou relation; they are also a way of attempting to 
usurp YHVH’s leadership. 
Buber analyses the phenomenon of idolatry and nature worship in the greatest depth in Moses 
and The Prophetic Faith. We will reserve a more detailed elaboration of his thoughts on sin 
and the problem of theodicy to a section below in this essay. For the present, let us 
concentrate on what made idolatry so tempting to the Israelite. Buber traces this great struggle 
to its historical roots in the Moses’s time. Perhaps one of the earliest incidents of man trying 
to usurp YHVH’s power and call it one’s own is the Korahite rebellion (Nu 16). Here the 
Korahites murmured against Moses in the belief that the entire people were the possessor of 
the Lord’s divine presence, and were thus holy. They believed that, possessing this god, “they 
could transform their own will into the will of God”.58 Buber argues that at the root of this 
rebellion lies the human folly of Korah presumptuously believing he was holy and that by 
being so, he was in some sense equal to God.59 
The particular danger facing the nomad now moving into the life of the farmer is a way of life 
diametrically opposed to the nature of YHVH and His people coming into Canaan.60 The new 
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59 Ibid., pp. 184–90. Buber goes to considerable lengths to explain the inner nature of the rebellion: Moses is a 
mediator between YHVH and the people but he is not a priest. He is a prophet, and even in that sense is unique 
in his direct dialogue with YHVH, who does not speak to Moses in the usual way through dreams or divinatory 
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expressly chosen for this purpose, they are practically calling God a liar. The leaders believe, moreover, that the 
Law displaces spirit. But Buber argues that this is false specifically because it is grounded upon doubt in 
eschatology. Devotion to God’s Kingdom should be spontaneous, grounded in belief in the age to come in spite 
of harsh present historical realities. Moses was humble and did not wish to use force against the rebels but he 
considered, according to Buber, thinking such as theirs to be spiritual death. Thus he left the rebels to their fate. 
 
60 Prophetic Faith, p. 71. 
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centre of interest is the “depths of the ground” cultivated – ground that Buber effectively 
describes as full of mystery insofar as the plants seem to spring from it, as opposed to the 
living cattle that clearly procreate by pairing. 
What makes the Baalim (the local vegetative cult deities) a stronger temptation – besides the 
fancied ability to imitate them by the act of procreation and thereby entice their blessing of 
their fields – is the fact of their plainly visible and evidently deeply entrenched presence in the 
land into which the nomads enter. This, according to Buber, is part of what makes these local 
deities not only hard to forget but easy to follow and believe in: Although the settlers still 
remain devoted to YHVH in matters of war and strife they now find these local deities more 
convenient and closer to their earthly affairs and charms. They drop worshipping these idols 
in times of crisis, returning to them only once safety has returned, finding the rites of their 
cultic ceremonies nearer to their earthly hearts than YHVH, who is above all this and will not 
tolerate the hallowing of an aspect of earthly life such as the sexual sphere. The Baalim 
gradually work their ways into the cities and soon the kings such as Solomon and Ahab have 
places in the temple for them alongside YHVH. The power of the Baalim is only broken by 
YHVH Himself through the agency of men such as Elijah who form a group of men purely 
devoted to YHVH who show that He is also the Lord of nature by performing miracles.61  
Hand in hand with this, according to Buber, is a certain desire on the part of man to free his 
mundane life from the rule of YHVH, especially in the aspects of daily matters and state 
affairs. An attempt to limit the sacral aspect to the temple grows: It is for the king, not the 
priest or prophet, to decide when the kings are to go to war. The king (Saul) takes matters into 
his own hands when a Samuel is unavailable, even though he faces rejection from YHVH 
afterwards for doing so. The prophet no longer offers sacrifice with the coronation of David 
as king, and Buber argues that “this is another stage in the battle for YHVH, the battling by 
the word as such”.62 With the institution of the king into office, there is a strong desire to free 
the king from accountability to anyone over earthly affairs and an effort made to keep YHVH 
and His sovereignty safely relegated to the stone temple, despite YHVH’s wish to only 
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62 Ibid., p. 81. 
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occasionally come down to the earth to the moving Sanctuary. Solomon’s dedicatory speech 
(1 Ki 8.12–61), argues Buber, is evidence that the king finds the prospect of YHVH as the 
leader of the people discomforting. The author believes that Buber is suggesting that in such a 
position where the king would be potentially accountable to YHVH for social and human 
rights abuses, he would be far more vulnerable, and it would thus be advantageous to keep 
His (YHVH’s) power as limited as possible to a realm where there are fewer threats.63 And 
what is this if not an attempt to control YHVH: even if not by magic? Man is essentially 
trying to wrest something from the hand of God to which he is not entitled. Now the lone 
prophet is the only one left holding the king accountable, at risk of his life, for his (the king’s) 
misdeeds. That was something that the sovereign understood and in order to limit the 
prophetic influence, perhaps in particular among the people, there was the official cult with its 
officially approved prophets who, given their station of privilege, were in fact little better than 
the king’s stooges.  
Buber rejects traditional source and literary criticism in numerous places of his major Biblical 
theological works as an inadequate explanation of the structure of the Biblical text.64 He takes 
a redaction-critical departure-point in The Prophetic Faith when he believes that the 
genealogical narratives are edited with the specific prophetic purpose to stretch from Eden to 
Moriah, believing that one of the purposes of the book is to write a history of the faithful 
witness, set as a criterion contrasted with and placed against the diluted cult and royal court 
with its attempt to free man from his daily obligation to God. Later in The Great Tensions, 
Buber summarises the narrator-prophet’s purpose: to impress deeply upon his hearer, by 
means of the literary devices we have mentioned above, that YHVH is the God of the 
                                                
63 Ibid., pp. 83–85. This is, in Buber’s opinion antithetical to the nature of God, because all the realms of life are 
subject to religion, and YHVH wants to remove the notion from man’s heart that the two realms (i.e. those of 
God and man) can be separated. Buber also says (p. 85) that “...the opposition of the kingdom is supported by a 
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64 Prophetic Faith, pg. 90. Buber draws attention to the numerous repetitions in Gen 3, writing that the author‘s 
purpose is to show, by repetition, the connection between events: The parallel creation stories are intended to 
emphasise different aspects of man’s relationship to God and to the earth. Man’s rebellion has resulted in the 
earth’s being cursed.  By man’s sin, suffering comes to the earth. He also writes that the intention of the author 
of Gen 4 is to illustrate the difference between right and wrong offering, saying that the key to the offer being 
accepted or not is the right or wrong intention, saying that the soul remains closed when the intention is wrong, 
making the offer to God worthless. It is significant to note, however, that the majority of commentators on Gen 4 
generally write that God’s rejection of Cain’s offer is a mystery, there being no compelling textual evidence that 
could viably support another conclusion. Buber’s interpretation of this passage, although logically plausible, is 
not supported by the text.    
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universe; He reveals Himself in history; and besides accompanying man in the history in 
which he has played such an important role, YHVH demands absolute devotion from him. 
YHVH, however, leaves the resisting man to the fate he has chosen with his resistance.65  
In a sense, the prophet in Buber’s theology reminds this author of Plato’s slave who has 
escaped the cave into the blinding light, away from the shadows of the phenomenal world. 
Buber’s prophet likewise has access to a world far removed from the world of earthly 
ambition and greed. Like the slave misunderstood and resented by his peers who feel secure 
in the phenomenal world, the prophet encounters resentment and misunderstanding among his 
peers who are content to be in the world disturbed and corrupted by human sin.66  
1.3.0. Critical Assessment of Buber’s Hermeneutics of the Old Testament: Buber’s 
hermeneutics of the Biblical text is highly text orientated, paying careful attention to 
the Hebrew text. Nevertheless, he sometimes opens himself open to the criticism of 
putting forward unqualified arguments. His interpretation of Judaism and Hasidism 
has been also criticised by certain scholars as too subjective and individualistic. 
Perhaps more so than most other scholars before him, Buber paid very close attention to the 
text of the Hebrew Bible. Along with Franz Rosenzweig, he was responsible for translating 
the Hebrew Bible into German in a manner that attempted to retain in German some of the 
basic features of the Hebrew original. Their labours have received both acclaim and criticism 
from scholars, some hailing it as a masterpiece of beauty, and yet others who pointed out that 
this faith to the original text was sometimes retained at the expense of overall coherency. 
There have also been disagreements among scholars regarding the fidelity of the translation to 
the original.67 Muilenburg describes the translation as an important attempt to transmit the 
text faithfully into a modern idiom and a valuable tool for exegesis, describing the translation 
as a palimpsest whose task is to remove this or that word, sometimes using words which 
sound unusual to the modern ear, but at the same time seeking to retain the philological 
complexities of the original. Muilenburg believes that the Buber-Rosenzweig translation 
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66 PLATO. Republic, 514a-518b, Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1993. Transl. by WATERFIELD, Robin 
(Hereafter to be referred to as Plato, “The Republic”. 
 
67 Friedman, Martin Buber, p. 239. Friedman cites several views praising Buber and Rosenzweig’s translation as 
a masterpiece of translation of the Hebrew. 
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provides clues to the Biblical author’s intent.68 Nevertheless even Muilenburg draws critical 
attention to Buber’s translation of certain cultic terms, as well as Buber’s theology of the 
divine appellations and God’s name, saying that Buber has not taken into sufficient account 
the diversity of meaning in these key words, that sometimes etymological concerns dominate 
the translation in the interests of retaining the dynamic of the original text. Muilenburg, 
moreover, considers Buber’s translation of YHVH as He who is present to go against what we 
know about the history of words. His criticisms of what he sees as Buber’s problematic 
translation and interpretations of certain key passages imply that Buber leads the text in a 
direction that it was not originally intended to go.69 This is a pitfall for any translator and 
interpreter of the Bible. Indeed, every translation is already to a greater or lesser extent an 
interpretation based on a more or less subjective understanding of the original text. But in 
Buber’s case, matters are more complicated. 
In Buber’s Biblical hermeneutics, whether regarding the Old or New Testament, one can 
immediately notice an almost uncompromising attention to textual detail. In the preface to his 
book Moses, he not only dismisses the standard scholarly interpretative methods (Biblical 
source and literary theory that divided the Biblical text into strata of source documents), but 
also gives the reader what can be taken as a compact statement about his general approach to 
Biblical hermeneutics in his books on the Bible: He says he “has treated the Hebrew text in its 
formal constituents more seriously than has become the general custom in modern exegesis.” 
He then adds that various passages, word-plays, connections between texts with words are 
repeated in other passages, adding different dimensions to their meaning.70 Indeed, he will 
often connect various apparently unrelated passages by making the reader aware of key words 
in one passage that have been used in related ways in others, thus connecting them.71 
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71 The amount of passages that using this approach are too numerous to list here completely, but are evident 
throughout his books Right and Wrong, pp. 12, 36, 53–5; The Prophetic Faith pp. 31–41, 60–93, 215; Moses, 
pp. 21–32, 40–55, 86–93 et al. See also Glatzer, pp. 362–3; 366–67. Here Glatzer analyses Buber’s approach, 
pointing out similar arguments to those written above regarding attention to rhythm, key words and phrases, 
describing Buber’s method as a demand for perfect attentiveness (p. 362) in which the documents are to be 
treated as originals in their own right and scrutinised rather than paying attention to “…literary or linguistic 
influences on the Biblical texts, nor with historical dependencies, parallels, or relationships, Buber follows the 
guidance of the text itself.“ He describes Buber’s translation of the Hebrew Bible as a work freed from layers of 
academic overgrowth. Buber’s approach is one that tries to make the Biblical text alive to the modern reader in 
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Repetition is described as a device to prompt association which connects and completes 
passages as they are placed near one another in the hearer or reader’s memory given his / her 
familiarity with the text.72 This is an approach some commentators might use as evidence that 
these texts were intended for use in liturgical contexts where a given passage would often 
allude to others, creating a rich interplay of memory, association and connotation. Such close 
attention to intertextuality as Buber’s at a time concerned primarily with the issue of whether 
the Biblical narrative was to be taken as an historical account of temporal events (and tried to 
prove as far as possible that the Biblical text was based on them) makes Buber a pioneer of 
recent reader and text-orientated critical Biblical hermeneutic methods advocated by such 
scholars as Walter Brueggemann.73 According to Glatzer, the duty of the scholar is, in part, to 
be a good listener, and Buber’s approach makes the reader aware of often unnoticed nuances. 
Glatzer also rightly points out the importance of Biblical hermeneutics as lying primarily in 
its approach to the text as a dialogue between God and man.74 The reader of the text enters 
into a dialogue, which can be facilitated and strengthened by a careful and perceptive 
translation and interpretation.  
Buber nevertheless does not entirely remain text orientated and sometimes comments on 
historical issues around the text which actually focus attention to similar topics to the 
historical critics. And yet at the same time he does not want to rely on such evidence, which 
places his writing in a difficult position. One cannot dismiss the broad spectrum of critical 
scholarship as unconvincing and yet use such methods where it suits one without being self-
contradictory to at least some extent.75 A shortcoming of Buber’s approach from a Biblical 
                                                                                                                                                      
its primeval sense hence the reason why Buber translates the text in a manner that sometimes leads to the 
paradoxes and riddles which are so characteristic of the Hebrew text. 
 
72 Prophetic Faith, p. 215. 
 
73 BRUEGGEMANN, Walter. The Theology of the Old Testament. Minneapolis. Augsburg Fortress Press. 1997. 
Reprint 2005, pp. 78–80. 
 
74 Glatzer p. 366. 
 
75 Cf. Moses, pp. 20–32, Here Buber refers to extra-biblical sources such as the Tell-el-Amarna correspondence, 
discusses the word Habiru etc.  In the chapter of Moses titled Legend of the Beginning (pp. 33–38) he compares 
the legend of Moses being saved from death in the Nile to other Semitic literature (such as a cuneiform text of 
Sargon of Akkad from 2600 BCE). In the same chapter Buber, like numerous other scholars of his generation 
theorises about the historicity of the Exodus, trying to pinpoint the Pharaoh under which the oppression of the 
Israelites took place and theorising about Thutmose III, known as the Pharaoh of the Oppression. But he then 
takes the curious step of saying that, “In any case there can be no doubt as to the historicity of the servitude of 
Israel…no people would care to invent so ignominious a chapter of its own history.”  These are just two 
examples among others found in Buber’s Biblical theological works that are representative of his style of writing 
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scholarship perspective, connected with the above, is the fact that Buber often makes 
statements he does not qualify, which consequently seem closer to a philosophy of religion or 
history than to Biblical scholarship. He attempts to delineate the historical kernel from the 
cover of the magnificent events written about in the text. This approach is especially marked 
in his study Moses which is written in the style of a biography. In numerous places, Buber 
adds that the core of the events described has a historical nucleus that can be noticed time and 
time again.76 In doing so Buber places himself somewhere between critical Biblical 
scholarship and simple faith in the historicity of the events described. Where the Biblical text 
describes events not imaginable to most modern readers, Buber respectfully says that these 
are events where the historical nucleus cannot be pieced together by modern approaches. 
Where passages describe events closer to our perception of reality, Buber says that such 
things are perfectly plausible and have happened time and time again. Perhaps this is the most 
viable approach, one that tries to hypothesize about the historical kernel of the legend-
coloured narrative rather than try to back it with flimsy historical or archaeological evidence 
which in turn only seem to further contradict the Biblical narrative: Clearly the approach 
needed is the one concentrating on the Biblical message rather than its historical facticity. 
Considerable criticism of Buber concentrates on his approach to Judaism as a dual-Torah 
religion. In this respect, the strongest criticism comes from Jewish authors who differ strongly 
to his beliefs against the Torah as revelation and Law. In this sense, Buber emphasises the 
dialogical aspect of the guidance of the Torah as God’s gift to man to guide him. Buber 
knows that man is the recipient of the Law, but believes that God is not the giver of a law. 
Nor does he believe that the Torah is essentially law although it contains numerous 
commands and statutes. But we can agree with Nahum N. Glatzer that although empty 
legalism is a sign of late decline, and that although the Torah is more than a mere law, “...in 
the law is Torah“.77 This is a similar position to the one taken by James Muilenburg when he 
                                                                                                                                                      
and interpretation which defies categorisation but show, nonetheless, that Buber yet does not free himself 
entirely of the same scholarship he criticises elsewhere as inadequate. Cf. also Prophetic Faith p. 34–41 where 
Buber tries to trace the historical roots of the calling of Abraham from Ur and the Semitic origins of God’s name. 
Such an approach is in fact very close to traditional historical criticism. Then, however, on p. 61, He once again 
makes the statement that there is no reason to doubt the historicity of the disaster at Ebenezer (1 Sam 4.21 ff) on 
the mere basis of the fact that “no people would invent such a thing”. pp. 70–80 contains a further comparison of 
historical extra-biblical sources and Biblical data in the discussion about the Baalim. 
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criticises Buber for denying that the Decalogue was the basis upon which the covenant at 
Sinai was made, resulting in what Muilenburg describes as one of the Old Testament’s central 
messages – in which the people of Israel are most certainly described as the people of the 
Torah.78 Another author, William Kaufman views Buber’s religious writings as more a 
reflection of Buber’s general approach to life which sees being Jewish as the most intense 
experience of being human: Buber, according to Kaufman, emphasizes the Jew’s passion for 
unity with God as well as the Messianic ideal of Judaism – the distinctiveness of the Jewish 
people lying “in a unique combination of nationhood and spirituality“. Kaufman also notes 
Buber’s high regard for the narrative parts of the Bible, which Buber considers to be 
accurately representative of the primal religious encounter of the Chosen People with God, in 
contrast with the Halakhic sections and Rabbinic Judaism, in which Buber sees only a 
hardening of this primal experience, and therefore rejects it, dismissing it as a way not to 
approach God. Like his philosophy, Buber’s Biblical theology “emphasizes the encounter and 
concrete life-situation of the individual.“79 In this respect, Leibowitz, places Buber under still 
harsher criticism when he says that Buber was a Jewish theologian for non-Jews precisely 
because his (Buber’s) views have nothing to do with historical Judaism which Leibowitz 
describes as a Judaism of the Torah and mitzvot.80  
It also must be said that Buber’s anti-intellectualism and religious anarchism appears 
individualistic when confronted by the fact that no historical religion has ever survived 
history without a coherent group and identity. Even the anti-Talmudic position he takes in his 
theological, and to some extent in his Hasidic tales seem based more on his subjective and 
philosophical views than historical reality. Catholic authorities in medieval Spain and 
Portugal attempted to eradicate Judaism by banning the Talmud and destroying any copies of 
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it they could find. They apparently believed that by doing so, and by suppressing and severely 
punishing the practise of Judaism, they would eradicate it over time. The backbone of 
Judaism as being formed by the collection of laws and traditions contained in the Talmud is a 
view held almost any pious Jew. Adin Steinsaltz in his classic book The Essential Talmud 
noted that in places where authorities managed successfully to suppress the Talmud, Judaism 
simply disappeared as if it never existed there.81 It is perhaps a further note of interest that in 
cases such as the persecution of Jews in Spain in 1492, where Jews were forced to convert to 
Catholicism, many people either forsook their former beliefs completely, practising 
Catholicism only outwardly for professional reasons or in order to escape harassment, while 
others practised Judaism in secret at high risk. The lack or non-existence of religious 
literature, however, led to highly irregular forms of worship that had only remnants of 
classical Judaism, curiously mixing in aspects of Catholicism that had somehow found their 
ways into these secret communities’ worship.82  
The view stated elsewhere in this essay that Buber is a religious anarchist is one shared by 
another author, Gershom Scholem, who actually calls Buber a religious anarchist and his 
teachings religious anarchism. One of Scholem’s main criticisms in the context of this section 
of our thesis is that his (Buber’s) teaching amounts essentially to an ethics that say that one’s 
conduct is important without specifying exactly what that conduct should be (lest Buber fall 
into I-It mode of thought). In a different context, but one relevant to this discussion, Scholem 
reminds that Hasidism remained faithful to the Jewish tradition, which of course, as a religion 
of Torah and mitzvot, says what one should and should not do.83 Although Scholem 
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Ironically, Spinoza’s “excommunication“ from the Jewish community, as Yovel points out, was an aspect of 
Catholic influence that had crept into Judaism and was used as a tool by the Amsterdam Jewish community 
leaders to show the Calvinist authorities that they were strict about keeping their Jewish faith free of heterodox 
elements. 
   
83 SCHOLEM, Gershom. Pojetí Hasidismu u Martina Bubera in Davidova Hvězda. Prague. Nakladatelství 
Franze Kafky. 1995 Transl. by BLAHOVA, Alena, p. 108 (Hereafter to be referred to as “Scholem”). Because of 
unavailability of the German original or English translation, the Czech is cited here. 
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acknowledges the literary value of Buber’s writings about the Hasidim, calling them works of 
deeply soulful and serious prose, he writes that Buber does not proceed as a researcher, 
confirming what has been said above that the uninitiated reader of Buber’s Hasidic tales 
might get the impression that the Hasidim were religious anarchists who scorned anything 
theoretical.84 Buber moreover believed that the most we know about Hasidism is through 
legend and even in the Foreword to The Tales of Rabbi Nachman, he writes that he has retold 
these tales “with full freedom, yet out of his spirit as it is present to me“. He dismisses the 
notes left behind by a disciple as being deformed and distorted, saying that he had to edit 
these tales considerably in order to retain what he felt to be part of the original.85  
And yet Scholem, an important authority on Jewish mysticism, polemizes with Buber, saying 
that the first generation of Hasidim left behind a large corpus of theoretical works – homilies, 
lectures, Biblical text interpretations and later expansions and interpretations of those, all 
numbering some several thousand volumes – which provide vital clues to their teaching. 
Because of their roots in Lurian Kabbalism (which Scholem accurately says Buber probably 
scorned in concordance with his anti-Gnostic / Platonic and anti-dualistic standpoint), Buber 
in later years would refer to them only minimally, choosing instead to rely on legends, quotes 
and anecdotes which Scholem says were a secondary development and certainly not of the 
same authority as the theoretical works left behind that no researcher could or should ignore.86 
Although The Tales of Rabbi Nachman which we have referred to here belong to the earlier 
mystical period of Buber’s works, the same approach as can be found in his later works on 
Hasidism is plainly evident even here: Buber (probably intentionally) does not write this book 
like a critical scholar, drastically affecting its usability as a work for the critical researcher: 
the fact that Buber does not leave any references to primary sources for further investigation 
seem to make these books of little use in the study of Hasidism. 
                                                                                                                                                      
  
84 Ibid., p. 95. 
 
85 Rabbi Nachman, Foreword. 
 
86 Scholem, pp. 96–98. Scholem gives a very convincing elaboration on the inherent weaknesses in Buber’s work 
on Hasidism as works of research, discussing the various strata of primary literature left behind by the early 
Hasidic masters that sharply contradict the view of Hasidism as a laity movement. Scholem notes that the 
biographies and legends that Buber uses come from a period when it was believed that telling legends was on a 
more spiritual level. But Scholem notes that despite the permeation of Kabbalistic language in the early 
theoretical works, these works do in fact come from a period when Hasidism was truly productive. Scholem 
writes that the fact that Buber chose to ignore these primary works makes his work inaccurate, greatly decreasing 
the scholarly value of Buber’s works on Hasidism.  
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1.4.0. Buber and Christianity 
1.4.1. Judaism and Christianity: Although Buber’s attitude to Christianity is often 
polemical, he still feels love towards the historical Jesus and places the Jesus of 
history in the same line of faith of Judaism with its basis in the Old Testament.   
Buber’s weightiest comparative elaboration of the relationship of the faith of the Christians 
and Jews is found in his study The Two Types of Faith.87 Like his other major works of 
Biblical theology, it is based on careful exegesis of the text and it is demanding, weighty 
reading addressing numerous problems. It is also his greatest polemic with Christianity, and 
even a theologian as sympathetic to Buber and his thought as Emil Brunner defines it as a 
“..major attack on Christianity”.88 Although The Two Types of Faith examines Christianity – 
especially the Pauline direction it took – critically, we will now try to summarise and 
elaborate on Buber’s arguments in more depth. Firstly, Buber places at odds what he defines 
as two types of faith different in kind: emunah and pistis. Buber is not favourably disposed 
towards pistis, the type of faith that believes something is true based on belief in something 
one has heard, believing that this second kind of faith is a derived kind of faith adulterated by 
Greek thought and therefore not faith in the truest sense of the word..89  
Buber’s thoughts about Jesus and his (Buber’s) attitude towards him can be traced back to 
those attitudes to the two kinds of faith we have briefly discussed. He writes, in the preface of 
                                                
87
 The discussion of Buber’s polemics with Christianity focus attention on his argumentation as it is contained in 
this book. 
 
88 BRUNNER, Emil. Judaism and Christianity in Schilpp and Friedman (Hereafter to be referred to as “Brunner, 
Judaism”), p. 314.  
89 BUBER, Martin. The Two Types of Faith. pp. 7–11. Emunah is the kind of faith that believes something even 
though the faithful person is not able to say exactly why. The other kind of faith is the type which believes 
something is true and acknowledges it as such, although even in this case, the person who acknowledges 
something as true also puts his trust in it without being able to says why. But Buber clearly leans towards 
emunah, the relationship of faith with the entire being, using the early community of Israel as its example, 
insofar as it had its birth in faith in YHVH. Christianity emerged as a “new formation” amidst the decay of this 
ancient nation and others around it. Buber finds the origin of Israel in a unity of more or less disintegrated family 
members who had concluded a covenant between themselves and their God; Christianity arose from the death of 
Jesus, whom Buber (p. 9) calls “a great son of Israel”, and begins as a Diaspora and mission. In all, Buber 
implies that the emunah relationship of ancient Israel with their God is a more genuine kind of faith, whereas the 
Christian faith principle of pistis has its origins in Greece, “...the faith principle...that so-and-so is true is of 
Greek origin...made possible only through the comprehension reached by Greek thought of an act which 
acknowledges the truth. The non-noetic elements which were combined with it in the primitive Christian 
mission, originate essentially from the Hellenistic atmosphere”. This will be elaborated on in detail in the 
subsection on Buber’s polemics with Pauline Christianity. 
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The Two Types of Faith, that he thinks of Jesus as his great brother, and finds the fact that 
Christianity has found in Jesus the Saviour of mankind a fact of the greatest importance, 
regarding him as holding an important place in Israel’s history of faith.90 He also finds that 
Jesus’ faith and that of his disciples is one that is different in kind and not degree, believing 
that true faith is accessible to any man, that even a small amount of pure faith is sufficient 
enough, for example, to work miracles, interpreting the verses of Mk 10.27 and Matt 19.26 to 
mean that the truly faithful are taken into God’s realm and possessed by His power, not the 
other way round. Thus the faithful witness of purity can work that which is within God’s 
power, anything being possible for God. Buber interprets faith as a pure inner certainty of 
God’s power, and as this author sees it, is an extension of Buber’s dialogical philosophy, 
where emphasis is placed on the immediate and direct relationship of I to Thou.   
Buber goes very far in his acknowledgment of Jesus in The Two Types of Faith, especially in 
his elaboration on the Jesus of the Sermon on the Mount (Matt 5–7). Compared to the Gospel 
of Matthew, the Gospel of Mark is already held in lesser esteem. Matthew’s Jesus who 
exhorts the faithful to repent and turn from their erring ways is not the Markan one who 
invites them to believe his word. Nevertheless, even the Markan Jesus is shown to be a man 
who resists any form of deification. Jesus’ answer to the wealthy young man (Mk 10.17 parr; 
Matt 19.16–30; Lk 18.18–30) shows that he continues in the Old Testament demarcation of 
divine and earthly when he reminds the young man that only God is good.91 Buber stresses 
the fact that Jesus speaks like a prophet addressing the faithful person as the one who has free 
choice and is able to turn and come into fellowship with God.92 The faithful person also trusts 
God and has faith in Him, and Buber stresses the unusual steadfastness of Abraham, noting 
his faith as one of the central incidents in the seven revelations in the Genesis account when 
                                                
90 Ibid., p. 12–13. 
 
91
 Two Types of Faith, pp. 114–16. 
 
92 Ibid., pp. 24–25. One of the central principles of the message concerns, besides Israel – in whom, according to 
Buber “...the being of man as addressed has its concrete reality, and through him, Israel as such in which the 
intended humanity has its concrete reality” – man alone: The reality of the relationship with God is rooted in the 
individual life of the faithful and “...cannot elsewhere take effect”. Buber traces the call (pg. 26-27) to turn to the 
prophets, where the call to turn was their primary word; he finds that “turning and returning are related to one 
another as two corresponding parts in a conversation, in which the one who is infinitely subordinate preserves 
also his mode of freedom.”    
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he compares this to Paul’s faith, Paul being the figure whom Buber regards as the real 
originator of Christian faith as we know it today.93 
Buber’s affinity towards the Jesus of history can be traced back to Buber’s thoughts about the 
Torah and Jesus’ attempt to make its teaching current. Buber writes that the Jewish position 
regarding fulfilment of the divine command “...is only valid if it takes place in conformity 
with the full intention of the revelation and from the whole intention of faith – in which 
however the conception of the intention of faith receives an eschatological character”.94 Buber 
takes the meaning of Torah in the Hebrew Bible not as law but direction or God’s instruction, 
noting the meaning of the Hebrew word Moreh as teacher, believing that the rendition law is 
the result of a Greek mistranslation which ultimately deprives it of its inner dynamic and 
force. Buber finds the reasons for such mistranslations going back as far as Sinai where a 
tendency began which led to the increasing objectification of the Torah and its becoming even 
more static by the time Christianity began. Buber finds the strength of the Torah in its ability 
to resist the process of petrifaction insofar as hearing the Word had a strength which was able 
to “...liberate again and again the living idea”.95  
Perhaps the relationship of the historical Jesus to the Torah lies at the heart of Buber’s 
thoughts on Jesus, especially at the Sermon on the Mount. Buber’s understanding of the 
fulfilment of the Torah extending to the hearing of the Word with the entire being in order to 
prevent its hardening meant that Jesus at the Mount wanted his followers to comprehend the 
Torah in its entire depth. Buber agrees that empty legalism could be easily maintained without 
any belief, going so far as to admit that the struggle against trivialisation and loss of 
inwardness became a crucial issue in Judaism reaching back as far as the prophets and their 
accusations against a cult which had become increasingly superficial despite sacrifices: 
Without inner intention, the sacrifice and the multitude of cultic actions was all but 
meaningless. Buber shows that the struggle for the “direction of the heart” goes from the 
Pharisees throughout history all the way down to the Hasidim who emphasise the complete 
turning of the heart towards God in order for an action to have validity.96   
                                                
93 Ibid., p. 44. 
94 Ibid., p. 56. 
95 Ibid., pp. 56–58. 
 
96 Ibid., pp. 58–59. 
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Buber still esteems the Gospels for retaining the emunah sense of faith, even though the 
Gospels themselves use the Greek word pistis. He approaches their philological aspects with 
similar care and attention as he does the Hebrew Scriptures, also saying that Jesus still 
occupies the “simple, situation-bound original dialogical relationship of the man of the 
Bible...who found eternity...in the profundity of the real moment of time”.97 Max Brod draws 
attention to the exegetic fidelity of Buber in his analysis of Buber’s comparative theology as 
well as the possible reasons for Buber’s quite specific portrait of the Jesus of the Gospels, and 
as we shall see, Buber prepares the way for his main line of argumentation, his polemic with 
Pauline theology.98  
Buber connects Jesus with the Pharisaic phase of Judaism current in Jesus’ time, drawing a 
comparison between the Sermon on the Mount (Matt 5.48) and the saying “Ye shall be holy, 
for I am holy”. To Buber, these words are a sublimation of the Pharisaic doctrine which gives 
direction to an initially directionless heart in need of being turned towards God. This is 
significant and decisive in one’s actions, the wicked heart being incapable of being turned 
towards God’s will. The reflective imagination of sin is thus ultimately worse than the act 
itself in its ability to estrange the heart from God. Jesus, in Buber’s interpretation, understands 
the Torah as instruction to the heart rather than fixed law, which is why he emphasises the 
inwardness, the heart as the place where obedience to the Torah truly begins.99 Ultimately, 
Buber “claims” the historical Jesus for Judaism, by placing him, as Brod puts it, “together 
with the prophets and the non-hypocritical wing of the Pharisees, the true representatives of 
this attitude, in the camp of classical Judaism which Buber in the long line of works 
mentioned above has depicted as a living unity”.100 By doing so, he separates Jesus from what 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
97 Ibid., p. 34. 
 
98 BROD, Max. Judaism and Christianity in Buber’s Work in Schilpp and Freidman (Hereafter to be referred to 
as “Brod, Judaism” pp. 326–27.  
 
99 Two Types of Faith, pp. 61–68. The inward direction of the heart influences the outer manifestations thereof in 
one’s actions. Buber further connects (pp. 70–78) even Jesus’  command to love one’s enemies to the emunah 
faith of the Old Testament by connecting it to the love of God for His creation: Because God sheds His love on 
all without exception, we are to imitate His love by doing the same. Moreover, because of the creation of man in 
God’s image, discriminating between people and races is inadmissible. Because all men are sons of God they are 
to love one another. Jesus’ command to love one‘s enemy is also seen by Buber as being of Jewish origin, and he 
goes to some lengths to prove this, citing parallels in Rabbinic literature as well as Hasidism 
    
100 Brod, Judaism, p. 329. 
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he depicts as the Pauline type Christianity which has formed and remained though the 
centuries, which Buber believes goes contrary to the Old Testament teaching. 
1.4.2. The Heart of Buber’s Polemic with Christianity: It is in Pauline Christianity, 
adulterated, in Buber’s opinion, by Hellenistic elements completely foreign to Jewish 
faith, that Buber finds the most radical departure from the Old Testament faith of 
Israel. It carries with it a deep pessimism which has its origins in Gnosticism.   
The central problem radically separating Paul’s teaching from that of Jesus is the way the two 
think of the Torah. At the centre of Buber’s polemic against Paul lies Buber’s firm conviction 
that the faith preached by Paul is different in kind from that preached by Jesus and the Old 
Testament line in which he stands. In general, he views the New Testament faith as far more 
rooted in Greek thought than in Hebrew thought. One example of this is his illustration using 
the need of the man of the New Testament to be convinced by proof of the rectitude of his 
belief. Because the non-existence of God is something foreign to the Old Testament person of 
faith, proof of God’s existence is superfluous for him / her: The presence of God in daily life 
is manifest in all aspects of the creation. Buber uses the Epistle to the Hebrews as an example 
of the existence of God as not being a matter of course in Christianity, but an article of faith to 
be believed in. The Old Testament witness of faith experiences God’s nearness in nature and 
history, and the Synoptic Gospels retain something of this faith. But it is already in John 
where Buber identifies Greek and Iranian influences which change the essence of the New 
Testament faith, alienating it from that of the Old.101 The Jesus of the Synoptics, according to 
Buber, still believes in man’s ability to fulfil the commands of the Torah. With Paul, the case 
is different. A part of Buber’s main arguments in his polemic with Paul lies in his elaboration 
on Paul’s way of understanding Abraham’s faith. Central to Abraham’s faith is that he trusted 
God unconditionally, allowing himself to be led away from the land of his fathers. But 
according to Paul, based on his reading of the Septuagint – which Buber decries as a 
                                                
101 Two Types of Faith, pp. 37–41. Buber elaborates on the Israelite to whom God is a matter of course and to 
whom all depends on whether he trusts the God who is “as a matter of course” as his God, and refers all things 
that happen to Him. Even in the moments of hardship and darkness, God is ever present, even if eclipsed. Buber 
then contrasts this to the Johannine Gospel which exhorts the believer to believe in him who has been sent, and 
threatens the non-believer with judgement. The Israelite is the one to whom faith or unfaith is not an issue, not 
only because of the Covenant out of which Israelite faith grew, but also because of the Hebrew faith which is 
realised within the bounds of everyday conduct as well as in the face of unexpected upheavals (e.g. as in the case 
of Job). 
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completely Hellenised translation of the Hebrew text – Abraham was able to believe in view 
of a promise, and his faith was further strengthened by this. 
 Buber’s Paul has an entirely forensic understanding of Abraham’s faith, where 
‘righteousness’, or a rightness of conduct is added to the proving true of Abraham’s faith, 
brought about paradoxically by God’s own action in what is described by Buber as an ‘inner 
divine dialectic’ leading ultimately to God in the Pauline letters, surrendering His son to the 
world in order to save it.102 Buber goes to considerable lengths to emphasise what he believes 
to be Paul’s distorted understanding of the Masoretic text which Buber believes is 
untranslatable. He believes that Paul’s view of the absence of real faith before Christ is based 
on his concept of the previous faith of Israel and later Judaism as a mere grouping of works. 
Moreover, Paul’s belief that the works of the Law cannot be fulfilled and that yet “all the 
things” which are written in the Book of the Law must be fulfilled in order to live is missing 
from the Masoretic text.  
It is primarily in the concept of the Torah as Law where Buber’s opinions about Christianity 
are at their most critical, specifically because they are based on Paul’s concept of the Torah 
which not only Buber, but other Jewish scholars object to as robbing the Torah or 
impoverishing it of its content.103 At the heart of Buber’s arguments is Paul’s apparently 
direct contradiction of Jesus’ teaching not only as far as the Torah was concerned, but also his 
desire to know Jesus in Spirit, implicitly denying the teachings of the historical Jesus as he 
did so. According to Buber, after the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus, Paul puts forward 
that the Torah is impossible to fulfil by man, indeed that it was given precisely so that sin may 
abound, that man may be frustrated by the imperative to fulfil it and his inability to do so, in 
order that he may seek refuge in the Lord’s grace. The essence of sin for Paul, consisting in 
one’s seeking to justify oneself instead of seeking mercy in God actually makes God’s own 
                                                
102 Ibid., pp. 45–49. 
 
103 See also Brod, Judaism p. 331. Here one can read another view supportive of the arguments Buber uses 
against Paulinism. He, like Buber believes that Jesus regarded the Torah as being capable of fulfilment, and that 
the essential meaning of the word Torah is “instruction”. Paul’s translation to the word “Law” is based on 
Hellenistic / Alexandrine Judaic understanding of this word. Brod points out the close relationship of the Lord’s 
Prayer to its original Jewish elements. Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount is said to have a close relationship to 
Rabbinical Judaism given the radicalism of his obedience to the Torah, but he nevertheless has a different 
understanding of the present age insofar as the present epoch, although a struggle of competing powers for 
world dominion still allows free decision for good or evil, as well as the possible “return to the good way 
through trust in God.”   
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law ineffectual, paradoxically by God’s own intention. Thus Paul’s concept of the Law leads, 
in Buber’s opinion, to God’s self-contradiction.104 But Buber also accuses Paul of leading the 
reader down ambiguous paths of unclear text, especially in his “theocentric history of the 
cosmos and of man”.105  
Buber harshest criticism of Paul concerns Gnostic dualism; and the arguments he uses are 
both instructive and thought-provoking. Buber sees an inescapability of evil so pervasive in 
the writings of Paul that not even God can control it anymore. Now in opposition to its 
original function, the Law inescapably excites God’s wrath and man’s death. The Jews are 
kept captive under the very same Law given to them to possess but which only serves to 
further indict them, in order to make way for the Parousia. But Buber finds this antithetical to 
the concept of YHVH, the God of the Fathers who leads His people from the house of slavery, 
who always seeks the salvation of even the wayward. There is the added problematic element 
of the hardening of man in the New Testament serving God’s purpose, which is one of the 
main reasons why Buber thinks that the God of the New Testament bears little relation to 
YHVH of the Old Testament. There God as the Creator gives man freedom, and gives him the 
Torah as a way to life – as a gift. People, however, reject its direction. Buber finds the 
concept of original sin absurd; it goes against the word of Jesus in the Gospels who postulated 
forgiveness through prayer, prayer being the essence of immediacy with God. Yet in Paul’s 
theology one remains far from God’s mercy and grace except through Jesus, and is abandoned 
hopelessly to the powers of Satan, to whom the God of wrath has given man and the world.106 
                                                
104 Two Types of Faith, pp. 148–49. Although Paul writes that the Law is just and good, it merely brings about 
the knowledge of evil and the desire in persisting in it. Man, flesh and Israel are still sold under sin; yet the Law 
is still ostensibly there to save man. Moreover, Buber finds the fact that Paul does not pray for the mitigation of 
judgement of mankind but puts forward a God who will have nothing less than full punishment for man’s sin as 
being unsustainable and going beyond measure. 
 
105 Two Types of Faith, pp. 80–81. 
 
106 Ibid. pp. 86–87; 138–49; 158–61. One of the most vehement objections to Paul concept of God’s wrath is 
found in the latter text (pp. 138–49), in which Buber compares the Old Testament concept of God with Paul’s, 
whom he accuses of saying nothing about God’s love. The fatherly wrath of YHVH towards his disobedient 
child is contrasted with the Pauline God who is completely alienated from the world in which wrath has been 
given complete power over mankind until the coming of Jesus. God’s wrath in Paul’s writings has entirely taken 
the character of hostile fate determined by the elements which Paul has derived from Hellenistic Judaism in 
which God and fate have combined to crushing the individual will. God then causes his Son to save the elect (p. 
140). There is a strong opposition to the doctrine of original sin which Paul’s teaching originated, and Buber 
espouses the view (pp. 158–61) that men sin as Adam sinned, and that God, being Almighty, ever-present 
eternally is just as capable of forgiving eternally – not eschatologically – without the need of a mediator. 
   
See also Brod, Judaism, pp. 334–35. Brod writes that Paul’s concept of the God who gives the Law to His 
people as a stumbling block so that they may be convicted of sin misleading, saying that it differs widely from 
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Buber is at wide variance with Paul regarding the function of works. Although Paul sees 
works as a way of illuding oneself into self-righteousness in terms of the Law (Rom 5–6), 
Buber shows that such matters were also an issue for the Pharisees e.g. in their Lishmah 
doctrine which stresses the importance of the act’s place in the heart: The Torah itself cannot 
bestow life, and the act cannot be separated from the soul. Paul and John are also accused of 
moving the centre of Christian faith away from devotion to God, and nearer to the hope and 
expectation of individual resurrection. Paul and John exhort the believers to follow them (1 
Cor 11.1; Jn 8.15) and listen to their message in order to be saved. Individual resurrection is 
ultimately connected to faith in Jesus Christ – in recognizing him as the door to salvation; that 
he is Lord and that he was raised from the dead, all of which Buber classifies as pistis or faith 
that.  
Buber maps the Old Testament occurrences and roots of the belief in ascension from death, 
from the doctrine of such holy men as Enoch or Elijah being taken by God, to the idea of 
resurrection in Pharisaic Judaism. Buber writes that the belief in resurrection applied to the 
nation and was believed to be realised in the course of history. The Pharisee as well as the 
individual Jew did not have their faith centred on the belief of individual resurrection, which 
was more an aspect and concern of Greek thought at the time. Although such belief was 
comprehended by Hellenistic Judaism, Buber writes that Judaism nonetheless chose to remain 
separate from it, which he believes is the core reason why Paul’s and John’s teaching found 
the response they had expected in the Gentiles, whom Buber believes the apostles had 
unwittingly chosen for.107 In essence, this not only results in a loss of immediacy by making 
the condition of salvation a faith in something, but also goes against the very self-identity of 
Jesus, who did not demand or desire that he be deified by believers. One of the primary 
sources for Buber’s argumentation is Mk. 8.30 and related passages, in which Jesus charges 
Peter not to tell others that he is the Christ.108  
                                                                                                                                                      
the Old Testament conception of God whose wrath is directly connected to the wilful disobedience of His 
children.  
 
107 Ibid., pp. 91–101. 
 
108 See also Friedman, Martin Buber, pp. 274–76.  Friedman supports Buber by criticising Christian belief in 
Jesus the God-man, saying not only that Jesus did not summon his disciples to have faith in him, and tried to 
discourage them from speaking in public about whom they supposed him to be. Friedman repeats in brief the 
arguments brought up by Buber in Two Types of Faith which have been written about in this thesis, but also 
speaks of the strengthening of the loss of immediacy in the strong dualism of wrath and mercy in the Pauline 
concept of God, saying that the result is a dual God, one good, the other evil. 
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Another direction Buber’s criticism of Christianity takes is his mapping of the understanding 
of the Messiah in Judaism after the exile through to the time of Jesus. Buber sees an important 
influence of Second-Isaiah on Jesus’ self identity, especially in the concept of the suffering 
servant who remains hidden, his sufferings a mystery to those around him and even to 
himself: Jesus understood himself to be the bearer of Messianic hiddeness which Buber 
believes is the meaning of the Messianic secret. Here the servant is compared to an arrow in 
the quiver that is not its own master; its purpose yet to be determined. The fact that the figure 
of the Messiah was supposed to come from the ranks of humans is as important in Buber’s 
argumentation as the fact that this figure changed considerably from the time of the exile, in 
which the Messianic commission is divided between the king Kyros and the remainder of 
Israel, the servant of YHVH. Both conceptions involve an ascending, human Messiah rather 
than one that has been sent from heaven. Buber argues that the figure of the Messiah changed 
in substance and essence in John and Paul’s conception, transforming their conception of the 
Messiah from the verse in Daniel (Dan. 7.14) to one nearer to deification.109  
According to Emil Brunner, Buber’s criticisms of Paul are the result of careful exegesis and 
scientific study in comparative religion, and his exposition of the meaning of pistis goes deep 
to the heart Christian doctrinal tradition determined by the belief that something is true. It is 
even true that there was incorporation of some Gnostic ideas into the Christian dogma, 
especially in the first five centuries. But Brunner emphasises that although there was some 
Hellenising of faith, a true understanding of the doctrine of justification through faith alone in 
fact requires distancing of oneself from Gnostic doctrines. A similar view can be found in 
Bultmann’s Theology of the New Testament in which Bultmann confronted the Gnostic and 
Jewish Apocalyptic influences of the New Testament in exceptionally deep and broad    
terms.110 
                                                
109 Two Types of Faith, pp. 104–13. 
 
110 Brunner, Judaism, pp. 314–17. Brunner argues that although Buber criticises the making of a historical event 
(the Cross) the subject of faith, he leaves the historical aspect of revelation in the Jewish faith out of 
consideration even though it was precisely historical events such as the revelation at Sinai in which YHVH 
revealed His name. And yet, according to Brunner, recognition of Jesus’ life and death at the Cross as God’s 
self-revelation and the knowledge of being judged and forgiven are of the same nature. Believing that is thus an 
act in which one man opens himself unreservedly to God in self-commitment. Brunner writes that sin is an 
estrangement from God and His will which no act of turning can repair. In the Cross, God communicates 
Himself to man, who recognises Christ as the vicariously suffering servant of God and has his righteousness 
imputed to him. Man must go beyond himself, not believe in his own righteousness and trust God completely. 
Brunner argues that such faith has the result of a transformational turning of the self to the direction of God, 
loving Him and one’s neighbour with all one’s strength.  
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1.4.3. God’s Hiddeness: Although God is invisible and sometimes needs to hide Himself in 
order to be seen, the Jew never gives up faith because he realises that although God 
sometimes judges, God’s last word is always mercy. To the Christian, God is only 
present in the person of Jesus Christ, who has come to save the world from its 
destitute state. These different concepts of God in history are the last major element 
that separates Judaism and Christianity by an unbridgeable chasm in Buber’s Biblical 
theology.  
Maurice Friedman describes the integration of God into every aspect of everyday life in 
dialogic relation which makes the idea of a God confined in the person of a human being – 
Jesus of Nazareth – impossible. Friedman supports Buber in his belief that Christians attempt 
to confine God in this form through which the only contact with Him is possible. This is 
offensive to Buber not only because God cannot be limited to the realms of the supersensual 
or spiritual, but the very impossibility of limitation in God means that He can manifest 
Himself in nature whilst remaining hidden. Buber and Friedman believe that Christians aim to 
prevent God from doing so.111 In the Old Testament, God hides Himself whenever the 
relations between Himself and His people have become estranged, because the people stray in 
wilful disobedience.  
For Buber, Christianity after John brings about a new article of faith which gives up the 
emunah paradox for a palpable image of God with a human face, telling us that this new 
image is the revelation of the Eternal God in man, appearing to us as He is Himself. In what 
Buber believes is an unacceptable anthropomorphism, the Christian God now has a 
countenance, something unacceptable to Jewish faith. Then Buber continues to say that in 
precisely this countenance persisted and became known in the Christian faith as God Himself. 
For this reason, Christians do not let YHVH be Himself. Because God is in all powers and 
mysteries but is not an object, so that images such as those the Christians have of God oppose 
the immediacy of the Jewish relationship with the Imageless One where God can only be 
                                                                                                                                                      
See also BULTMANN, Rudolph. Theology of the New Testament Vol. I.  London. SCM Press Ltd. 1951. Transl. 
by GROBEL, Kendrick, pp. 164–83. Bultmann examines the Gnostic mythology which had an influence on the 
Hellenistic Church but shows the great difference between the two doctrines, one of the most important being 
that the Church did not consider man to contain fragments of the Divine Light. See also below 1.5. Critical 
Assessment of Buber’s Thoughts on Christianity.     
 
111 Friedman, Martin Buber, pp. 242–46. Friedman emphasises the connectedness of this line of thought to 
Buber’s understanding of relation as the dialogue in which man can experience God without coming to know 
about His essence. Before man can speak about revelation, he must experience it as a living reality. 
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loved with the entire believing heart. Thus Christians, in Buber’s interpretation, only succeed 
in further concealing God, although Buber acknowledges that a certain kind of immediacy is 
achieved when the object of love is that of a loved person who has precisely this form. But 
closer to Christian doctrine is the belief that God revealed Himself in the person of Jesus 
Christ, and that Jesus Christ is humanity as God intended it to be. Buber ignores the fact that 
the Hellenistic Church was extremely cautious about saying that Jesus Christ was God. One 
could go so far as to say that Buber’s conception of Jesus Christ is closer to Monophysitism 
than orthodox Christian doctrine of the Trinity and the two natures of Christ.  Mention has 
been made of Buber’s low esteem for the Apocalyptic. Philo and the late Hellenistic 
Apocalypticism influenced by Iranian dualism are listed by Buber as being among Paul’s 
other theological influences, influential also on his attitude to the human body as the seat of 
the passions. This goes some way towards explaining Buber’s low esteem for Paul.112 Yet 
Buber conveniently omits the fact that Judaism of the Hellenistic age was burdened by 
precisely the same influences as Christianity. 
Closely connected with this is what Buber presents as the Pharisaic attempt to retain 
immediacy in a world changed by Hellenistic ideas of fate and the Mediator. They espoused a 
doctrine of Providence against fate in which God is present in all creation, always changing 
the middah of judgement to that of mercy. Justice and grace form a unity in Pharisaic doctrine 
that Buber finds absent in Paul.113 The conclusion Buber arrives at is that our era is still in the 
grip of Pauline pessimism, with the tendency of dividing the world of wrath from the world of 
grace. But the the redeemed Christian, despite being redeemed, stands alone and powerless in 
a world possessed by evil powers. In contrast to theologies based on the satisfaction theory, 
Buber uses the argument that God, being God, is superior to all that is human and is above all 
laws; He would remain even if the world ceased, thus needing no mediator. Buber uses Franz 
Kafka to illustrate emunah. Kafka’s tangle of absurdities in which the individual is inexorably 
                                                
112 Two Types of Faith, pp. 144–45. In the case of Philo, God uses the powers to mediate between Himself and 
man, and in such apocalyptic literature as the Ezra Apocalypse, man’s nature is suffering under the burden of 
freedom that God has given him powerless against the root of evil common in the hearts of men that was sown in 
Adam’s heart from the very beginning. Paul’s world-view and negative attitude towards the body which is 
powerless against the passions developed from these ideas. Adam – instead of being God’s good creation –  is 
evil from the start in a Gnostic conception of flesh created by the Demiurge as evil. 
113 Ibid., pp. 152–54. See also Friedman, Martin Buber pp. 276–79. Like Buber, Friedman concludes that the 
two types of faith stand side by side, irredeemably separate despite the impassioned statements Buber makes 
about Jesus in the Jewish community. 
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judged by an unseen judge with cruel kings as intermediaries and the remoteness of the judge 
is a recurring theme in The Castle. Buber says that this is precisely the Jew’s security in the 
dark: without illusion, a place where no-one can hurt you. Kafka’s faith is the belief in a God 
who remains hidden “without disowning reality“. God’s hiding Himself does not diminish His 
immediacy because He remains manifest in His creation and is present throughout it. 
1.5. Critical Assessment of Buber’s Thoughts on Christianity: Although Buber’s thoughts 
on Christianity are to be taken seriously, his thoughts in sum lead to a new form of 
dogmatism. Buber is too selective in his portrayal of the historical Jesus, not taking 
sufficiently into account numerous passages in the Gospels that are highly critical 
towards Pharisaic Judaism. Quite the contrary from being separable from Paul, the two 
are in fact closely connected. Buber also ignores numerous passages of Paul which are 
markedly anti-Gnostic in tone and thinking. 
Without doubt much of what Buber says about Christianity deserves to be taken seriously by 
Christians, especially given the careful exegetic attention with which Buber scrutinises the 
New Testament text. Most specifically, The Two Types of Faith is an important work in so far 
as Buber does much to “clarify the religious message of Judaism from its basis in the Old 
Testament.”114 Buber also goes some way to clarify, lest the Christian forgets, Jesus’ origins 
in the Jewish faith, not only acknowledging his greatness, but also seeing in Jesus a brother 
and a great son of Judaism. But despite Buber’s assurances in the preface of his book that 
polemics are not his intention, the tone of his words about the apostles, and especially Paul 
ultimately combine to form one of the harshest of modern attacks on Christian faith. 
To begin with, a Christian reader may find even Buber’s interpretation of the Gospels too 
selective insofar as he often conveniently ignores the fact that Jesus himself did not spare 
Pharisaic Judaism any criticism in the Gospels, evidently finding faith as they practised it to 
be insufficient. Pharisees and Sadducees are called hypocrites and an adulterous generation 
for seeking a sign i.e. for their lack of faith in Jesus (Matt 16.1–6; Mk 8.15; Mt 12.38–42; Lk 
1.29–32); they are also strongly criticised for mere outward fulfilling of ritual and cultic 
demands without adequate substance (Matt 12.1–14; Mk 2.23–28; 3.1–6; Lk 6.1–11). 
Elsewhere, the scribes and the Pharisees are described as a “generation of vipers” when they 
accuse Jesus of having his healing power from Beelzebub (Mt 12.22-37;   Mk 3.19–30; Lk 
                                                
114 Brunner, pp. 313 
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11.14–23); elsewhere they are described as tempters when they question him about divorce 
(Mt 19.1–12; Mk 10.1–12; Lk 16–18) and try to incriminate him in the questioning about 
paying tribute to Caesar (Mt 22.15–22, Mk 12.13–17; Lk 20.20–26) or about the greatest 
commandment (Mt 22.34–40; Mk 12.28–34). 
The strongest denunciation of the scribes and Pharisees is, however, to be found in passages 
amounting to the harshest criticism of legalism and dogmatism (Mt 23.1–36; Mk 12.38–40; 
Lk 11.37–54; 20.45–47). Despite what Buber writes about Jesus thinking that the commands 
of the Decalogue could be fulfilled, it is clear that the opposite is the case. In Mt 23 and Lk 
11.37–54 Jesus condemns outward yet spectacular fulfilment of commandments and rituals, 
calling the Pharisees vain lovers of attention for precisely this reason (Mt 23.1–8; Lk 11.41–
43). He calls the demands they make on people burdens that are impossible to fulfil, calling 
the Pharisees hypocrites and blind guides for making demands on people that they do not 
fulfil themselves, or says that they take care only of what is on the outside, but that their 
inside is full of “ravening and wickedness” (Lk 11.39, 46). To look at matters from the other 
side, the prolific Judaic scholar Jacob Neusner speaks of Pharisaic Judaism as a dynamic 
reform movement that sought to sanctify every aspect of everyday life, to literally create a 
nation of priests by bringing the temple to the very home, complete with a great multitude of 
complex laws to achieve this goal. This created the backbone of the laws and traditions 
collected and codified in the Talmud.115 
It is also to be noted that the rabbinic literature of Judaism’s formative age was no more 
sparing in its criticism of early Christianity. The primary documents of that age are full of 
mutual verbal disputes; the polemics have a particular tone and seem time-conditioned. 
Unfortunately, the fact that interpreters on both sides have taken these remarks with less 
reserve than they should, has led to a mutual deepening of animosity which will take a lot of 
work to remove. 
All in all, the above are only a few of the examples precisely from the Gospels that show that 
Buber oversimplifies matters by selectively taking a small, if significant passage from the 
Gospels (most specifically Mt 5–7) and laying the greater part of the burden of his 
argumentation by connecting Jesus with the faith of the Old Testament primarily on the basis 
of this passage. Jesus did indeed seek to radicalise the faith of the time, saying that “one jot or 
                                                
115 NEUSNER, Jacob. Invitation to the Talmud. Birminghamton. Global Publications. 2001. 
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one title shall in no wise pass from the law, till all shall be fulfilled” (Mt 5.19) but also added 
that unless one’s righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees, one would not enter 
into the kingdom of heaven. Perhaps in doing so, he acknowledged the justification for the 
moral demands of the Pharisees, but at the same time said that righteousness is something 
unachievable by man. While it is true that Jesus stands in the line of Old Testament faith, no 
reader of the Bible can ignore the fact that Jesus clearly does not believe that man is capable 
of fulfilling these demands and achieving righteousness. He also speaks of confessing him 
before men in order to be accepted before the angels of God (Lk 12.8–12), and warns his 
disciples against being deceived by others who come in his name claiming to be Christ (Mt 
24.4–5 parr.). Although Jesus was aware of his messianic identity very early (Mk 1.9–11), 
others were not. The reason Jesus did not want his identity to be spread was because he knew 
that it was not the right time.  
Perhaps one of Buber’s greatest contributions to the Christian-Jewish dialogue is his reminder 
to the Christians of the rootedness of the two faiths in the faith of Abraham. In a study, Hans 
Urs Von Balthazar writes that he thought he had understood Paul for the first time after 
reading Buber, who also points out that Paul writes quite clearly in Rom 4 about the “holy 
root” (the Jews) which sanctify the wild grafted roots (the Gentile Christians), emphasising in 
the process that Christians would only be accepted as believers if they acted as such.116 
Christians have rarely been aware of the Jewish roots of their faith; over the ages there has 
been a narrow, strongly anti-Judaist theology despite primitive Christianity’s debt to Judaism. 
Balthazar looks for the connection to the Abrahamic faith of Judaism elsewhere; for example 
in the Law, cult, kingdom, and priesthood, but especially in suffering, where he sees the 
anticipation of Christology precisely in Israel’s experience in being knowingly ordained to 
vicariously suffer for the world’s sins.117 Balthasar is critical towards Buber for what he sees 
as a dogmatism in which Buber attempts to discredit Christianity because of its inability to fit 
into his (Buber’s) “prophetic” faith thesis, whilst ignoring developments in historical 
Judaism.118  
                                                
116 BALTHASAR, Hans Urs von. Martin Buber and Christianity in Schilpp and Freidman, p. 345. 
 
117 Ibid., p. 346. 
 
118 Ibid., p. 347–49.  Buber’s thesis borders on absoluteness, and Balthasar notes that Buber’s thoughts on the 
essence of Judaism practically ignores its development after 70 C.E., as well as the material content of Law / 
legalism. But we agree that Buber’s reduction of Judaism down to a “prophetic” faith of immediate relation of I 
to Thou, with his demands of complete unity of the earthly with the divine with no earthly intermediates places 
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But it is perhaps Buber’s attacks on Paul regarding his conception of a world held in sin that 
poses the greatest stumbling block for Christians. Although Buber believes that the world’s 
evils and shortcomings are evidence of the eclipse of God and not evidence that the world is 
held in sin, any observer of events in recent centuries could seriously question the tenability 
of that line of thought. There is little evidence to suggest that man’s nature is not evil at the 
core and that without God’s grace humankind would not survive long. Buber’s thinking that 
man is able to save himself by turning is flatly contradicted by the fact that over the millennia, 
man has merely shown himself to become increasingly adept at finding new and more 
effective ways of causing his own destruction. As Balthasar notes, Buber’s paths lead to a 
utopia involving a salvation coming from man, based on an optimistic belief that man is good 
by nature and has it in his power to save himself, to change the world and create a genuinely 
good society.119  
As disturbing as one may find many of the passages in the Pauline corpus on Judaism and the 
human body, as well as passages that borrow from Gnostic ideas, a reader of the New 
Testament apocrypha will immediately notice the divergence between Gnostic and Christian 
thought. Perhaps some of the most important of these are the fact that Jesus is not considered 
to be the Saviour of mankind in the Gnostic Apocrypha, but merely a messenger who has 
come to make man aware of the divine spark that dwells within him and free him from this 
plane of corporeal existence considered to be the lowest, in line with the Platonic dualism of 
the Gnostics. This newfound divinity liberates man not only from corporeal existence but 
from its moral constraints as well, leading to unlicensed moral libertinism. Moral restraint 
was, however, strongly urged by Paul; the body, being the temple of the Lord, was to be 
sanctified. A significant part of his works concern the ethical conduct of the members of the 
church in expectation of the Parousia, which although delayed was nonetheless to come. 
                                                                                                                                                      
him outside the boundaries of historical Judaism. Balthasar correctly points out that the “Judaism” of Martin 
Buber goes beyond both liberal and orthodox Judaism, as we have discussed above in 1.3.0. Later, in the same 
essay (pp. 352–56), Balthasar speaks of Buber’s conception of Judaism as one that seeks to eliminate the duality 
between the divine and earthly, and that this is then to become the propelling force of mankind, but that his 
demand goes further than a mere political Zionism and in fact becomes a dogmatism that can be found only in 
Catholic Christianity which also makes absolute demands on earthly religion. Balthasar notes that for Buber, all 
that is good, true and pure in Christianity is that which has its origin in Judaism before it was adulterated by 
Manichaeism and Paulinism, that Jesus himself was a Jew. But because we have drawn attention to the fact that 
Buber’s conception of Judaism is untenable from at least the scholarly point of view, are his polemics with 
Christianity are not too subjective bearing in mind the selectivity with which Buber handles its formative 
documents.   
 
119 Ibid., p. 356. 
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Many passages contain what could be described as laws and statutes based on the Decalogue 
(1 Cor 6.12–7.40; 10.1–33; Eph 5.1–21; Col 3.5–25; Gal 5.16–26; 1 Thess 4.1–12; 1 Tim 6; 
Tit 1–3.11). Because Paul was well aware of the danger of fusing the divine with the earthly, 
he issued numerous warnings urging sobriety in worship (1 Cor 12–14; Gal 1.6-10; 1 Tim 
1.3–11). 
Ultimately, acceptance of Christianity involves rejection of Gnostic attempts to fuse the 
divine with the earthly. Sin is the estrangement of man with God his Creator, leading to an 
estrangement of man with his neighbour and the proliferation of sin in the world which man 
on his own, without help from above, is unable to halt. This is what Brunner believes to be the 
true meaning of the Cross, in which man looks beyond himself and his own powers and trusts 
in God’s self commitment to man in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.120 Perhaps the 
most important characteristic of this new life is love which is the greatest gift of all (1 Cor 
13), which is patient, kind and accepting of others’ weaknesses. Buber, however, almost 
entirely disregards the above.  
1.6.0. The Problem of Theodicy 
1.6.1. The Mystery and Paradox of Suffering: Suffering in some of Buber’s writings is an 
incomprehensible mystery that yet places the afflicted near to God. Yet some of 
Buber’s writings on this question show strong characteristics of existentialist 
interpretation. 
Buber’s small but powerful book Right and Wrong and the chapter The God of the Sufferers 
of his book The Prophetic Faith contain some of his most penetrating insights into the 
perplexing problem of theodicy. Here some of the key figures in the Bible – Jeremiah, 
Ezekiel, Job, Psalm 73 and Second Isaiah – are analyzed in depth. Buber’s treatment of Job 
and Second Isaiah is particularly instructive. The suffering prophet is contrasted with the 
superficial attempts at reform in the days leading to the destruction of the first temple. Rather 
                                                
120 See also Brunner, p. 316. Brunner writes that Paul recognised the central salvific act in the Cross where God 
addresses man as a child in the event of God’s self-communication to man who, in recognising in Christ the 
Ebed Yahveh, is brought to salvation in a manner that repentance alone cannot bring. This kind of faith is 
described as an extension of emunah because it trusts in God rather than oneself, returning to God in the process 
by identifying himself with the one on the Cross. This brings about a new being by turning away from the old 
kind of being in a turning back to God that is enabled by the power of the Holy Spirit which has a profoundly 
changing effect on the inner man, turning man’s intentional being towards God. 
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than telling the people what they want to hear (the sign of the false prophet) Jeremiah chooses 
to tell the bitter truth and be a vessel for God’s word, suffering as he does so; yet in his 
suffering we see the Eternal Thou in distress too. The prophet in his suffering takes the 
punishment of his people’s iniquities upon himself in order to purify them, God’s presence 
being nearest to the afflicted and suffering. His sharing in their plight forms a mysterious and 
paradoxical connection between God and suffering.121 “The sufferings which he bears 
because of Israel he bears for Israel”.122  
Buber ascribes the Book of Job to the time of exile. Job’s cries of anguish are interpreted 
collectively in terms of the Babylonian exile, becoming an effective metaphor for Israel. 
Several views of God’s relationship to suffering are presented in response to the question of 
theodicy.123 Although Job knows he is not sinless he believes that his punishments are 
disproportionate to his sins (Jb 29–31). And in line with Buber’s concept of the God that 
remains close even when hidden, Job the faithful man believes a solution will come, even in 
the face of great adversity. Although perplexed and mystified, he feels close to God in his 
suffering, and can only accept his plight and ask for his God. Struggling with the hidden God 
who is remote, Buber’s Job believes in the God who hides Himself (Jb 19.23–24; 26). He 
embodies a faith close to primitive Israel in a near and ever present, rather than being a stilted 
and mechanical god who acts causally and according to human laws. Thus Buber’s God 
sometimes does not give people the answers they might want. God’s speech (Jb 38–41) is 
depicted as the fourth view of God’s relationship to human suffering forming a complement 
to the faithful believer’s steadfast and devoted trust in hidden God. Buber notes details of the 
text such as the poet of the book of Job, calling Job God’s servant several times because of his 
                                                
121 Prophetic Faith, pp. 178–81, 183. Jeremiah is depicted as hurting inside but unable to keep silent with the 
word he has to bear. He suffers with and for the people whom he knows are in the wrong. Buber sees the 
suffering of an Eternal Thou in the prophet Jeremiah’s suffering; yet Jeremiah’s suffering has a personal element 
and is representative of the suffering of the people. “The “I” of the individual remains transparent into the “I” of 
the community. It is no metaphor when Jeremiah speaks of the people of Israel not only as “we” but also as “I”, 
just as it is no more figurative language to speak of Rachel weeping for her children.” (Jer 31.15) 
 
122 Ibid., p. 18. 
123 Ibid., pp. 188–95. The reader of the Biblical text knows that God has allowed Satan, one of his creatures, to 
entice Job by attacking his family and smiting him with sores (Jb 1–3). Job’s friends believe the cause of his 
ailments points to Job’s sin (Jb 4; 8; 11; 15; 18; 20), which leads Job to complain against God who has 
withdrawn Himself leaving Job to the false representation of his friends (Jb 19.1–22). The third view of the 
relationship is Job’s, of a God who contradicts His revelation by remaining hidden yet noticeably near in the face 
of disaster. Both Job and his friends know about justice only from a human perspective, knowing that human 
agents act and punish others representatively. Human activity is willed by God but opposed by His acts. But 
because God appears to torment Job gratuitously, no answer that Job can think of is of any avail to his suffering.   
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steadfast faith in the face of his suffering. Buber places Job in the same line as the great men 
of faith designated by God – Abraham, Moses, David and Isaiah, leading up to the Servant of 
YHVH in Deutero-Isaiah. Job’s intercession for his friends before God appears to be another 
link to this figure. The prophet intercedes on the behalf of men and Buber links the utterances 
of various suffering prophets by pointing out similarities in their speech and words. The 
prophetic experience is a terrifying and weighty occurrence that touches the lives of those it 
affects deeply; and yet in suffering, the prophet attains the vision of God.124   
In Right and Wrong, a small series of exegetic studies of unusual depth and profundity, Buber 
discusses the plight of Israel in exile. In The Heart Determines, Buber elaborates on Psalm 73, 
where a man discusses the meaning of his experience in life. Here we see The Psalmist 
describe how he penetrated to the deeper heart of his experiences in the face of the prosperity 
of the wicked; the speaker is described as the man of Israel, suffering in Israel’s hour of need. 
Communal suffering is condensed into the suffering of the individual. The speaker is brought 
to the edge of despair by seeing the wicked prosper. God reveals His goodness to the pure of 
heart. Buber demarcates a dividing line between the pure and impure of heart. The repentant 
sinner can also experience that God is good to him. From this perspective, the wicked are 
“those who persist in impurity of heart”. Attention is drawn to the keyword of this Psalm 
“heart” meaning “inner man” in Hebrew.125 The Psalmist, on the brink of despair and even 
envious of the landowners who remained in Palestine during the exile, is almost ready to 
accuse God, experiencing the enigma of wicked people’s happiness; Buber emphasises the 
persistence of this enigma, even though the Psalmist tries ever harder to see deeper into his 
plight with “the eyes of the spirit, but always subsequently comes back to the same 
conflict.”126 The conflict is resolved when the Psalmist enters into the sanctuary of God, and 
Buber writes that only the pure of heart can receive God’s blessing and enter into his 
sanctuary, know His mysteries or enter into the sphere of holiness where the true meaning of 
conflict is revealed. In what can be described as a truly existentialist interpretation of this 
Psalm, Buber says that the evil do not really exist, and whatever they experience only leads 
                                                
124
 Ibid., pp. 192–97. 
 
125 Right and Wrong, pp. 34–39. 
 
126 Ibid., pp. 40–41. 
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back repeatedly to the non-entity of their being: They constantly experience their non-
existence in lives that are lived in mere shadows of God’s reality.127  
The way of the wicked is one of struggle, and in his exegesis of Psalm 1,128 they are those 
who continually stray from the path to follow their own ways. Buber once again examines the 
way the Psalmist uses such literary devices as parallelism to compare the way of the wicked, 
righteous and sinful. Buber is struck by the words “O happiness” that commence the Psalm 
and with it the entire Psalter.129 It is not a promise of a reward of happy life for those who 
follow the way, but a cry of joy. The actions of the good are always ultimately a success in 
spite of numerous setbacks and failures. The way of the wicked, on the other hand, leads 
nowhere; and Buber believes that they eventually come to comprehend the nullity of their 
existence at a time when it is actually of no avail to them “...neither before nor after, their life 
is wayless.”130 The expression of the Psalm “For the Lord knoweth the way of the righteous” 
(Ps 1.6) is grasped by Buber in the context of his analysis of the word “to know” which 
carries the meaning of someone knowing something by coming into contact with it by 
knowing it at its centre.131 Buber sees the most intimate knowing in the calling of the prophets 
to be the bearers of God’s word; in Israel whom He is sending out on its mission. He 
accompanies these even in the face of adversity. God shows the way in the Torah, and one 
cannot merely follow it, but must delight in its teaching and live in it actively. By doing so, he 
remains rooted in God’s eternity no longer burdened by the concerns of time. The wicked 
actively oppose God’s way; they are evil. Sinners sometimes stray and do evil. Buber sees the 
difference between the two in the inability of the wicked to change their paths, whereas the 
sinner may yet repent and turn. The wicked are not closed from God’s side but their own in 
their complete lack of desire to turn, hence the nothingness their lives amount to. The 
                                                
127 Ibid., p. 43. “Their life has been a shadow structure in a dream of God’s.” Buber also writes that the Psalmist 
wants to teach us that the struggling man’s being with God is revealed to him at the time of his distress, when he 
has become purer in heart, and having become purer, stays in God’s sanctuary continually. This gives the 
speaker strength. Buber describes the central experience as one of the father leading the son, being continually 
with him.  See also Prophetic Faith pp. 199–202 for a parallel account of this Psalm. 
 
128 Ibid., The Ways, pp. 53–62. 
 
129 Ibid., p. 55 This is Buber’s translation of the verse that begins “Blessed is the man that walketh not in the 
counsel of the ungodly.” (Ps 1.1) 
 
130 Ibid., p. 57. 
 
131 See also above p. 6, 21n. 
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possibility of such firm resistance to God’s will is a mystery which Buber then turns silent 
about, leaving it alone as something only God can fathom.132  
Although being near to God in His sanctuary gives the pure strength, it does not absolve the 
individual of the weighty responsibility of being free to choose in the course of his life. Yet 
the revealing insight changes the perspective of life and death. Death is no longer the 
meaningless end of life, although there is no doctrine of life after death, and Buber writes that 
it is into God’s eternity that the pure of heart moves into; this eternity is different to any time 
we experience. Attention is drawn to the distance of the wicked from God in what is called 
“lost existence” by Buber.133 Such vocabulary and phrases are very reminiscent of such 
existentialist concepts as inauthentic existence (Heidegger) or poor faith (Sartre). Buber 
himself calls his book a work of “existential exegesis”134, adding that true existence is the 
nearness of God.     
1.6.2. The Redemptive Nature of Vicarious Suffering: In the figure of the suffering servant 
of Second Isaiah is the culmination of Buber’s concept of YHVH’s relationship with 
suffering. In the willing, suffering love of the servant of YHVH the estranged 
relationship between Israel and YHVH is renewed. The servant is to become a light for 
the nations. 
God is near to his faithful, even in death: People of faith place their trust in God and His 
eternity, not in the immortality of the soul. Because they live in communion with God who is 
eternal, God is their portion. And yet: “This communion is acquired through suffering.”135 In 
the hours of the greatest darkness, in the depths of exile, the prophets are to reveal the 
message of salvation, so that the faithful of Israel do not despair. This small remnant will 
return home from exile. Israel’s redemption and that of the nations are part of God’s single 
redemptive act among men.  
                                                
132 Ibid., p. 62. 
 
133 Ibid., p. 48–51. 
 
134 Ibid., p. 10. 
 
135 Prophetic Faith, p. 202. 
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It is Buber’s complex and illuminating treatment of Second Isaiah that some commentators 
hold in particularly high regard, especially that of the servant of YHVH. From a strongly text-
based, philological departure-point, Buber throws in relief the meticulous pattern of 
connecting words and phrases which serve to integrate passages in such a way that they 
complement and explain one another.136 It is here, in this part of Isaiah that the sovereignty of 
YHVH against all other human images of gods is asserted. These so-called gods are only 
inventions of the minds imagining them and are thus dependant on the same for their being; 
and YHVH is God who is living and being, who inspires the prophetic word; He is God of the 
prophet and the suffering. The strongest assertion is of YHVH as God – who not only controls 
history but also enters into it and intervenes, rising above His enemies and prevailing over 
them – is to be found in Second Isaiah. For all its complexity, the Babylonian pantheon is yet 
another human invention or mere talk about God.137  
In line with some Biblical scholarship, Buber is aware of the greatest textual unity connecting 
Israel and the servant of YHVH, citing numerous examples from Biblical passages in what is 
reminiscent of rabbinic hermeneutics where attention is also paid to various textual parallels 
and connections developing a single theological problem or concept.138 “Israel’s redemption 
and the redemption of the nations are merely different stages in the one great act of 
redemption which God performs in the world of men.”139 The people’s suffering was also to 
carry meaning in the light of the salvation that was to follow. And yet Buber ultimately argues 
neither for the figure of the suffering servant as a single individual nor corporate Israel in the 
Songs of the Servant (Is 49.1 ff; 50.4 ff). The servant was all those people who were the 
prophetic bearers of God’s Word who suffered resentment for it at the hands of the people,140 
primarily because of what Buber describes as the need to set the anonymous servant, in whom 
he delights and upon whom He puts His Spirit (Is 42.1), against the Israel whom He had 
                                                
136 Ibid., p. 206. Buber believes that the connection of these words is more than mere repetition:  Basic words 
and groups of such words that recur from section to section show that in the manner and sequence these occur, 
there must be an unmistakeable intention. 
 
137 Ibid., pp. 208–13. Here God is the master over history as well as the forces of nature over which he has power 
insofar as he is its Creator. The creation and acts of redemption coincide in a history of God’s intervention in 
time to save his people. 
 
138 Ibid., pp. 219, 221. 
 
139 Ibid., p. 217. 
 
140 Ibid., p. 224. 
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“chosen” and “held”, but who had failed historically. It is, however the individual figure who, 
in the songs, speaks of his sufferings and vocation in the first person in a manner similar that 
to Jeremiah.141 The suffering servant constantly hears YHVH’s word; and living ever more 
steadily by the Word of God the servant is able to bear unusual suffering. Buber incorporates 
the personality of the prophet with that of the servant, the prophetic stage being first stage of 
the servant’s life; the second is the acting of the affliction: The servant has willingly accepted 
to bear affliction for God’s sake, not knowing the reason for such suffering, but not 
questioning either; and his offer is accepted. 
 Buber views this as a sort of completion of what was commenced in the figure of Job, who 
experienced suffering as an insoluble mystery and “the Psalmist who recognised that God 
loves those who suffer willingly.”142 The third stage is described as the success of God’s 
desire: The redemption of the subject people and nations “which the purified servant as its 
“light” has to bring in, the covenant of the people of human beings with God, the human 
centre of which is the servant.”143 Against the external governmental offices, there is the 
Buber’s nabi, whose calling has become increasingly dangerous because of his unpopular 
views based on that direct communion and dialogue with God. He brings peace, shalom with 
him, but must attain it through suffering. Buber stresses the tie between the servant Israel and 
the personal servant, the personal servant being those among Israel who remained faithful to 
YHVH; in those He glorifies Himself. Here Buber fuses the many bearers of the prophetic 
word with the suffering servant, the meaning of whose suffering, once understood, will 
become a light for the nations. Then Israel and the prophet will no more be at odds with one 
another. The servant’s vicarious suffering is, in substance, a love for God’s sake which brings 
about renewal. Whereas the prophets of the older generations had worked for the renewal of 
Israel, now the vicariously suffering prophets are to work directly for the redemption of the 
nations, having taken Israel’s role in being the living embodiment of her essential meaning 
and truth.144 Thus Buber seems to reduce faith to that which he believes is the prophetic faith, 
based on direct, unmediated dialogue with YHVH. The great witnesses of faith are the great 
prophets whom He has led away from their homes, who suffered in their generations, given 
                                                
141 Ibid., pp. 223–24. 
 
142 Ibid., p. 229. 
 
143 Ibid., idem. 
 
144 Ibid., pp. 231–35. 
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strength by God giving them the prophetic faith which enabled them to bear their hardships, 
whose Name they carried in their hearts throughout their wanderings. Yet although the 
suffering servant is spoken of as the various individuals over the centuries who prophetically 
lead YHVH’s faithful, one nevertheless has the impression that the individuals form, over 
time, a universal of the prophet; embodying all that the prophet essentially is: the bearer of 
God’s Word, leader, critic, courageous and suffering admonisher of social ills and finally, 
redeemer of Israel and the nations. 
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Part II: The Implicit Notion of YHVH in the Philosophical Thought of Martin Buber: 
2.0. Buber’s Dialogue with Some Past Thinkers: The Problem of Man: Buber examines 
the problem of philosophical anthropology in his series of lectures What Is Man? Here he 
analyzes man’s place in the universe and relation in the light of the concepts of various major 
thinkers who have concerned themselves with this problem, whose concepts he assesses 
primarily from the point of view of relational and dialogic philosophy. Important clues to the 
influences on Buber’s I-Thou, dialogical and relational philosophy, as well as his points of 
departure from these thinkers can be found in this set of lectures and selected early essays.  
Buber opens this interesting set of lectures What is Man with a description of certain 
questions and problems that philosophy addresses and attempts to answer, such as those of an 
epistemological or ethical character. Such disciplines ultimately make philosophical analysis 
of man fragmentary in character, reducing the whole man. Thus a successful and legitimate 
philosophical anthropology must consider man in his multi-faceted wholeness and must place 
man within the nature he is part of, yet separated from – in contrast to scientific     
anthropology – aware that the investigator is also a man. Buber feels that the philosopher’s 
knowledge of man crystallises around self-knowledge, his subjectivity and the putting forth of 
his whole being into his observation being integral aspects of his reflections. According to 
Buber, empiric sciences place impediments to man’s self-understanding.145   
Buber traces the development of philosophical anthropology from where man is considered as 
an almost separate part of the world – Augustine feels wonder at that in man which cannot be 
understood as a thing among other things. Medieval man comes to be at the centre of the 
world in the thought of Aquinas – the horizon and dividing line between physical and spiritual 
nature. After a pause until the late medieval ages the anthropological issue rises once again, 
and Buber subtly shows the gradual shift towards lesser security as man begins to 
comprehend that he is able to know all except God. Then Buber discusses the discoveries of 
Copernicus, Bruno, Kepler and Pascal, which confirm that man is but a relatively insignificant 
part of the increasingly infinite universe. Despite the disquiet and diminution of man in the 
face of making these discoveries, his knowledge continues and he knows yet more about the 
                                                
145 BUBER, Martin. What is Man? in Between Man and Man. Boston. Beacon Press. 1959. Transl by SMITH, 
Ronald Gregor (Hereafter to be referred to as “What is Man?”), p. 122. But see also previous paragraphs of this 
essay dealing with Buber’s thoughts on the empiric sciences. 
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relation between the universe and himself. Buber now considers philosophical concepts that 
analyze man’s place in the universe, having become insecure and a “problem to himself“.146 
Hegel and Marx are both blamed for secularising Messianism insofar as they proclaim a 
certainty bordering on perfection; and Marx’s proletarian man enters into this Messianism and 
makes it his faith, no longer concerned with the universe. Interestingly, it is with Marx where 
Buber finds that the concern regarding society begins. Concerned with society’s quest for 
perfection, the Hegelian idea or universal reason is replaced by human conditions of 
production. The conditions of production alone now become the very foundations of human 
life, transforming man’s world into society. Thought no longer assures life, but rather the 
circumstances of the immediate present simultaneously have a transforming effect on the 
future, the proletariat self-awareness being a catalyst for events which are to lead to the 
abolition of capitalism. Although Buber agrees with Marx inasmuch as present circumstances 
can indeed affect the future in numerous ways, he finds that Marx’s weakness lies in the fact 
that he (Marx) does not adequately take into account how the quality and direction of thought 
can also shape future events, nor does he adequately consider human decision. This can lead 
to a potential totalitarian state where men can perform negative or evil acts using their own 
belief in the quality of their decision.147 
Buber feels that the community aspect of philosophic anthropology is begun in earnest with 
Feuerbach, whose reduction of anthropological being reduces man to an unproblematic state, 
even though man is consistently overpowered by that which is not human. But it is Feuerbach 
who adequately analyzes man in his community aspect and setting – which was something 
that Marx’s philosophy lacked. Marx’s collectivism becomes as false an alternative as the 
individualism he opposed. The last of the three great radical Hegelians, Nietzsche, is then 
considered. Buber’s response to the will to power is especially interesting. Power in itself is 
considered by Buber as evil, especially so when man believes it is his own possession. It has a 
                                                
146 Ibid., pp. 128–42, In Spinoza, man’s place in the universe is given by God’s love for Himself. Hegel attempts 
to secure man a home in history and, according to Buber, tries to replace man’s faith in God with the certainty of 
man’s increasing knowledge or evolution, but Buber writes that faith in salvation is stronger and thus not 
replaceable by a mere conviction of the perfecting of the world by an idea because only trust in the trustworthy 
can establish a relation of unconditional certainty towards the future. Concerning Hegel, Buber concludes        
that “...thought does not have the power to build man’s life and the strictest philosophical certainty cannot endow 
the soul with that intimate certitude that the world which is so imperfect will be brought to its perfection.“ (p. 
142)  
 
147 Ibid., pp. 143–46. 
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corrupting effect on the world when divorced from responsibility, in betrayal of its very 
source – the spirit. Ultimately, Buber is critical of philosophical anthropology up to Nietzsche 
for not considering carefully enough the community along with the spirit, and nature as a 
power we can approach for information. Buber criticizes these for having invoked either the 
spirit or nature but then neglecting the power of community, leading to an inadequacy of the 
knowledge of man reached until then.148  
Buber was strongly influenced by both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard although he deals with 
them critically in this and other essays of his. The main criticism he aims at Kierkegaard is the 
renunciation and denial of the whole which, for Buber, is a part of God’s creation. God 
created the world and keeps it whole. Communion with God is the aim and goal of creation.149 
Some readers might find Buber’s thinking in this regard similar to Christian thought, which 
                                                
148 What is Man?, p. 153, 156. 
 
149 Ibid., p. 179. But see also Buber, Martin, The  Question to the Single One in Between Man and Man, pp. 52–
58, Buber modifies Kierkegaard’s concept of the Single One insofar as he believes that God wants us to come to 
Him by means of other creatures he has placed in our way, the creation being the road to God. God lets us reach 
Him by the world He has made accessible to man. All things living in the world have a purpose that lead 
ultimately to Him. This line of argumentation may strike some readers as Hegelian. Buber, however, does not 
consider the world fallen insofar as God is Almighty; His creation thus cannot break away from His power. 
God’s creatures cannot be stronger than His action and Buber arrives at the conclusion that God embraces His 
creation by relating it to Him personally.  Kierkegaard, according to Buber, isolates God by cutting Him off from 
men, leaving only God to Himself. Buber also argues that the God of the theologians is a logical  God; religion 
becomes, in theology, a specification. To Buber, the ethical means helping God by loving His creatures and 
creation (For a more detailed discussion by Buber concerning Kierkegaard’s ethics, see also Buber’s lecture  On 
the Suspension of the Ethical in The Eclipse of God, pp. 115–21 in which he confronts Kierkegaard’s  Fear and 
Trembling: Abraham is unique in his faith and obedience to God. His faith meant that he could not confuse God 
for Moloch, unlike those after him who confused the voice of the Absolute with those of demons to the degree 
that they inappropriately sacrificed their first-born. The voices of demons come out of the darkness, sometimes 
whispering, at other times roaring, most often from inside, demanding that which involves a turning away from 
integrity and becoming cruel to one’s brethren. Buber concludes that people suffer from the inability to probe 
their hearts to distinguish the real origins of the voice addressing them.) Further, in The Question to the Single 
One (pp. 58–77), Buber elaborates on the difference between the crowd and community, the crowd being the 
most miserable state, in which one’s person becomes prone and subject to the easy influence of the crowd, which 
Buber calls a form of idolatry. The person in the crowd allows oneself to be answered for by it, leading 
ultimately to a loss of individuality. The crowd can strangle the awareness of the approach of God in His Word 
and the answer that this address demands, the allowing of oneself to be answered for by the crowd is, ultimately, 
the fall from faith. This does not mean that one cannot join a group, but one must, according to Buber (The 
Question to the Single One, p. 70) “...remain...submissive …to the One who is his Lord”, sometimes making 
decisions opposed to it. The revelation of truth involves the risk of incomprehension, sometimes the risk of being 
ostracized. Humans have a history - which beasts do not have. Moreover, because they have knowledge of good 
and evil, they are both of these rather than simply corrupt. Good and evil are not opposites: the former moves in 
the direction of Thou, the latter is aimless, a shirking away of the soul from its intended community with God. 
The collective holds the person bound to it in such a way as to erase the responsibility. Thus “True community 
and true commonwealth will be realised only to the extent to which the Single Ones become real out of whose 
responsible life the body politic is renewed” (p. 82) The individual who breaks out of the crowd and its untruth 
to become a Single One and with it, the truth, is of great importance to Buber: Man becomes human by 
confronting and entering into relation with divine, unconditioned truth and by “entering into decisive relation 
with it.” (What is Man, p. 173). 
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holds that God’s intention for man was to live in community with Him in his creation; to 
some degree, this explains the great acclaim and popularity Buber has found in Christian 
thinkers despite the critical points Buber has addressed towards it.  
When reading Buber’s writings about philosophers both past and contemporary to him, one is 
struck by the fact that the same criticism he levels at institutional religion, elaborated upon 
earlier in this thesis is aimed at the God of the philosophers: Because God is beyond any 
systematisation by virtue of His nature, the God of the philosophers is reduced to an idea 
despite the fact that, as Buber understands it, God encompasses all ideas.150 
2.1. The I-Thou and Dialogical Philosophies of Martin Buber 
2.1.1. The Wholeness of Being in the Immediacy of the I-Thou Relation: True living and 
being is in meeting and dialogic relation of I with Thou. This meeting is direct, 
immediate and experienced with the whole being, having a character that cannot be 
captured or held. The attempt to do so leads to the inauthentic being of the I-It relation 
defined as alienation by Buber. This is one of the main points of conflict between Buber 
and traditional philosophy and religion which he feels tries to capture and hold that 
which remains only in the present. 
Early in the 20th century, philosophy began to separate into two major directions which were 
to determine much of its later development: logical empiricism – emphasising science and 
mathematics; and the other with its emphasis on ontology – phenomenology and later on, 
existentialism. In the late 19th century Edmund Husserl was among the first to attempt to 
transcend the boundaries of the empiric sciences with his programme of transcendental 
reduction delineated in his Ideas I. Although Husserl presents phenomenology in the 
introduction of his Ideas I as an eidetic science “which exclusively seeks to ascertain 
“cognitions of essences and no “matters of fact” whatever”; and phenomenology as an 
“eidetic doctrine of transcendentally reduced phenomena”,151 his philosophical thought was 
                                                
150 See The Love of God and the Idea of Deity in The Eclipse of God, pp. 49–50. Buber finds that the 
philosopher’s concept of God does not correspond with the loved living Absolute: such an Absolute would not 
be an Absolute anymore, but God Himself. 
151  HUSSERL, Edmund. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. 
FIRST BOOK: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology. Dordrecht. Kluwer Academic Press. 1976 
(Reprint 1998). Transl. by KERSTEN, F. (Hereafter to be referred to as Ideas I). Preface, p. xx. 
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actually a protest against the world-view presented by the empiric sciences which he believed 
made claims towards absolute truth.152 The author believes that this background is relevant to 
the understanding of the major aspect of Buber’s philosophy which crystallized in his small 
but meaningful book I and Thou, further elaborated in two collections of some of Buber’s 
important essays Between Man and Man and The Knowledge of Man.153  
Man’s identity and the authenticity of his being is defined by his two-fold relation to the two 
realms of Thou and It. Words are described as signifying a reality, and the binaries I-Thou and 
I-It are the two primary words. The first is spoken with the whole being, the second is not. 
The relation to Thou, having no clear-cut boundaries is a relation with being, as opposed to 
the relation with It, which in Buber’s view is a superficial accumulation of information; with 
its clear-cut boundaries it is always a relation to something. Buber describes the realm of 
experience as one of alienation defined in the concept of I-It. By contrast, the world of I-Thou 
is that of relation, extending the spheres of relation to the realms of nature, man and 
intelligible forms.154  True being is relation which cannot be described but only brought forth, 
as meeting. Relation is, moreover, immediate, without any means or mediation.155 Thus true 
living is relation to the present, because Thou always remains in the present, whereas It 
remains in the past, as does the I of the I-It. Friedman describes the meeting with Thou as the 
moment when one’s being becomes concrete, calling it a moment experienced with the whole 
soul, compared to the moment of I-It which remains in the past.156 The present endures; thus 
the present is living. 
                                                                                                                                                      
145 It is interesting to note that Husserl, early in his career, parted ways with Gottlob Frege, (one of the pioneers 
of mathematical logic as we know it today) precisely because of  Frege’s  over-emphasis on logical calculus 
rather than meaning, as well as the anti-psychologistic viewpoint that Frege took. Cf. PIVCHEVICH, Ivo. 
Husserl and Phenomenology. London. Hutchinson University Library. 1970 (Hereafter to be referred to as 
“Pivchevich”), pp. 23 – 33. The clash with Frege was to lead to the development of the two major diametrically 
opposite schools of philosophic thought in the 20th century. 
146 
I and Thou, pp. 3–8. Buber extends the I-Thou relation even to such things as trees. We can view other things 
or people as objects and view them in the conventional manner as a collection of causes and effects or we can 
relate ourselves to them. Our relation to human beings mirrors our relation with Thou because a human being in 
his essential unknowableness is “a whole in himself…lives in his own light“ (p. 8). 
 
153 What follows bases itself mostly on findings from these three books. 
 
147 
Ibid., pp. 11–13.  
 
156 Friedman, Martin Buber, pp. 57–60. 
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Perhaps the most striking characteristic of this multi-faceted thinker is the style of writing in 
his philosophical works, in which his basic concepts spiral into demanding, pregnant and 
densely systematic sets of wordplay that take on a fugal character of several voices; 
overlapping, leading the reader into a labyrinth of unexpected turns, inverted themes, 
juxtapositions and contrasts which have things of depth and importance to say to anyone 
patient enough to think and read carefully: Perhaps the most crucial aspect of Buber’s I-Thou 
philosophy is its emphasis on love; even if the reader does not necessarily agree with Buber, 
his (Buber’s) love and wonder towards man - and with it, for his reader - is always evident.  
Buber distinguishes between love and feelings. Feelings are separate from love; they are 
passing, fleeting emotions that do not necessarily have any permanency. In love, Thou cannot 
become an object, nor can it be viewed as one. This may remind some readers distantly of 
Kant, to whom every person is to be regarded as an individual end, but never as a means 
merely to achieve one’s ends. Love is between I and Thou; it is a relation of full mutuality, 
taking responsibility for the other. Although one cannot hate and remain in relation – as hate 
sees only partial aspects of the other and restricting relation – it is better to hate someone than 
to objectify him / her.157 Later in I and Thou, Buber elaborates that if true living and love is 
mutuality and relation, the community of love arises when people take their stand towards a 
living centre and secondly, to one another – most perfectly embodied in the relation of 
marriage, in the revealing of the Thou in the other.158 
Because the I of the I-It is lived in the past, it is a form of non-living existence based on 
man’s simplified models of the phenomenal world. The reader familiar with philosophy will 
notice the polemic here with thought that seeks to capture the whole in crisp, abstract 
concepts of universals. One senses the implicit criticism of the logical positivistic thought 
which was breaking new ground when I and Thou was written. Some readers may find that 
Buber’s arguments against this philosophy over-simplify a very rich and complex movement 
of thought, leading unawares to an implicit dogmatism. For instance, it is significant to note 
that even a logical positivist such as Bertrand Russell holds views against dogmatism and the 
                                                
157 Ibid., pp. 14–15. 
 
158 I and Thou, pp. 14, 15, 45. 
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narrow-mindedness of the common world-view, but expressed in balanced and 
comprehensible language.159   
Our relations with others mirror our relation with the Eternal Thou. This absolute appears to 
be whom Buber refers to as YHVH in his Biblical theology. His I-Thou philosophy seems 
grounded on the two most important commandments of the Torah – to have no other gods 
besides YHVH, and to love one’s neighbour as oneself. Perhaps this is because man bears the 
image of God, an inborn Thou that becomes realised in relation. Man has called this Absolute 
by many names, yet even these names later become a form of idolatry; but by addressing God 
with the whole being one addresses the Eternal Thou, the true Thou of our lives. Being 
confronted by Thou, man steps into direct relation with Him, something Buber describes as 
becoming an effective whole, going out with the whole being to meet Thou – the unum 
necessarium being a visible, full relation to the present.160 God can be addressed but not 
talked about; yet because He is the Creator, Thou permeates all life on earth. Community and 
the collective are compared in the essay Dialogue, in which community is described as being 
the living of persons with one another, compared to the living next to one another in order to 
keep in the marching step of the collective. In community, I flows into Thou; it is the 
confirmation of life lived towards the other.161 
Although I-It is viewed by Buber as a form of alienation from true being, he nonetheless finds 
some value for that relation in the hermeneutics of the everyday, even acknowledging that 
man cannot progress without It. But true humanity is also to be found in the correct balance 
between these two types of relation. Childhood is an intensely relational part of human life, 
the development of the child being bound with a longing for a Thou. The individual also 
develops through Thou, and yet becomes increasingly aware of self, separating from Thou 
                                                
159 See especially RUSSELL, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1912. 
Reprint.  2001, pp. 89–94. Russell finds the value of philosophy precisely in its uncertainty. Russell writes that 
he does not believe that philosophy can provide us with definite and clear-cut answers about even the most 
mundane aspects of everyday life. Russell also criticises what he call the “tyranny of common sense“, saying that 
the opening of our minds with philosophic thought can free us from this prison. Quite the contrary from being 
able to give us any certainty, philosophy paradoxically frees us precisely in the scepticism in which it leaves us. 
Russell is strongly anti-dogmatic in this sense, also taking a position against the kind of existence which is 
simply concerned with the “goods of the body” (p. 89). Russell is equally aware of the limitations of science 
which bases its concepts upon simplified models of reality. 
 
160 I and Thou, pp. 78–80, 102–3, 109–13. The arguments of relation and the immediacy of relation with the 
whole being to Thou repeat themselves numerous times in I and Thou.  
 
161 BUBER, Martin. Dialogue in Between Man and Man (Hereafter to be referred to as “Dialogue“), p. 30–33. 
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over time – the body and the individual having matured to be capable of arranging things in 
the space-time relations which are not an aspect of the I-Thou primary relation: the I-It 
relation increases alienation to Thou as knowledge grows.162 
The overrunning of It into the essential relation leads to evil. Buber traces its root to 
decisionlessness, believing that causality does not weigh on the free man. Besides causality, 
Buber also believes that the age is sick with the quasi-biological and historical thought 
leading to ever greater belief in fate, in which man believes that life has been set in an 
inescapable framework. This gives the reader a clue to many of the criticisms Buber aims at 
apocalyptic writing. In his early book The Tales of Rabbi Nachman, Buber’s retelling of the 
Rabbi’s story of the clever and the simple man foretells Buber’s later position, which can 
largely be described as anti-rationalistic.163 
I and Thou has been called a “philosophical-religious poem” by its first translator Ronald 
Gregor Smith, and the phrase, as Malcolm L. Diamond points out “captures the flavour of the 
work”. Precisely what makes Buber’s essay take on a religious as well as philosophical tone is 
his insistence that ultimate questions of human thought and existence have a character defying 
objectification which in fact defy precise wording.164 One of the criticisms, to some extent 
true, that have frequently been levelled at Buber is his apparent lack of system. His essays, 
many of which are written in deceptively simple language, frequently defy definition or 
categorisation. Although Buber is frequently identified with the existentialist school of 
thought, his writings do not entirely fit in with that description; he has also been known to aim 
criticism at other philosophers identified perhaps more strongly with existentialism such as 
                                                
162 Ibid., pp. 25–31. Man perceives the world around him as things organised in a system of causes and effects, 
thus he tries to control them. pp. 37–44, History is an augmentation of I-It, and Buber uses similar arguments 
that remind one of phenomenology when he speaks of the thwarting of the life of spirit by man who turns life 
into his own account. The realm of experience where objects that are placed in order can extend to that of 
humans in which case it intrudes on relation. Interestingly, both feelings and institutions are necessary in Buber’s 
writings, but they do not create human life; and although Buber acknowledges the value of I-It in man’s being 
able to find his bearings in the world, he nevertheless shows a tendency towards a similar anarchism that is 
found in his Biblical theology discussed earlier.  
 
163
 Rabbi Nachman, pp 71–94. The clever man is a quick-witted and shrewd fellow whose nature becomes 
increasingly demanding as his knowledge grows, but who becomes impossible to please and looks down 
scornfully upon all whom he meets. The simple man, the clever man’s childhood friend who grows separately 
from the clever man, is initially the laughing stock of the town, but eventually gets placed in a position of power 
by the king who values his simple honesty. He grows to be loved by the people. Ultimately, the simple man is 
the object of praise in the tale for his heartfelt, generous nature that does not falter even when he is the subject of 
ridicule. The clever man is cold and insensitive, earning him the indignation of others and even a beating (pp. 
91–2).    
 
164 DIAMOND, Malcolm L., Dialogue and Theology in Schilpp and Friedman. 
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Heidegger and Sartre. The author believes this is probably intentional on Buber’s part, fitting 
in with his religious and philosophical “anarchism”. Buber is, however, equally capable of 
holding ground using complex philosophical terminology as his series of lectures contained in 
What is Man and Eclipse of God and other philosophic works clearly show. The reader is 
sometimes reminded of Plato’s Seventh Epistle in which the fire that is kindled between two 
souls is a mutual fire that burns between the two and therefore defies being set down into 
words. Despite the profoundly poetic prose Buber sets into writing, a reader with even modest 
philosophic training might feel that Buber’s thoughts are closer to the Greek than the Hebrew 
tradition in this regard. 
2.1.2. Dialogue and Relation: Man’s ability to relate to the other and engage in dialogue sets 
him apart from other animals. Parallel to the primary words I-Thou and I-It are 
dialogue and monologue. Another important part of man’s life is his ability to set the 
other over against himself in relation. These two aspects of Buber’s philosophy evolve 
into an elaborate anthropology which can be viewed as an interpretation of the two 
commandments of love. 
In the essay Dialogue, the Word of God can be borne witness to but not produced, and the 
community is the place where we expect theophany. Genuine religious dialogue is, according 
to Buber not necessarily a community that shares the same faith but one where there is 
genuine common life in which man is turned towards the other in genuine dialogue that 
transcends mere conversation. Interestingly, Buber believes there are many potential vessels 
for the Word of God. Something being said to us needs an answer. The only limits of dialogue 
are the limits of our own awareness; everything that occurs to us is a form of address. The 
estrangement lies partly in the fact that we close ourselves off to the signs of address to the 
degree that we no longer notice them. Like the immediacy of the relation to Thou, which 
remains ever in the present and cannot be captured or held, what is said in the address to us 
remains indescribable and yet familiar.165  
Buber draws religious consequences from this, saying that religion is all of that which is lived 
in the possibility of dialogue. God, the God of the moment, is the giver of words and signs. 
Our communication with God is in the daily speech of our communication with others around 
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us in its immediacy. Lived life is a never-finished situation; and speech is constantly directed 
at man in the multitude of events both great and small which he encounters. Thus Buber 
arrives at the conclusion that man experiences God in the “sacrament of dialogue”,166 aptly 
characterised as the “theology of encounter” by William Kaufman who says that in the 
thought of Martin Buber, we only know God through encounter.167 
Three kinds of dialogue are named – genuine, technical and monological. Dialogical life is 
not necessarily one lived in continuous love – no man, according to Buber, can only love; but 
it does mean always standing in direct relation to the other – a movement towards the other, 
addressing with our souls.168 Monologue is a refusal to turn towards the other, called a 
“reflection” by Buber, in which one refuses to accept the other in his or her particularity, 
allowing the other to exist only as a part of the self. But one human soul is not that of all, thus 
even the action of thinking in philosophy must be dialogical: We have to think about the Thou 
in the other as the activity of thought also belongs to the other person. Present being dwells 
among men when both turn to one another with the wholeness of their being.169 In another 
essay, Elements of the Interhuman, Buber defines, in a compact form, this meaning of genuine 
dialogue in which neither of the partners of the dialogue try to impose themselves upon each 
other: Besides making the other present as one’s “partner in genuine dialogue”, we receive the 
other. It is a mutual effort which requires honesty and involves risk. It must, according to 
Buber expect nothing in return and there must be no semblance, or the dialogue loses its 
genuine character. It is also of importance that one must not remain closed to the contribution 
of another person nor think that it is not valid enough to be considered. Each participant must 
be in a frame of mind and think in a manner enabling them to take part in genuine dialogue. 
Buber does not see intellect as a gateway to this sublime discourse: Not even men of 
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167 Kaufman, Encounter, pp. 56–7, Kaufman draws attention to similar points as the author: In Buber’s 
philosophy, relationship with God is similar to the relationship with other humans, I-It not enabling us to know 
the other person because of the intellectual barriers it erects by keeping us reserved, not trusting the other. He 
also emphasises the immediate and mutual nature of the I-Thou relation, calling it more profound than any aspect 
of I-It knowledge. 
 
168 Dialogue, pp. 19–21. 
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considerable intellectual stature are immune to becoming imposing, fighting and destroying 
the dialogue.170  
Buber delineates three modes of being in language: present continuance, potential possession 
and actual occurrence of a particular language. The third mode, found in the in-between of 
genuine dialogue involves both participants: Something happens not only to and inside us, but 
in-between us. In The Word that is Spoken, Buber contrasts monologue with dialogue in 
considerable depth: The monologue is predictable, without surprises or room for growth, 
whereas the dialogue contains a tension echoing the unpredictability of the human being. This 
tension is present even when two people agree with one another, although Buber perhaps 
somewhat circularly writes that “it can be fruitful, it always becomes fruitful where, out of 
understanding each other, genuine dialogue unfolds”.171 Linguistic ambiguity echoes that 
present moment that defies capturing – a living language always in the present: Man comes to 
be partly in language, a manifestation of his unique relationship with the world set over 
against himself in which the reality created by words combined into sentences. This 
phenomenon enables the articulation and bringing to life of highly complex inner worlds 
otherwise hidden to the listener, making the listener part of that world by providing the 
linguistic window to the soul. There is also the tool of facticity’s idiom, in which man 
becomes one with his daily hermeneutic circle. The continuing linguisticality, in a sense a 
word without end, comes alive in genuine relation between I and Thou, the truth an attainable 
ideal in the word genuinely spoken.172       
In waking reality people work and struggle together in the being-in-the-world common to all; 
but within that world the individual is to understand his uniqueness and not be dragged along 
                                                
170 BUBER, Martin. Elements of the Interhuman in  The Knowledge of Man – Selected Essays. New York. 
Harper and Row Publishers. 1965 Transl. by FREIDMAN, Maurice and SMITH, Ronald Gregor. (Hereafter to 
be referred to as “Elements of the Interhuman”), pp. 84–88.  See also Distance and Relation, transl. by SMITH, 
Ronald Gregor in the same collection of essays (Hereafter to be referred to as Buber, “Distance”) p. 65. In trying 
to convince the other of the correctness of our opinion, it is vital to recognise the other as an equal and respect 
his / her individuality.  
  
171 BUBER, Martin. The Word that is Spoken in The Knowledge of Man, transl. by FRIEDMAN, Maurice 
(Hereafter to be referred to as “The Word that is Spoken”) pp. 110–14. The fact that Buber’s argumentation 
frequently overlaps is a reality that makes his work the most difficult to place in an ordered system. Although 
many of his commentators, especially from anti-rationalistic schools praise his work for this, it is in fact a source 
of bedevilment for the author trying to make an informed comment about his thought. Many of his basic lines of 
argument, however, are complemented and elaborated in different words, creating an implicit system. 
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by facticity and the collective. The genuine We is the common life in which genuine living 
constructs the very fabric of daily existence. Speech plays a central role in this, although in 
contrast to dialogue, it plays a secondary, more pragmatic role of helping us achieve our ends, 
sometimes to help one another, or sometimes to help point outside facticity.173 Gabriel Marcel 
credits Buber with making a significant contribution to the philosophy of intersubjectivity in 
an age which has been increasingly concerned with control and calculation. Buber, according 
to Marcel, rescues us from the impasses of collectivism and individualism. Marcel, who also 
made significant contributions to the I and Thou considerations of humankind writes that man 
tries to overcome the isolation of living in the mass by becoming a part of it, but that life in 
such a mass is just that of one man alongside the other. He also places great importance on 
mutual understanding in order to overcome what he calls the circle of solitude, adding that it 
is precisely the life of man lived with man which makes human existence so fundamentally 
unique: Genuine meeting and encounter takes place between two individuals, not to both 
separately.174 Let us now turn to the next facet of Buber’s I-Thou dialogic philosophy and his 
anthropology – his concept of the in-between, which we shall now discuss in more detail. 
In order to bring out the uniqueness of man, Buber contrasts what sets man apart from the 
other living beings in his environment. Whereas animals live in a world bounded by their 
senses and corporeal needs, man understands himself as an individually existent being; and in 
doing so, man transcends the corporeal realm. Man is able to grasp the whole and set the 
realm of what is over against himself as an independent opposite. Precisely this ability forms 
the essence of humanity, continuing regardless of space and time. Turning to this separated 
realm, man enters into a relation with it; and in doing so, man becomes aware of the 
wholeness and unity constituting being. The ability to distance or separate oneself produces 
the human situation; this in turn enables one to enter into relation with that separated realm 
and, upon understanding its individuality, respond to it meaningfully. In relation with one 
another, the in-between becomes even more clarified.175  
                                                
173 BUBER, Martin. What is Common to All in The Knowledge of Man (Hereafter to be referred to as “What is 
Common to All”). Transl. by FRIEDMAN, Maurice, pp. 105–107. 
  
174 MARCEL, Gabriel. I and Thou in Schilpp and Friedman (Hereafter to be referred to as “Marcel”), pp. 41–43.  
 
175 BUBER, Martin. Distance and Relation in The Knowledge of Man (Hereafter to be referred to as “Distance”), 
pp. 59–64, See also Elements of the Interhuman, p. 78. 
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One senses an implicit Hegelian dialectic in the three step thesis-antithesis-synthesis of man 
as a solitary being aware of himself, then becoming aware of that which he has set apart from 
himself, the two becoming complete only once man enters into relation with that which he has 
set apart from himself. But it is in the same essay that Buber polemizes with Hegel’s concept 
of art as the will to expression of the inner state. Buber argues that the ability to enter into 
relation even with objects that are generally implements and represent them in the forms of art 
is in fact more evidence of man’s uniqueness, evident in the ability to enter into even more 
personal relations with the non-human in such ways and create the formal representation of 
the in-between. Human communication in intelligible speech is essentially different from the 
sounds and body language animals use to communicate among themselves, and words are like 
tools which are able to give clues to the reality within us. The independence of the otherness 
of our neighbour is given greater depth and completed by becoming a part of the other by 
making him / her present as a human being. Buber says that this is done by making our 
neighbour’s experience partly ours by comprehending it in its essential depth in an action 
described by Buber as being of an ontological rather than a psychological category, complete 
only when the other recognises that he / she has become a self to us. According to Buber, man 
wants to be accepted and acknowledged by the other, constantly waiting for the “Yes” 
confirming him as a human being, and this can come only from one human to another.176 The 
reader familiar with Biblical thought in the Hebrew Bible will realise that if we are to say 
truly that we love God, we must also love our neighbour, because our neighbour is God’s 
creation created in his image. It could thus be said that this philosophy of dialogue and 
relation echoes those commandments.177  
Yet the interhuman goes beyond mere intersubjective communal life. One is unavoidably part 
of a community but the crowd and its pressures can often carry the person away. Nor is the 
interhuman mere comradeship, but rather an actual relation that goes beyond psychological 
                                                
176 Ibid, pp 67–70. See also LÉVINAS, Emanuel. Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge in Schilpp and 
Friedman (Hereafter to be referred to as “Lévinas”), pp. 138–41. According to Lévinas, in the I-Thou relation, 
the I fully recognises the other as something radically other, a subject external to the self, but confronts the other 
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phenomena. This can happen in the most banal daily situations where the anonymity of the 
crowd is broken and two strangers meet and mutually acknowledge each other’s individuality. 
Lies are not only in defiance of particular facts, but also in threaten the interhuman by 
jeopardising the I-Thou relation: In truthful relation we communicate one another as we really 
are, whereas putting on masks by desiring to seem a certain way to the other is inauthentic. 
Buber calls the “giving in to seeming” cowardice and its overcoming courage. Genuine 
relation involves risk because what we reveal of ourselves may not necessarily be 
reciprocated.178 This to some degree mirrors the risk God took in creating man and giving him 
a free will and the choice to decide – between being upright and following God by listening to 
him and remaining in community with Him and refusing and rebelling against His goodness. 
Unlike Sartre, however, who sees man as essentially alone and whose existence precedes his 
essence in the absence of God, Buber believes that man’s frequently wretched state can be 
broken. Emmanuel Lévinas writes that the I-Thou relation is the condition of all intentional 
relations; and by reducing the other to a third person level, we reduce the other to the most 
superficial surface experiences, where the person takes on a neutral, disposable character 
which does not fulfil the condition of grasping the other – resulting in a meeting that cannot 
be called presence.179  
In Buber’s philosophy, no-one can have no claim to absolute truth: Ethical decisions and acts 
must take into account an Absolute that is beyond the self and not derived from it. Man is not 
God; all human decisions thus involve the risk of possible error. Man’s conduct must be 
rooted in revelation if it is to be correct. In an important and critical essay addressing Buber’s 
moral philosophy, Marvin Fox calls Buber’s philosophy a kind of natural theology. He 
describes the role of the inner man’s conscience or the sense of inner obligation in the heart of 
Buber’s man as a guiding light and a confirmation for Buber that the Absolute exists. As this 
Absolute is the source and judge of morals, the individual becomes accountable even for his / 
her very thoughts. One does not, nor would one feel obliged to hold fast to values perceived 
merely as invented, as the passions often intrude on what appears to be a better decision. God 
and his revelation thus become the giver of morals in man’s life, the revelation having an 
unmistakeable and life-changing quality about it. This is defined succinctly by Fox as the 
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immediate, direct awareness of the presence of the divine in one’s life. Such a voice can often 
address the listener subtly, perhaps being little more than a whisper in the silence.180  
Fox, however, raises the question about some of the other ethical problems that occupy 
Buber, such as the question about how we can know if it is really the Absolute addressing us 
or a demon, as well as the question about how we can know any values without the 
systematized or set values that Buber so defiantly opposes in his works. We shall deal with 
this issue in more depth in the section below regarding critical points on Buber’s philosophy 
by other authors.  
2.2. The Ethical Dimensions and Consequences of Martin Buber’s I-Thou Philosophy. 
2.2.1. The Encroachment of I-It on Genuine, Dialogical Relation: Buber recognises the      
value and importance of the I-It primary word in the world at hand, but views its 
predominance in the world as evil. Because of its objectifying nature and the 
thickening of distance it causes it leads to an alienation from the primal source in a 
forgetting of being. This alienation from the primal source leads to many manifest 
social ills.  
Buber writes that it is “the exalted fate that every Thou in our world must become an It”: once 
the relation is not immediate, the other ceases to be a Thou. Buber considers many of our 
civilised modes of being to be simple, worn-out formulas. I-It is the separation of the human 
body from that which surrounds it at birth.181 Relation is the freeing impulse of man’s 
existence in the world: The man who lives relationally with Thou is free, being able to find 
the correct balance between the two primary relations; able to permeate the realm of It with 
the relation and dialogue with Thou. Buber, as we have said earlier, grants the necessity of It 
in communal life. But man’s profit is only meaningful when such life is lived in the Spirit. 
Separated from being, man’s life becomes evil.182 As Lévinas puts it, in more technical 
language: Subjective knowledge is dependant on the objective, phenomenal reality reaching 
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181 I and Thou, pp. 16–17, 41–43. Some things can remain in the realm of It and yet point to Thou. Scientific 
understanding is important for man to keep his bearing in the world, but Thou must always permeate the realm of 
It (which must not be allowed to assume primary importance). 
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the subject. Yet that very same reality is affected by the subjective perception which 
conceptualises it. Lévinas sees Buber’s philosophy as a direction away from the object 
towards being: The knowledge of being is more than a mere object orientation. Buber, 
according to Lévinas, conceives of the self / subject as a relation to the objective world: I-
Thou relation is the condition of all intentional relations. He aptly sees Buber’s inquiry as one 
into the “ontological structures anterior to those which characterise the objectifying 
intellect.”183 The ability to set over against self and accept the other implies Buber’s parting of 
ways with classical epistemology dealing with the problems of the correct mediation of the 
object to the subject. This is because the subject is aware of the fact that he shares in a reality 
not belonging to him. The sharing aspect is of crucial importance given the relation always 
involved in it. But because man frequently tries to master the world which does not belong to 
him, and estrangement from Thou results, the pseudo-predictable world of I-It predominates 
the essential relation, causing the illnesses and evils in society that prevail. Because relation is 
a correct balance of I-Thou and I-It, I becomes a self-contradiction when there is a failure to 
relate to the other and I becomes the self of consummation.184  
In elaboration of a point mentioned earlier it is perhaps useful to remember the philosophical 
backgrounds of phenomenological ontology in the existentialist and anthropological schools 
and their polemics with logical positivism and its concerns about scientific verification. Buber 
seems to polemize in much of I and Thou with the prevailing scientific and analytic world-
views which he believed were threatening to destroy humanity in the face of its apparent 
progress. 
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184 I and Thou, p. 69. See also Friedman, Martin Buber, pp. 62–68, for a detailed and compacted elaboration on 
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the realms of It, institutions knowing only specimens, feelings only the object. Modern man is obsessed mostly 
with his feelings, and the mastery of I-It over man and community brings many evils, but evil can be redeemed 
for the service of the good. The man who finds the correct balance between the two primaries and lives in 
relation is free. In contrast to him, the self-willed man neither believes nor meets – his life amounts to the 
shadow world of the past he wishes to control and use. The free man responds with his whole being, the captive 
is the slave of public opinion, social status, his own neurosis etc., never responding spontaneously, but always 
measuring the other in terms of status or usefulness. Thus the I of the I-It also becomes conscious of self as the 
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 The controversies raging between the two opposed schools of thought – phenomenology and 
analytic philosophy could be summarised, if only very briefly, as follows: phenomenologists 
felt that mankind was increasingly threatened by science that could be potentially exploited 
and abused for the annihilation of Man – quite the contrary of the progress that was hoped for. 
Both the First and Second World wars brought about a scepticism and disillusionment in the 
potential of technical progress and analysis to be put in the service of mankind. Even though 
Husserl commenced phenomenology as a transcendental “science”, he was soon criticised for 
a position found to be too intellectual and scientifically orientated to be of practical use in the 
Lebenswelt. The philosophy of such thinkers as Sartre, Marcel or Camus placed increasing 
weight on emotion and its analysis, “rejecting” systematic and academic thought.185 On the 
other hand, there were the logical positivists who sought to clear philosophic thought from 
layers of unclear concepts that had accumulated in philosophical thought through 
metaphysics. Instead of attempting to provide crisp definitions of the whole, they 
concentrated on solving the micro-problems of correspondence of sentences with reality using 
logical calculus (previously used for the verification of truth in mathematical propositions) to 
test the consistency of the abstract truths philosophy aspired to. They hoped to find and 
eliminate tautologies and contradictions. Although this movement attempted to find truth 
through the correct and clear use of language, its way of thought was diametrically opposite 
from the dialogic and relational philosophy developed by Buber, who held the theory that the 
elemental relation of the making present of the other is hampered by what he calls the modern 
viewpoint as well as by analytical and reductive viewpoints. Although he grants that such 
sciences have their value he believes their usefulness is limited and thus they must know their 
boundaries.186 On this note, however, it must be said that the arguments that Buber advances 
against excessive dependence on empiric sciences is by no means new and in fact has its roots 
firmly in the Greek rather than the Hebrew tradition. Although we can hardly accuse Buber of 
being a dualist, the lack of esteem that he holds for these sciences is reminiscent of the scorn 
Plato and his followers had towards the phenomenal world and the limits of empiricism which 
could be termed techné or doxa rather than epistemé. One recalls that the phenomenally 
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perceived world is but a mere shadow of the world of ideas and true knowledge.187 But Buber 
feels, unlike Plato, love and wonder towards the sensory world, seeking to experience its 
reality and beauty to the full, which is why he tries to devote as much strength as possible 
even at mundane levels such as trees or a well-loved pet cat and does not want to call that 
world the lowest level of existence.188 
There are numerous ethical consequences brought about by the encroachment of I-It into the 
primary relation. We have already mentioned the potential abuses of science when it is used 
to annihilate man. There are, however more subtle levels of the encroachment of the I-It 
primary into genuine relation. In his essay Man and His Image-work, Buber shows how the 
modern world of the senses accepted uncritically in the past became gradually transformed 
into an increasingly (if only deceptively) reliable, measurable world. Yet that predictable 
world paradoxically evolved to become increasingly foreign in its estrangement from the 
Lebenswelt. Science, despite its replacement of older theories with more consistent, versatile 
ones, did not trouble itself over what Buber describes as man’s continuing need for a 
metaphysical grounding providing “a real world constituted in a certain way”.189 Yet that 
same image given by empiric sciences appears abstract and symbolic in itself, it runs contrary 
to what we know about the world. A metaphysical dualism within itself arises insofar as these 
theories (based on empirically observed reality - the validity of which science has cast into 
increasing doubt) mean that we proceed and make advances based on an ever-less-familiar 
world. In recalling a conversation with the scientist Albert Einstein,190 Buber traces the hybris 
of the scientific in their ‘we’ that almost claimed to draw the very lines of being after God 
despite the unsteady grounds upon which their progress was based.191  
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188 Cf. I and Thou p. 7. For example, Buber’s thoughts about the tree, in which he contrasts perceiving the 
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The reader may remember what has been said about the elemental relation of the interhuman 
in which we accept the other in his otherness and become a part of his reality in mutual 
relation that becomes dialogue. We can now contrast to this relation to the method of 
persuading our neighbour typical for propaganda. The propagandist forces his views or 
political beliefs on the other until that other begins to understand and accept the foreign view 
as his own latent thought. In contrast to the educator – who seeks to bring someone’s 
individuality to the fore by nurturing and developing it – the propagandist seeks to understand 
another’s individuality in order to exploit and manipulate it at his own discretion.  The 
propagandist simultaneously tries to stifle the personal individual perceived as a threat to his 
intentions amounting to little more than a search and grouping of adherents for a certain 
cause. Buber rightly observes that political methods at their extreme depersonalise the 
human.192  
Despite the depth and intelligence of Buber’s philosophy, the intentional lack of system 
pervading his ethics is a source of criticism by authors such as Fox.193 Buber’s argumentation 
on this topic is very similar to his arguments regarding revelation: He believes that man is to 
follow his heart because the heart knows what is right based upon revelation and direct, 
immediate relation with the absolute. Evil is a lack of direction; it is never done with the 
whole being and its direction is always turned away from God. Because morally correct 
action is always done with the fullness of being and the heart in the right direction, there is no 
need for a fixed moral codex, which is nearer to idolatry. Even the Bible and the Decalogue is 
ultimately the work of man. Although Buber’s thoughts on such matters as racial prejudice 
                                                                                                                                                      
them as they are in themselves, things then become an x or a y, and it is in this that Buber finds the main 
encroachment of empirical science and the mathematical world on the object. Buber relates the story of the 
Linden tree emptied of its reality once it is broken down according to mathematical formulae, concluding that 
nature becomes robbed of its content until we learn to accept it as a thing of the senses in immediate existential 
reality in the multiplicity, not as an object cut and dried. 
 
192 Elements of the Interhuman, pp. 82–3. 
 
193 Fox, pp. 151–68. Fox’s deep and thought-provoking article discusses the foundations of Buber’s ethics in 
revelation which transform the entire being of man and addresses the problem of the human who does not know 
whether the revelation received is truly from the Absolute or an idol. Because no-one is ever entirely pure there 
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social grace which is the fulfilment of the command to love one’s neighbour in the Pentateuch. 
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and love towards the neighbour are rooted in the Pentateuch, he does not insist that such 
moral standards are binding. They are a guide but are not to be confused with the Word.   
2.2.2. Buber, Religion and Philosophy: Martin Buber’s philosophic thought is strongly based 
on the revelation of YHVH, whom Buber evidently refers to in his philosophy as Thou. 
The permeation of the Thou in our being in the world has ethical consequences 
affecting our lives and contacts with our neighbours. Worship of the Absolute in the 
forms of religion has a legitimate place in society, but not even religion is immune to 
the alienation of I-It that can result from religion worshipping its own forms. When 
religion loses sight of revelation and lives for itself it becomes idolatry. 
The moment of revelation, which cannot be experienced, is that of the meeting with the 
Eternal Thou. The Word of revelation is “I am that I am”. Even though the Eternal Thou 
cannot become an It, in pursuing religion for the sake of religion, man exchanges the Eternal 
Thou for an It.194 A god who condescends to become the object of a religion or a cult can only 
be spoken to, not about. The Spirit’s presence is a liberating force bringing joy to life and 
work. Buber believes that all men have, somewhere in the depths of their souls, some 
awareness of Thou and points out the meaninglessness of It in sickness or boundary 
situations. He also depicts society that has ceased to be grounded in the relational as 
metamorphosing into It, where causality replaces the former harmony in the cosmos to 
oppress its people in fate.  
In the lecture Religion and Philosophy Buber writes that the genuine relation of self to being 
is also decisive for true religion; it is not of primary importance to be able to talk about God 
in order to believe in Him. Genuine relation and belief are both calls to God. The question 
about proof of God’s existence is a negative one because of the lack of experience; and even 
the ancient philosophers such as Protagoras understood that one could neither prove nor 
disprove the existence of God. Buber sees the difference between the great religions and 
philosophy as lying in the fact that the great religions are such in which there is a living 
relationship to Being – believed-in, Absolute Being results in a belief which has an existential 
reality in a mutuality of I and Thou. In philosophy, the Absolute is objectified and all else is 
derived from it. The duality here is that of subject and object; and the philosophical attitude 
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tries to gain and seek autonomy for itself, viewing religion as something between clear 
knowledge and confused opinion. In religion, faith does not understand relation as noetic, but 
rather stresses reciprocity insofar as it comprehends mutual relation as mutual contact. 
Philosophy, being concerned with essences, tries to liberate itself from religion and “wills to 
become life”.195  
Buber finds the essence of religion in concrete reality and not above the struggle with reality. 
Once again, he stresses the immediacy of the moment which is lost by trying to experience 
that moment. Buber believes that one must stand firm before reality and answer it fully in 
order to experience meaning. He believes there is an absolute and essential mystery which is 
unknowable here but which can be found in the everyday. This is the realm in which we 
hallow the divine: Fear of God involves something seemingly as simple as accepting the 
situation as given by the Giver. We cannot love God without fearing Him first: An easy god 
thus loved becomes a mere idol, fashioned according to one’s needs. Knowing God, Thou, in 
fear means putting oneself in the hands of His mercy; this is the only thing that can bring man 
to truly love God in the deeply personal religious experience.196 
But Buber feels that philosophy does the opposite to this in its looking away from the 
concrete towards abstraction. Reality is thus only the starting point of philosophy, where man 
lifts himself above the sphere of concrete reality further into the sphere of precise 
conceptualisation where the object is the higher reality of the Good or the Absolute that can 
be found in universals. Buber criticises the too general nature of Greek thought as well as the 
fact that it denounces the immediate relation of I to Thou. Although the world would not be 
comprehensible without the conceptual thought characteristic of philosophy, Buber’s 
arguments show that God is present and shines through all forms and yet cannot be held in 
any kind of image. Because in philosophy, thinking plays the key role in all faculties one 
becomes, as Buber seems to suggest, insensitive to surroundings. The highest intensity of 
being is to be found in truly religious reality – permeated as it is by the I-Thou primary. 
Considering the above, it is not surprising that Buber finds the highest concentration of the I-
It primary in philosophical knowledge in which the subject is extracted “from the I of the 
                                                
195 BUBER, Martin. Religion and Philosophy in The Eclipse of God. 1952. New York. Harper and Row 
Torchbooks. Reprint 1957. Transl. by FRIEDMAN, Maurice (Hereafter to be referred to as “Religion and 
Philosophy”), pp. 28–35. 
 
196 Ibid.,  pp. 36–38. 
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immediate togetherness of I and It ...and produces the exact thinking of contemplated existing 
beings, yes, of contemplated Being itself.”197 Buber says that philosophy can offer a 
corrective to theology that has strayed from its path when the symbols and 
anthropomorphisms it uses place barriers to genuine relation with the God, Thou who has 
suffered them. Precisely the critical atheism of the philosopher – who opposes symbols and 
metaphysics – can rouse the religious back to following the God they had previously 
destroyed with their fashioned images.198  
Connected with Buber’s thoughts on the turning away from Thou are those regarding the 
abolition of relation, specifically Buber’s critical words addressing mysticism and     
Gnosticism – both of which he believes seek to abolish I by unifying it with Thou in what 
Buber specifically calls the “loftiest peaks in the language of It”. In this process of the human 
becoming unified with the divine, the soul senses or imagines a unity with the divine. Yet 
Buber ascribes little more than a flight from reality to it, because this unification only takes 
place in the soul of man. The flight from reality is of little help in its detachment from the 
earthly situation, leading ultimately to the annihilation rather than affirmation of the self.199 
“Eastern flights from reality” are, moreover, an evasion of genuine existence as We, where 
dialogic speech carries a realm in which response (and responsibility carried within that 
response) is required. The man of flight leaps into the flight of the multitude or into the self 
but always away from that all-important mutual responsibility lived as We. Such individuals, 
who grow deaf to the voice of the other, cease to hear Thou.200  Reality exists only in mutual 
                                                
197 Ibid., pp. 44–6. 
 
198 Ibid.,Idem. See also Friedman, Martin Buber, pp.127, 130–31.  Friedman  describes a social and cosmic 
insecurity which strengthens the breakdown in community living causing a loss of ability to respond with the 
whole being, leading to an existential mistrust and a loss of trust in God. This he describes as an eclipse of God 
experienced primarily in Being itself, with the human side of God hiding its face. Man is able to glimpse God, 
yet unable to produce images of an Absolute who eludes direct contemplation. Friedman sees the most serious 
consequence as the loss of God’s nearness and the inability to renew relations with Him; man does not believe 
himself addressed by God; and in a world full of horror, we feel unable to call to God. 
  
199 It is interesting to note that this criticism – the flight from reality and lack of rootedness in the lived world of 
man was one of the main moving forces in the parting of existentialism with early phenomenology as 
represented by Husserl, which itself sought to part with the scientific world-view making greater claims to 
absolute authority. 
 
200 Elements of the Interhuman, pp. 108–9. See also Buber’s polemics with Aldous Huxley in Idem, pp. 98–102. 
Buber opposes Huxley and his experimentation with hallucinogenic drugs, saying that these are only a flight into 
the world of the self. Such chemical holidays divorce one not only from the I of facticity but also from the world 
and the personhood the world brings about in us. The loss of situation in such self-paradises shuts one away from 
other people and makes them look suspicious. Although Huxley considered his mescaline experiences mystic, 
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action in Buber’s thought.201 Moreover, in relation, man feels his dependence on God as a 
creature. The doctrine of Karma is similarly negative to Buber given the inescapability of fate 
in which it keeps its believers (and the cosmos).202 
It is of interest to note here that Buber was himself influenced by mysticism, and started out 
as a mystic early in his career. He himself writes that in his earlier years the religious 
experience was the exceptional, defining it as the “experience of an otherness which did not 
fit into the context of life”.203 The attraction of mysticism was the ability of the religious to 
tear time apart which, Buber says, could lift one out of one’s accustomed existence with its 
everyday affairs and concerns into a sphere where “illumination and ecstasy and rapture held 
without time or sequence.”204 In the same passage, however, Buber decries this “division of 
the temporal life which is streaming to death and eternity and which only in its temporality 
can be fulfilled in the face of these” as illegitimate. The suicide of a man who had come to see 
him, not simply in order to chat but rather to seek a decisive answer, shook Buber deeply. 
Blaming himself for this man’s death, Buber writes that he had been in too much of a 
religious rapture after a mystical experience to respond (to Buber’s mind) appropriately to the 
man’s questions when he was still alive (even though Buber says he listened to the man 
attentively, answered his questions as carefully as anyone else who called on him with similar 
matters as had this man). This incident disturbed Buber profoundly enough for him to stop 
seeking out religious experiences divorced from the everyday.205 Among the other influences 
                                                                                                                                                      
Buber reminds us that the artist and the mystic are both removed from the community in which they belong and 
(p. 102) “...must deliver not less than themselves...in order to withstand what has taken possession of them.”  
 
201 I and Thou, pp. 83–89. See also pp. 91–99. Buber dismisses Buddhism as a false goal because it seeks the 
cessation of pain i.e. the becoming and passing away. Because Buddhism also leads to the rejection of the 
sensory world, Buber decries it as an extinction of the ability to say Thou and a renunciation of the meaning of 
life, which is to remain in relation. Ultimately, Buber dismisses Buddhism as an illusory belief that God dwells 
in the soul.  God is near, but remote at the same time, and is not our Self.  
 
202 Ibid., pp. 51, 54, 55. According to Buber, Karma is a tyranny which shuts “...us into a prison that we cannot 
break in this life….a heaven was established in a law...stars now rule in oppressive might…But now, whatever 
we do, we are laden with the whole burden of the dead weight of the world, with fate that does not know spirit. 
The storming desire for salvation is unsatisfied after manifold attempts, till it is stifled by one who learns to 
escape the cycle of births..“ This quote is among the more representative of the light in which Buber views most 
mysticism and Gnosticism, which shall be discussed later.  
 
203 Dialogue, p. 13. 
 
204 Ibid., idem. 
 
205 Ibid., pp. 13–14. 
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on Buber’s thought in the early 20th Century were Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism (which 
persisted) and German mysticism. Also of importance are the Haskalah and Hasidic 
movements in Judaism which Friedman believes Buber synthesized into his philosophy; 
Buber saw Judaism’s main task as a synthesis of word and deed, the truly creative man being 
the one who could bring inner division into harmony and follow a new direction in one’s life 
yet remain rooted to a people through and in whom one is enriched.206 
2.3. The Permeation of the I-Thou Primary into Daily Life in the Practical Sense. 
2.3.1. Education and Character Formation: Buber’s awareness of the importance of genuine 
relation in such fields as education closely follow the ethical aspect of I-Thou relation 
and dialogic philosophy. The teacher has a responsibility over his / her charges not 
only in the sense of teaching them facts but also for the building of their character by 
accepting and bringing their individual personalities to the fore. Because education 
not only teaches mutuality to children, but also develops the educator’s person, it is 
intensely dialogical and relational, and thus an important aspect of the I-Thou 
primary.  
Buber’s contribution to a philosophy of education can be found in his essays Education 
(1926) and The Education of Character (1939). He begins the first by discussing the reality 
into which children are born by the hour. Children are born with a disposition of a given 
historical reality that begins its encroachment into character even before the child is born. 
Despite this, the future is not simply a deterministic mechanism that causally pulls the 
individual hither and thither. In fact, the individual plays a crucial role in shaping the         
future – as do educators.207 Buber connects intellectual development to creation; and the 
creative process is an instinctive ability common to all. The desire to take part in speaking or 
even the destructive urge – but yet seeing something new emerging as the result of our    
efforts – are particularly apt examples taken from the everyday world of human desire to be a 
part of the world-at-hand.208  
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207 BUBER, Martin. Education in Between Man and Man (Hereafter to be referred to as “Education”),  pp. 83–
85. 
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We have all experienced the wonder of a completely unexpected result forming after a 
seemingly long process of various steps led by our teacher. For example, a candelabrum that 
emerges from the negative space between two identical profiles one has carefully drawn 
facing one another. Buber uses the example of a choirmaster creating a polyphony of voices 
from a formless, somewhat disorderly mass of faces, voices and personalities. The activity of 
singing teaches one to be less selfish insofar as it trains regard for the other and the group as a 
whole, learning to keep one’s individuality within its appropriate boundaries. Like the 
choirmaster, the teacher plays an indispensible role in the sharing and mutuality that is 
necessary for a meaningful society lived as a communal We. Buber finds the essence of being 
in the communal opus. The artistic, creative opus is meaningful, but needs someone who can 
relate the individual to that which is beyond the arts as a fellow-creature lost in the world. We 
have discussed how the child is born into primal relation. Yet as the child’s personality grows 
once the person learns how to separate self from objects, the I-It primary beings to encroach 
on what was primary relation. But once the child begins to navigate his way into the world, 
this must be tempered and permeated by Thou if the child is not to take on a one-sided 
relationship with the world by objectifying it at the same time as internalising it. There is a 
danger of the child coming to recognise the world purely as a tool to be used. 209 
Buber believes that there is the instinct and desire for communion, the longing for the world 
at hand to become present to us as person who teaches us to say Thou. We desire a world that 
is responsive to us, that respects and confirms us as a person in our uniqueness - in other 
words, we desire the communality of the relational being of the I-Thou primary. Keeping in 
mind the child’s inborn capacity to receive the world, it is the educator’s field of concern to 
develop that capacity by condensing and selecting the “effective world” and making it 
manifest though him. Another interpretation of this is the teacher’s role and ability to edit the 
plethora of input the child receives and build his / her character from the outlines and the 
basic structures through the depths and inner relationships.210 
                                                
209 BLENKINSOPP, Sean. Martin Buber: Educating for Relationship in Ethics, Place and Environment, Vol. 8, 
No. 3, October 2005. London. Routledge. 2005 (Hereafter to be referred to as “Blenkinsopp”), p. 299. 
Blenkinsopp repeats the need for the I-It primary in the hermeneutics of facticity; but it is a means rather than an 
end, in which the child learns to explore and categorise. The teacher is a mediator of the scientific and relational 
world. That is why his work with the child is of such importance. 
   
210 Education, pp. 86–90. See especially p. 89, “The world, that is the whole environment, nature and society, 
“educates” the human being…education...means a selection by man of the effective world: it means to give 
decisive effective power to a selection of the world which is concentrated and manifested in the 
educator…through the educator, the world for the first time becomes the true subject of its effect.”  
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In his ability to condense and represent the rest of the world reaching the pupil the teacher 
provides the starting point of education. The teacher needs to develop potential as opposed to 
merely allowing compulsion. The teacher allows freedom to his pupils, freedom being the 
contrary of compulsion by nature or fate. The teacher in a sense echoes God, in a certain sense 
His representative insofar as he not only has a great responsibility, but also takes a great risk 
by allowing his pupils freedom, as well as in the manifold variety he sees in the pupils’ faces 
and personalities when faced with them for the first time. Buber likens it to a “veritable, 
chaotic multitude of unknown faces” so that the educator becomes a creator in the sense of 
Gen 1.1, where there is only chaos and darkness before God created the world.211  
There is a moment of wonder when the educator experiences reality from the other, receiving 
side which, although lasting only a mere instant, forms the indelible impression of the other, 
making him present. This is viewed by Buber as a transfusion, making it impossible to think 
of teaching the child as a mere elaboration of subjectivity. Buber lays strong emphasis on the 
inclusion which takes place in such cases where mutual realities overlap and are woven 
together to form the experience of the in-between in this unique event. In inclusion, one 
extends one’s own reality into that of the other, conversation itself only becomes genuine by 
inclusion (the main elements of which are relation and a common event), and the 
acknowledgement of the actual being of the partner in dialogue. Thus education is a branch of 
                                                                                                                                                      
 
See also Blenkinsopp, pp. 287–89. The human has an instinct for community and it is the teacher’s responsibility 
to realise and nurture this ability. In true dialogue one embraces the other. I becomes complete in relationship, 
both with the individual and the external world and this becomes a reuniting of the temporal with the eternal. 
Blenkinsopp emphasises Buber’s numerous encounters with the more than human in his early life as 
instrumental for his later thought – the reminder in the commonplace run of events of the voice of the Eternal 
Thou. 
  
211 But see also Blenkinsopp pp. 289–93 for a different view. Blenkinsopp traces the influence of Buber’s 
thoughts on education in Hasidism, especially in the concepts of Shekina and Shiflut. Two aspects of Buber’s 
God are His eternal completeness above, and in the Shekina, his exiled glory in little pieces in all His creation. 
Hasidism finds and recognises these sparks in the world and seeks to unite them both in themselves and with 
reference to the Creator. It is our duty to do so as well, and thus the teacher tries to bring out the sparks which 
may be hidden (through ignorance and choice), the sparks of the good, the God within everyone. This is because 
it is the duty of mankind to seek the connections of the Shekina in service of God in time and space. Buber’s 
concept of Shekina, according to Blenkinsopp, relates to teaching and teachers insofar as the teacher tries to 
develop love in students by seeking the good in them. The aspect of Shiflut is to be found in the humility of 
being able to be oneself in uniqueness – “becoming from within and translating that understanding of self into 
action.” (p. 293) Blenkinsopp also likens Buber’s educator to God in his ability to bring the world to the trusting 
pupil in its condensed form. He sees the teacher as a creator of a world for the students rather than the creative 
task in forms the student’s characters from the amorphous mass which he encounters at the first meeting. 
Blenkinsopp sees the teacher’s duty in recognising the sparks of Shekina in the darkness and connect them in 
mutuality and bring them into fruition by nurturing them (pg. 300). 
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the pure dialogue we have elaborated upon in previous paragraphs. In the formative aspect the 
educator forms the child’s trust in the outer world, shows him meaning by facing him in 
reality, by relating to him and in doing so, the teacher increases the child’s responsibility for 
the world. The child becomes one of the bearers of the teacher’s “communion with the world, 
one of the focuses of his responsibilities for the world.” 212 The meaning of education thus lies 
in our ability to become free through communion. The presence of the Eternal Thou is 
required in the educational setting to give us this ability. In the context of his essay on 
education, Buber mentions three forms of dialogical relation, the first of which rests on the 
experience of mutual inclusion. This is even present when there is a dispute where the two 
disagreeing parties recognise the legitimacy of the other’s point of view without relativising 
one’s own standpoint and in recognising the other, fulfilling our relation to Present Being by 
receiving what is “manifested of it and incorporating it into our own being. The other two 
forms, based and therefore proceeding from this full inclusion, are relation in education and, 
finally, friendship. Relation in education involves the acknowledgment implicit in inclusion – 
not merely experiencing the other side, but allowing oneself to be changed by it rather than 
merely second-guessing the interlocutor. Mutual education is the fruit of this process. The 
teacher remains in the child’s individuality but reverts to his own, catching moments, 
enlightening the child based on his observations. The educator experiences both sides of this 
relation, the child only one side. Finally, if the pupil is able, after some effort, or sometimes 
suddenly, to burst over to the teacher’s side, the educative experience becomes one of 
friendship.213 
The experience of the other side, whether it be one of acceptance or rejection of the other’s 
views also give a valuable insight into the other’s needs in order to grow. The teacher is 
bound by his subjectivity to edit what he deems formatively meaningful for the child. The 
dangers of this are to be dispelled by the educator being an integral part of the communal 
process turned as We to Thou. But one of the largest problems facing the views of 
                                                
212 Buber, Education, pp. 94–99 (quote pg. 98). See also Friedman, Martin Buber, pp. 176–81 Friedman sees the 
greatness of the teacher in his teaching, despite the fact that he does not see who he will have in front of him. 
The teacher can only educate in mutuality when he is trusted by the child, taking the child into his own store of 
experiences. The child, according to the philosophy of dialogue, grows through the teacher’s personality and the 
I of the author. Between total authority and freedom lies communion, and Friedman sees the way out of isolated 
individualism and oppositeness of teacher and pupil through communion and dialogic relation. The teacher’s 
task is to bring the child’s personality to full flower and yet giving him the opportunity to think for himself and 
formulate his own opinion. Friedman finds the main concern of teaching in its character-building properties. 
 
213 Education, pp. 99–101. 
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Blenkinsopp, Friedman and Buber on education is that they hold the opinion that the teacher 
must mediate the outside world to the pupil and develop his character without imposing his 
own values upon the child. This view lays itself open to a contradiction insofar as the teacher, 
in his subjectively individual interpretation of the world, is likely to colour the information 
chosen to be condensed as well as how it is chosen to be presented to the pupil. But Buber 
makes rather high demands upon the teacher by expecting him not to impose his subjective 
values upon the pupil: No matter how much the teacher would tries to distance the self from 
subjectivity, he is still likely to (perhaps even unconsciously) impose the norms of society, 
those presented by the media, those that form his own opinion etc. on the pupil. One asks how 
many educators fit the intellectual physiognomy presented by Buber.  
Buber’s solution to this is presented as the teacher’s rootedness in God, but this it remains a 
question as to how to apply these undoubtedly profound thoughts of Buber’s to a society as 
deeply secularised and consumerist as today’s. There is also the issue of keeping religion and 
belief outside the classroom, especially in educational institutions funded by state subsidies 
and the public. The educator, as Buber presents him, would find it difficult to work in a 
pluralistic reality, there are too many different kinds of belief for an educator to simply be 
rooted in God as Buber suggests (in line with his religious anarchism). It is a paradox that 
Buber is well aware of the dangers of propaganda in its attempt to seize the person by 
eliminating his individuality and using him as an object: Buber’s educator would have to 
essentially forget his creed, and with it, an essential part of his individuality lest the faith 
sensibilities of certain individuals in the pluralistic-era co-educational classroom are offended 
by a concept of God that goes contrary to that of their own faith communities. The 
enlightened spiritual man who firmly believes in the ability of good education to better 
mankind, confessing no particular faith is the only educator who could truly be rooted in God 
as Buber describes it. Buber does not seem to consider any established religion to be truly 
representative of the I-Thou primary. Yet how can the educator’s individual religion not 
colour his rootedness in God and what he / she presents to the children? Buber’s thoughts on 
education are interesting as an elaboration of his I-Thou philosophy, but may strike some 
readers as utopian (as far as its being realized is concerned) and dogmatic (in Buber’s 
anarchic religious sense).  
The author believes that Buber could even remove God from his educational philosophy 
without any harm done to the main content of his essays concerning education. In most 
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respects, Buber introduces God here, it seems, out of respect rooted in his (Buber’s) own 
belief in Him – somewhat like Bach’s Soli Deo Gloria at the end of each of his works. But the 
main content of Buber’s educational content seems more rooted in the enlightenment, with its 
emphasis on the education of character and its importance for the individual’s later life as a 
functional member in society. God is superfluous in the essay Education, and even more so in 
The Education of Character with its emphasis on the role of the teacher as a mentor and 
builder of character.214   
Buber’s educator sees himself in the position to help someone become a unique person and 
the bearer of that particular task to which the individual has been called. The educator 
believes that he is right and allows time for the truth to gently unfold whilst developing it. 
Buber contrasts this with the propagandist who does not (in Buber’s opinion) believe in the 
truth of the propaganda being taught and has to impose himself on the other and use special 
methods to achieve his ends. The educator believes in the ‘primal power’ of what he sees as 
his calling to scatter and develop.215      
It has to be said, however, that a convinced Fascist, racist, Nazi or Communist could also be 
thoroughly convinced of the rectitude and power of his beliefs and try to disseminate such 
beliefs in the classroom, not even so much because the party requires that he do so, but 
because he himself believes that these doctrines are correct. Buber’s propagandist, like his 
teacher, strikes the author as a theoretical-conceptual construction fitting neatly into Buber’s 
implicit system. As unfortunate a part of life as propaganda and its disseminators are, Buber 
also reduces both the educator and the propagandist to entities that become a part of his 
                                                
214 BUBER, Martin. The Education of Character in Between Man and Man, pp. 104–111. The essay is an 
elaboration of Education. Here Buber discusses the more complex task of education of character in comparison 
with education in empiric facts. There is resistance to one’s character being educated. Buber says that the teacher 
must proceed directly and spontaneously, trying to affect the whole being of the pupil with his character, and for 
this purpose must be able to communicate himself directly. Buber draws attention to the Greek meaning of 
character “impression“, meaning that one’s personality is formed by extranatal factors that impress themselves 
upon one’s being. The educator understands this as well as his role as redactor in which he yet remains distinct. 
In understanding this, he remains humble he has a formative responsibility. The pupil gives him confidence after 
the teacher has won over the pupil’s resistance, giving way to trust once the pupil has accepted the educator as a 
person. The educator has a real character-building potential especially when pupils approach him in confidence 
and the teacher answers as a human to the best of his knowledge. Character-building also happens in games and 
discussions about controversial topics. These controversies are the ultimate test for a teacher not only in his 
ability to answer, but to be ready to apply ointment to soothe the vanquished. Learning to become a person, a 
self, and overcoming the traps of collectivism are essential for entering into a relation with the Absolute. Again, 
Buber leads his argument from the formative role of the teacher to a relation with Thou or God.  
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dialogic philosophy. In doing so, is he not also objectifying them and using them as parts in a 
more or less closed system, as much as he might deny this himself? 
2.3.2. The I-Thou Primary’s Inclusion in the Field of Psychology: Like the educator, the 
healer of souls cannot simply view his patients as objects fitting into the character of 
observed empiric science. He must try to transcend their illness relate to them as a 
person and then bring them back to health. This is a process involving recognition of 
three spheres of guilt and, with it, three steps to recovery. One of the central problems 
in psychotherapy in this regard is that of existential guilt consequent from the inability 
to say Thou. Despite the depth of Buber’s observations, these remain on the level of an 
in-depth melding of psychotherapy and anthropological philosophy rather than a 
successful inclusion of his I-Thou philosophy into these fields. 
The researcher’s field of interest is in the empiric sciences. The psychoanalyst’s field of 
research concerns itself with the inner processes of guilt and guilt feelings beyond the factual 
course of events in the patient’s life. Most researchers limit themselves to the latent processes 
making up patient’s reactions; the analyst works within an inverted reciprocation. Buber 
defines mental illness and neuroses as a monological subjectivity or self-relation. The empiric 
sciences are concerned with guilt and guilt-feelings, conscious and unconscious. Yet Buber 
sees the problem of guilt as an ontic problem, its place more in being as such than in the soul. 
The scientific investigator must encounter guilt thus, and in his obligation to give help he 
must occasionally step out of the rules and boundaries of his school and approach the work of 
healing as a partner.216 
In the works of Jung and Freud, evil is not considered as an ontological phenomenon. They 
see guilt as the fear of loss of love, a result of a transgression against ancient or modern 
taboos – fear of the parental or social tribunal (Freud), or failure in the process of 
individuation (Jung). Neither of these, according to Buber, adequately considers the 
intersubjective aspect of guilt, viewing the phenomenon as a problem of inadequate 
individuation, or essentially a failure in one’s relationship with oneself. Buber tries to search 
deeper, finding the source of madness in the inability to say Thou and the insightful awareness 
of this estrangement in wrongdoing against what is then perceived as irretrievably lost time. 
                                                
216 BUBER, Martin. Guilt and Guilt Feelings in The Knowledge of Man (Hereafter to be referred to as “Guilt and 
Guilt Feelings“), pp. 122–25. 
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Illness occurs when the guilty refuse to acknowledge their guilt. Thus the therapist, when 
confronted by such patients, must do more than merely remove the existential guilt which 
goes deeper than the general categories of repression and becoming conscious.217  
Buber believes there is an event at the root of guilt which has been avoided and suppressed; 
this returns later to generate existential guilt. The healer has the role of returning to the event 
where an act was committed to transgress the order constituting human beings, and implicitly 
the order God or Thou created, for what is guilt if not sin or a transgression against the 
Absolute and His created order?218 The researcher finds that he has to transcend the 
boundaries of his detached methods; and in encountering this event causing illness he might 
find the overwhelming burden that his learned methods are too general. The researcher begins 
to understand the problem as one of interpersonal guilt in the relational aspect, not attempting 
merely to mask the problem by converting the authentic guilt into a feeling of relief provided 
by empiric methods such as hypnosis or dream analysis. Buber criticises such methods as 
destructive to any potential reconciliation to an alienated environment.219 
Because dialogue and genuine relation lie at the essence of man’s being Buber implies that 
the psychotherapist should, within his professional duties, enter into essential relation with the 
infirm soul summoning him by understanding its lapse and need. Although experts in the field 
say that the therapist should not, cannot enter into such relations with the patient, Buber 
believes it necessary in order for the expert to carefully lead the distressed soul to a vantage 
point where the patient can view the distorted geography of his mental landscape perhaps at a 
better distance and in comprehending the problem, see what needs to be done. Buber stresses 
                                                
217 Ibid., p. 126. 
 
218 Ibid., p. 127. ”Existential guilt occurs when someone injures the order of the human world whose foundations 
he knows and recognises as those of his own existence and of all common human existence. The doctor who 
confronts such a guilt in the living memory of that patient must enter into his situation…if he wishes to persist as 
a healer he must take upon himself a burden he was not prepared to bear.” 
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 Ibid., pp 128–30. According to Buber these methods only help to silence the problem rather that face it. He 
also poses the question as to whether the psychotherapist can viably venture beyond the boundaries of his 
empiric science when summoned for help as a human being rather than a scientist. He says that the human being 
is more than an amalgam of conscious and unconscious processes, adding that the great moments of existence 
are when essence is discovered, realised and moved onto a higher plane. The moment of healing begins when the 
infirm decides anew to become what he is, and establish, as he does so, a genuine relation with the world. 
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the need to learn about and understand guilt in its depths.220 In his ability to enable the patient 
see the wholeness, he enables the soul to see the essence through him, as Friedman puts it.221  
Like Carl Rogers, Buber postulates a client-centred therapy which strongly emphasises 
considering the client as a human being, having respect towards him and trying to view the 
outside world through the client’s eyes. This kind of therapy also involves taking into account 
and comprehending guilt as different from anxiety. Friedman believes, with Buber, that this 
means laying aside preoccupations with diagnosis and becoming more involved based on a 
deep respect towards the patient rooted in understanding him. Friedman draws a comparison 
between Buber and Rogers insofar as Rogers finds the essence of therapy in direct experience 
and mutual relationship with the client. This means entering the relationship and responding 
with the whole being; risking the patient’s repudiation and losing both the patient and self in 
the process.222  Buber identifies three spheres in which guilt can fulfil itself and where it is 
necessary to reconcile relations:223  There is society, whose laws and taboos have been 
infringed upon, bringing about a subsequent fear of retribution by that society. Then there is 
the sphere of faith. Neither of these two areas is the doctor’s area of concern – conscience 
with its own set of values can condemn the individual even when society is permissive and 
turns a blind eye to certain misdeeds. Even if the analyst is a God-fearing man, he cannot 
intervene in the religious sense if he does not want to be a dilettante. It is in the sphere of 
conscience – the sphere where past, present and future misdeeds and failures to act are 
condemned – where the doctor becomes active. Conscience goes beyond the commands and 
prohibitions a society has set – though these play some part in shaping the conscience and do 
not create conscience as such. Its inner working processes and criteria remain hidden and are 
not traceable to societal or tribal taboos. Buber is concerned with the relation of conscience 
and existential guilt. Good can only be done with the entire self and wrongdoing causes a 
                                                
220  Ibid.,  pp. 131–32. 
  
221 Friedman, Martin Buber, pp. 185–90. In Buber’s inclusive approach the therapist experiences the other side 
rather than remain on the objective side. The doctor experiences the other’s pain and tries to imagine the other 
side without losing sight of his own. Friedman sees the value of Buber’s approach to therapy in its attempt to 
look at the whole man in its anti-systematic approach to the concrete and unique.  The analyst thus helps to 
reassemble what has been shattered. It is his calling to make the shattered soul whole again. 
 
222 Ibid., 190–94. 
 
223 Guilt and Guilt Feelings, pp. 133–47, what follows in the elaboration of the healing process is based on the 
reading and interpretation of Buber’s description of the healing process. 
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disturbance in the surrounding equilibrium, meaning that the self starts to lack completeness 
leading to an estrangement from society.224 
Corresponding to the three steps of guilt is a process of three steps which lead back to 
wholeness. This can begin once the healer has reached into the depths of existential guilt and 
does not cower to the anguish found there. The first step, illumination, is where one is 
confronted by the great conscience where the infirm soul enters the depths of what one has 
known or recognised for a longer time but not been able to grasp in all its essence and 
consequences for life. The second, confession, involves dialogue and self-illumination. 
Without illumination of essence confession remains superficial. Refusal to take the step 
towards self-illumination and confession of existential guilt causes a resultant inability to 
overcome it at the crucial hour – Buber uses literary figures such as Kafka’s Josef K. as 
illustrations of how this failure ultimately results in loss of life and embodies the condition of 
modern human, whose disrupted condition is yet capable of inner-illumination of the state of 
guilt. But like Josef K. this is resisted. Thus existential guilt remains in the memory, not 
allowing itself to be repressed, but enters into the conscious memory in a different form. Only 
when the inner resistance is overcome can self-illumination begin: Here Buber describes a 
place where the soul is lead in the great light that is in the very interior of the law. The third 
step is perseverance in the identification of self but also of importance of the awareness of 
guilt to our neighbour. Life afterwards is a tightrope of self-illumination and self perseverance 
and the struggle for reconciliation through reparation. Although reparation is not, strictly 
speaking, possible, meeting those whom one has injured and admitting one’s guilt to their 
face makes some progress towards repairing the damage at least to some extent. None of this 
is for the psychotherapist, whose role in healing is at most to point out the direction of the true 
root of the problem to the patient – the existential guilt where one can begin the work of 
existential self-help – which, according to Buber can only take place once the patient has 
realised the reality Buber has described.225 
It seems that Buber is not describing the historical reality of the psychotherapist, but the 
psychotherapist as Buber would have such specialists be. One often understands when reading 
Buber’s work that he is drawing the reader into a complex world of his own deep 
                                                
224
 Ibid., pp. 133–35. 
 
225 Ibid., pp 147–48. 
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understanding of the human condition. The passages of Buber’s dialogical philosophy make 
for deeply moving reading that provoke thought in the reader. One nonetheless arrives at the 
conclusion that for all the depth of Buber’s writing such people as his healer and his educator 
remain rooted in Buber’s dialogical philosophy, anthropology, and to some extent, his 
Hasidism. The psychotherapist is reminiscent of Rabbi Nachman, who did not speak a word 
that was not bathed in many tears. As Buber has written, the therapist descends into the depths 
of existential guilt in order to point the patient in the direction of self-illumination and 
reparation. In order for the therapist to help he must put aside his detachment and empirical 
methods and become involved. Yet this does not fit the “accepted“ description of (probably) 
the vast majority of psychotherapists who must, like others in the medical profession, retain a 
distance and not become too involved with the patient lest the lack of objectivity 
compromises medical judgement. This is perhaps especially valid for those dealing with 
mental ailments. No professional and objective therapist can viably wade into the murky 
depths of mental disturbance and remain untouched. Buber uses language which never strays 
far from the core of his dialogical philosophy when he writes that mental disturbance results 
from the inability to say Thou. The therapist becomes somewhat like a prophet or a rabbi in 
secular attire, but one who yet cannot liberate himself from his theological grounding. This in 
itself does not detract from the depth of Buber’s writing, but it ultimately seems better suited 
to the intellectual public than to the medical profession. 
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3.0. Conclusion: Martin Buber’s concept of God is strongly rooted in his I-Thou and 
dialogical philosophy, which in turn is closer to Greek than Hebrew thought. His thoughts 
about the practice of religion and the permeation of God in such fields as psychotherapy and 
education are of great intellectual depth, but will be valued the most by the thinker rather 
than the practitioner.  
In his Biblical theology, Buber espouses a genuine relation between man and YHVH. Buber 
goes to considerable lengths to illustrate the difference between monotheistic Hebrew faith 
and the pagan polytheism of the nations surrounding Israel. The Israelites respond to the 
address of the Absolute who calls them from the safety of their homes and leads them on a 
journey. Theirs is a response of emunah or faithfulness in comparison to the nations 
surrounding them; the nations prefer the safety of settlement and attempt to understand and 
thereby control both the human and non-human world. Buber adopts an anti-institutional, 
anti-legalistic departure-point in many of his works – apparently influenced by Kierkegaard – 
which pervades much of his Biblical theology. 
At the core of this lies Buber’s I-Thou philosophy, which in turn holds the thesis that the I-
Thou primary is personal, immediate, direct and always in the present; it refuses to be held or 
controlled in a convenient system. In this regard, Buber is no less critical even of historical 
Judaism, which he accuses of attempting to confine the Absolute within the boundaries of the 
system of mitzvot, and then later the Dual-Torah. Buber is thus highly critical of both 
orthodox Torah-camp Judaism (which has established itself as a major branch of Judaism) 
and intellectual currents within that religion – viewing intellectualism as another way of 
reducing the I-Thou primary to I-It. In doing so, however, Buber places himself outside 
mainstream historical Judaism both in its orthodox and more liberal branches, often laying 
himself open to criticism from its exponents. 
Despite Buber’s depth and intelligence as a Biblical exegete, his highly selective approach to 
the Scriptures has been a target of criticism by both Jewish and Christian scholars. This 
applies to both his exegesis of the Hebrew Bible and New Testament, as well as the 
conclusions he draws from it. Buber dismisses historical criticism as being of little value in 
the hermeneutics of the Hebrew Bible; yet he readily adopts it when it is convenient for his 
purposes. At other times he brings forward unqualified arguments which detract from the 
otherwise undoubted quality of his interpretative analysis. He believes that true Judaism is a 
96 
 
religion lacking a system, based rather on its highly personal relation to YHVH based on 
emunah. Yet Buber does not consider (except to dismiss it) how structured and obedient to the 
Torah historical Judaism really is. For most Jews, however, obedience to the dual-Torah is 
definitive of Judaism and normative for that religion.  
But Buber also tries to read his concept of Judaism into historical Judaism, as though it were 
the essence or kernel within the empiric and historical-phenomenal reality of Judaism. The 
license, however, with which he treats words and passages of the Bible (as well as the 
selectivity with which he deals with historical primary material on such movements as 
Hasidism) has laid him open to and drawn criticism for presenting an image of Judaism that is 
more his own highly individual interpretation rather than a critical examination of the 
phenomenon. This applies even to such matters as his thoughts about theodicy and the 
suffering servant: His theodicy lies closest to the existentialist concept of inauthentic 
existence and related currents of thought. His interpretation of the suffering servant is of 
unusual depth and highly original, but seems closer to a philosophical than a theological 
interpretation.  
The same problems that pervade his interpretation of Judaism are evident in his criticisms of 
Christianity. Buber’s main line of criticism towards Christianity is that strayed from the 
teaching of the historical Jesus, whose teaching is best represented by the Sermon on the 
Mount which is itself rooted in the Two Commandments of Love and thus in the emunah faith 
of the Israelites. To Buber, the direction Christianity took after Paul is based on Paul’s 
forensic interpretation of the Torah based on the Septuagint misinterpretation of the word 
Torah. Paul’s interpretation of the Hebrew Bible is, according to Buber burdened by his 
pessimism rooted in Greek and especially Gnostic thought. Johannine Christology is held in 
low esteem by Buber for similar reasons. Buber rejects the concept of original sin as going 
against the Word of the Bible which says that man is God’s creation and therefore always 
capable of turning and coming back to God. God remains near even in times when He 
chooses to remain hidden. Buber’s theological works, however, remain thought-provoking 
and complex studies that are worth the considerable intellectual effort it takes to read them. 
Buber’s anti-systematic approach is only on the face of both his philosophical and theological 
writings. A careful reading will show several themes which reappear and overlap one another. 
These ultimately coalesce to form an implicit system based primarily on the core of his 
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thought as it is represented in Buber’s book I and Thou, including such themes as the two 
primaries, genuine relation, dialogue and the in-between, which we have tried to deal with in 
some depth in this thesis. Although Buber is sometimes presented as a thinker even for the 
layman or the grass-roots believer rather than the academic, his writing makes for no less 
demanding reading than any major thinker of the period. His thought, we have attempted to 
show, has its firm place within the context of existentialism and the polemics it held with the 
scientific world-view and the latent threat posed by science to mankind in viewing everything 
as definable by neat formulas. We see that Buber was importantly influenced in his 
philosophical thinking by Kierkegaard, who gave Buber an impetus with his own anti-legalist, 
anti-institutional standpoint. 
Although even philosophically less educated readers can profit immensely by reading Buber’s 
work, his writing are truly best understood with at least some background knowledge of 
existentialism, as well as the debates and polemics between the phenomenologist and the 
logical positivist schools of thought – especially after Husserl when phenomenology in its 
existentialist form became increasingly anti-rationalistic and anti-academic. With this in 
mind, it becomes evident that Buber, despite what his supporters such as Friedman might say, 
is very much a man of his time. Ultimately, Buber is most profitably read by more educated 
readers who take the time and effort to read not only I and Thou, but other books and essays 
by Buber and are willing to retain a critical distance from what they read. These works remain 
thought-provoking and important contributions to the history of Western thought; 
paradoxically they meander into a system of ideas no less complex than any other thinker’s. 
Buber’s God-permeated “religion”, “prophet”, “psychotherapist”, and “educator” are entirely 
his own concepts. In themselves, these are profound and complex; and practitioners and 
educators would do well to become acquainted with them and think about them carefully. It 
does, however, remain a question how many of the multitude are willing to go into the depths 
of the mind and soul the way Buber has done. 
Pavel Šuba 
Prague, April 2008                      
 
 
98 
 
4.0. Bibliography: 
 
Primary Literature 
I. BUBER, Martin 
- Between Man and Man.1947. Reprint 1959. Boston. Beacon Press. Transl. by SMITH, 
Ronald Gregor. 
- I and Thou. Reprint 1944.  Edinburgh. T and T Clark. Transl. By SMITH, Ronald 
Gregor. 
- The Knowledge of Man - Selected Essays. 1965. New York. Harper and Row 
Publishers. Transl. by FRIEDMAN, Maurice and SMITH, Ronald Gregor. 
- Moses. 1946. Oxford. East and West Library. Transl. by LASK, I. M. 
-  The Prophetic Faith. 1949. New York. The Macmillan Company. Transl. by 
WITTON-DAVIES, Carlyle. 
- Right and Wrong, An Interpretation on Some Psalms. SCM Press Ltd. 1952. Transl. 
By SMITH, Ronald Gregor. 
- The Tales of Rabbi Nachman. Reprint. 1962. Bloomington. Indiana University Press. 
Transl. by FRIEDMAN, Maurice. 
- The Two Types of Faith. London. Routledge and Kegan Paul .1951. Transl. By 
SMITH, Ronald Gregor. 
II. Other Authors 
BULTMANN, Rudolph. Theology of the New Testament Vol. I.  London. SCM Press Ltd. 1951. 
Transl. by GROBEL, Hendrick.  
HUSSERL, Edmund. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy. FIRST BOOK: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology. 1976 (Reprint 
1998). Dordrecht. Kluwer Academic Press. Transl. by KERSTEN, F. 
PLATO. The Republic. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1994. Reprint 1998. Transl. by 
WATERFIELD, Robin. 
99 
 
RUSSELL, Bertrand. The Problems of Philosophy. 1912. Reprint. Oxford. Oxford University 
Press. 2001.  
Secondary Literature 
BLENKINSOPP, Sean. Martin Buber: Educating for Relationship in Ethics, Place and 
Environment, Vol. 8, No. 3, October 2005. pp. 285–307 London. Routledge. Taylor and 
Francis Group. 2005. 
 
BRUEGGEMANN, Walter. The Theology of the Old Testament, Testimony, Dispute and 
Advocacy. Minneapolis. Fortress Press. 1997. 
FRIEDMAN, Maurice. Martin Buber – A Life of Dialogue. University of Chicago Press 
Chicago, Illinois. 1955. 
KAUFMAN, William E. Martin Buber: Can God be Encountered in Contemporary Jewish 
Philosophies. New York. Reconstructionist Press and Behrman House. 1976. 
NEUSNER, Jacob, Invitation to the Talmud. Binghamton. Global Publications. 2001. 
PIVCHEVICH, Ivo. Husserl and Phenomenology. London. Hutchinson University Library. 
1970. 
SCHOLEM, Gershom. Davidova Hvězda. Transl. by BLAHOVA, Alena. Prague. 
Nakladatelství Franze Kafky.1995. 
SCHILPP, P. A. and FRIEDMAN, Maurice, eds. The Philosophy of Martin Buber, La Salle. 
Open Court. 1967. 
- BALTHASAR, Hans Urs von. Martin Buber and Christianity. 
- BROD, Max. Judaism and Christianity in Buber’s Work. 
- BERGMAN, Hugo, Martin Buber and Mysticism. 
- BRUNNER, Emil. Judaism and Christianity. 
- DIAMOND, Malcolm L. Dialogue and Theology.  
- FACKENHEIM, Emil L., Buber’s Concept of Revelation. 
- FOX, Marvin. Some Problems in Buber’s Moral Philosophy.  
100 
 
- GLATZER, Nahum N., Buber as Interpreter of the Bible. 
- LÉVINAS, Emmanuel, Martin Buber and the Theory of Knowledge.    
- MARCEL, Gabriel. I and Thou. 
- MUILENBURG, James, Buber as Interpreter of the Bible. 
SHASHAR, Michael. Hovory o Bohu a Světě s Ješajahu Leibowitzem. Prague. Sefer. 1996. 
Transl. by BLAHOVÁ Alena.  
STEINSALTZ, Adin. The Essential Talmud. Reprint. New Jersey. Jason Aronson Inc Edition. 
1992. 
YOVEL, Yirmayahu. The Marrano of Reason. Princeton. Princeton University Press. 1990.  
 
III. Study Aids 
The Holy Bible – Revised Standard Version in Bible WorksTm. – Electronic Reference and 
Database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
101 
 
APPENDIX: Contents and pagination of the bound version of this Thesis: 
For technical reasons the pagination of the paper version of thesis thesis differs slightly from 
the bound version. The following represents the contents and page number information of the 
paper version. 
                         The  Notion of YHVH in the Thought of Martin Buber 
Contents 
Introduction………………………………………………………………………….Page 1 
Part I: The Notion of YHVH Martin Buber’s Biblical Theology 
 
1.3. YHVH’s Relation to Man in the Bible.......................................................................4 
1.1.1. YHVH’s Nature; His Dialogic and Personal Immediacy...........................................4 
1.1.2. The Dialogue through the Prophets.............................................................................9 
1.1.3. The Ethical Dimension................................................................................................14 
 
1.2. Buber’s polemic with institutional religion..................................................................17 
1.2.1. The Encroachment of Religious Legalism and Ritualism on the Dialogic and 
Immediate Relation...............................................................................................................17 
1.2.2. The building of Temples and Idolatry.......................................................................21 
 
1.3. Critical assessment of Buber’s Hermeneutics of the Old Testament.........................25 
 
1.4. Buber and Christianity...................................................................................................31 
1.4.1. Judaism and Christianity............................................................................................31 
1.4.2. The Heart of Buber’s polemic with Christianity......................................................36 
1.4.3. God’s hidenness............................................................................................................41 
 
1.5. Critical assessment of Buber’s thoughts on  Christianity…………………………...43 
102 
 
 
1.6. The Problem of Theodicy...............................................................................................47 
1.6.1. The Mystery and Paradox of Suffering.....................................................................47 
1.6.2. The Redemptive Nature of Vicarious Suffering.......................................................51 
 
Part II: The implicit notion of YHVH in the philosophical thought of Martin Buber....55 
 
2.0. Buber’s Dialogue with Some Past Thinkers: The Problem of Man…………………55 
2.1. The I-Thou and Dialogical Philosophy of Martin Buber.............................................58 
2.1.1. The Wholeness of Being in the Immediacy of the I-Thou Relation..........................58 
2.1.2. Dialogue and Relation...................................................................................................63 
 
2.2. The Ethical Dimensions and Consequences of Martin Buber’s I-Thou Philosophy 
2.2.1. The Encroachment of I-It on Genuine, Dialogical Relation.....................................69 
2.2.2. Buber, Religion and Philosophy..................................................................................74 
 
2.3. The Permeation of the I-Thou Primary into Daily Life in the Practical Sense. 
2.3.1. Education and Character Formation.........................................................................78 
2.3.2. The I-Thou Primary’s Inclusion in the Field of Psychology……….……………...85 
 
3.0. Conclusion.......................................................................................................................90 
 
4.0. Bibliography.....................................................................................................................93 
 
 
 
103 
 
 
 
